Rhodesian Air Force Operations

 Sample of the book

Intro by Tol Janeke - Prop has dedicated this book to his wife Rina and everyone mentioned in its pages. But it certainly covers a far greater readership than mentioned in his dedication. He has painstakingly and methodically recorded the history, not only of the airmen who were privileged to fly the aircraft involved in the air strikes, but so many others. All the wonderful support given by men and women within the Air Force and by the sister Services. And then there were the civilians who gave of their precious time to become members of the Volunteer Reserve and the Police Reserve Air Wing. Their names too you will find in these pages, meticulously recorded and indexed for the generations still to come. Here are the names of soldiers, policemen and internal affairs, men and women who added to the often unheralded courage behind the exciting story of these air strikes. The troops on the ground and those that flew in our aircraft with us, some of whom hated leaving their own familiar environment on the ground and in the bush. Whilst the recording of all these air strikes in itself is a fascinating story, none of the almost clinical efficiency of this small Force could have happened if it were not for the many years of training and development that preceded the conflict. Certainly based upon the methods and structure of the pre-war Royal Air Force, the solid foundations of the Rhodesian Air Force were set in the Second World War. A spirit of comradeship and loyalty developed within this, by world standards, tiny unit, which drew the admiration of even the dissenters of Rhodesia. For those of us who were part of this Air Force there was a special feeling of belonging. A pride that was quite extraordinary that in turn developed magnificent morale and the will to succeed. For most of the participants mentioned in this book the culmination of the war has lead to very different lives in Civvy Street. Many have become successful in their second careers, but very few indeed have again experienced the wonderful comradeship, passion and dedication they experienced in the Air Force. To those historians and collectors of militaria, this book is one that fills in much detail. It shows how operations in Rhodesia started slowly and built up to a situation where virtually the entire country became involved. The mass of little numbered dots on the maps shows the position of widespread strikes in all the operational areas. To the very end the Air Force kept up its valiant task of securing the airspace for our troops, the BSAP, the farmers and industry. This in addition to the direct support for those missions across the borders. By retaining centralised command it was possible to provide air fire power into all corners of the country. Often a single aircraft and its crew were carrying out strikes in three different areas of the country in a single day. And this from an Air Force that should have, in the words of our detractors, “ceased to exist” many years before the end of the war. I am often asked whether I regret my involvement in the Rhodesian conflict. To this I can honestly say an emphatic no. At the time the Southern tip of Africa was undergoing massive political change. In its own way the long drawn out battle gave the Southern African countries time to mature and to reflect. Time for the erstwhile colonies of Europe to reconsider the wisdom of the hurried abandonment of their responsibilities to their erstwhile territories. South Africa was given the time to recognise the futility of its policies and to recognise the need for a negotiated change. Also it showed the communist countries that their philosophies would not prevail in Southern Africa. The more pertinent question should be ‘what would Southern Africa look like now if Rhodesians had abandoned their duties and the Air force had not played its crucial role in the war’? To have been part of these historic times was in itself reward enough. To have contributed in a small way to them made the reward even greater. Prop has acknowledged that even this record is not complete. There are bound to be errors where records have been destroyed or are not accessible. It is important therefore that these gaps be filled in and corrections made while many of those who took part in the air strikes are still alive and have personal records reflecting the history. It is a history which deserves to be recorded. This book will keep alive the memory of an outstanding Air Force fighting for a special country and its extraordinary people. F.D Janeke Westville, Durban May 2007

The first edition was launched in July 2007, at the Virginia Air Show. The response and demand has been very encouraging and a reprint was done – after a special appeal to delete a small section about spilling the beans how the ‘Rhodesian Security Force’ (RSF) historical records came to be in the United Kingdom. This request was acceded to, despite the information already readily available in the public domain. The updated edition contained a few more Operations and Air Strikes, more maps, a couple of first hand accounts, many corrections and a few book reviews which have been re-produced on the back cover. This led to more Army colleagues asking me to change or delete ‘political sensitive’ revelations – which I have now again agreed to. However, the deletions were more than adequately off-set with further Operations and Air Strike inputs, so much so that splitting the book into two volumes again made this a more viable proposition. I am grateful to everyone who made a contribution to this more up-to-date and improved edition, and especially those who gave me copyright permission to re-use their drawings, maps, air strikes and stories.

OPERATION THRASHER: FEBRUARY 1976 The Thrasher operational area officially opened in February 1976 – and was charged with the responsibility for the Eastern Districts; from north of Inyanga to south of Mount Selinda. FAF 6 was established at Chipinga, and FAF 8 at Grand Reef [FAF 7, initially at Chiredzi and later moved to Buffalo Range, was established before FAF 8 Grand Reef / Umtali]. The so-called ZIPA, which was a failed attempt to unify the ZANLA and ZIPRA terrorists, was formed on the 12th November 1975, and commanded by Rex Nhongo. Under duress from the Front Line States, particularly Samora Machel, the renewed offensive should have commenced before Christmas Day 1976. This did not get off the ground until January when 400 terrorists were deployed in Tete (Op Hurricane area). 150 were deployed in the Manica Province and somewhat less than 150 into Gaza. 90 terrorists crossed into Rhodesia on 21st January 1976 south of Nyamapanda. The Rhodesian forces made contact the next morning, killing four and capturing one. The capture revealed that he was part of the “simultaneous” three-pronged infiltration. The plan did not work in that the second assault in the Melsetter area by 130 terrorists took place some five weeks later (and the third lot in the south-eastern area – Operation Repulse area – took place seven weeks later). This also explains why FAF 6 was established before FAF 8. AIR STRIKE LOG – I FEBRUARY 1976 No Date Aircrew Target Aircraft Weapons Result 284 01/02/76 Hurricane Trevor Troup / Boertjie Becker Pete Simmonds / Doug Sinclair Karl Volker / Maplot Pretorius Ten terrs at VS740333, 7nm northeast Kotwa – and west of Nyamapanda. (Choppers based Kotwa) Alouette III G-Car 7514 Alouette III 160x20mm cannon, 750 7.62mm MAG, 75x.303 The terrs opened fire on the helicopters. Six terrs killed, two wounded and captured. Simmonds slightly wounded (after relay change Nyamapanda – Police hit landmine). 10 RR pax also hit and wounded by ground fire. Aircraft moved from Kotwa to Mudzi on 8 February 1976. Pete Simmonds writes: “My tech was Doug Sinclair and we were based at Kotwa. I was called to do a relay change on a huge granite 'gomo' (hill) by the border, just north of Nyamapanda. A map will show you which one because it is so big and stands alone. On the way back to Kotwa I saw a Police Landrover carefully driving along the border road beneath the gomo and remarked to Doug that they were on a dirt road and must be shitting themselves worrying about land mines. We landed at Kotwa about 15 miles away a few minutes later and we heard the land mine that took them out go off just after our engines wound down. We both knew exactly where the next call out was going to be and a few seconds later the siren went off in the ops tent. I didn’t need to go to the ops tent to get the grid reference and we were hurriedly refuelling when the other crew came galloping out to the soccer field where the aircraft were all parked. They took off with the available browns onboard that were from 10th Battalion (Bulawayo). They were a very upbeat and aggressive bunch of guys, looking for a war to fight. Trevor Troup, flying the K-Car, led the formation out to the Landrover and put trackers down. “Doug and I eventually finished refuelling and couldn’t find enough soldiers to take from Kotwa out there until the 2i/c, a Captain, managed to get a cook, himself and a couple of hangers-on together, one with an MAG machine gun. We then caught up with the rest of the formation going round in circles while the trackers tried to find a direction of flight. I decided not to go all the way to the landmine site and as I had heard that the tracks were initially heading north I tried to put myself into the minds of the terrs and guess where they would have gone. They couldn’t go east out of the country because that was where the gomo was. They were unlikely to carry on north because their tactic was never to keep going in the same direction as their initial line of flight. South had some open land and the main road to Moçambique for them to cross and west, deeper into Rhodesia, had a tree filled river line that would have given them a bit of cover. I followed the river West at low level with my cook and bottle washers. “The 2i/c was under strict doctor's orders to do no heavy physical work while on his call up because he had a bad knee that continually popped out of its joint when he tried to run or jump - so we were trying to be the last chopper called upon to put troops on the ground. He had been assigned to taking care of the ops room for the duration of their call up. Since there literally wasn’t anyone else available to make up the 4th member of the stick he decided to go against his doctor’s orders. As we were flying along the river line at about 100 kts and 100 ft AGL the machine gunner with the MAG saw the group of terrs and promptly opened fire which was against all his training and orders. It gave Doug and me the fright of our lives but by then we were coming under heavy fire from the terrs that had been waiting for us to fly over them. “Two bullets came through the cockpit, one went through the perspex in front of my feet and the other came from behind on my right. 7 Sqn had very recently installed a more protective seat that was made of 1/4 inch solid steel and gave protection from under the thighs just behind the knees around the important parts if you like 'wimmin', and up the sides to include the small of the back. I was thrown forward as the bullet hit the seat about one inch below the lip inline with my spine and bounced off into the knee of the trooper sitting in the centre rear seat. He naturally began making a few complaints and Doug plus the machine gunner blasted away while I called Trevor Company over. Some shrapnel went over the seat into my back. As Trevor arrived overhead and was able to bring his K-Car 20 mm cannon into use, I was landing 1/2 a mile further West where the terrs were moving. The three remaining 10 Battalion guys jumped out of my chopper and the 2i/c's knee joint popped out as he deplaned next to me. The terrs were very close and about to come over a rise when one of the soldiers grabbed his Captains leg, put his foot into the Capt.’s crotch and hauled the leg back into alignment. They then got up and went hobbling into ambush positions. “I left with my casualty who amazingly was not complaining much and wanted to be on the ground with his pals. The bullet was deep in his knee joint and must have been bloody sore. We got him to a doctor quickly and in the meantime Trevor and his Tech/gunner were having a field day along with my stick that had the terrs running past their position. I can’t remember the kill and capture count but when it was all over everyone was full of shit about the punch up. In fact Karl Volker was so excited during one of his refuels in Kotwa that he decided to give the very few people left there a bit of a beat up and a fancy turn at low level across the soccer field. Unfortunately he was too low and collected a wooden goal post with one of his blades. The chopper didn’t like flying with the imbalance in the blades and as it came round to land on the field it sounded awful. I also noticed he was giving his Tech 'a very severe listening to' while they touched down and until well after the blades had come to a halt. Trevor’s Tech was beside himself with excitement and was able to claim at least a couple of the kills. As for Doug and I, we were just very lucky that the MAG gunner opened up on the terrs ahead of them firing at us because it kept their heads down long enough to prevent any real damage to our chopper. The shrapnel in my back has come out a piece or two at a time every few years but if it hadn’t been for the new seat which I was using for the first time, the bullet would have cleanly gone through my spine. A very close shave indeed!” AIRSTRIKE LOG 287 – 7 FEBRUARY 1976 No Date Aircrew Target Aircraft Results 287 07/02/76 Repulse (External) Mike Litson / Hansi Steyn Dave Johnston / Roelf Oeloffse Kevin Peinke / Steve Stead Dick Paxton / Steve Russell Ken Newman / Frank Robinson Michael Borlace / Pat Graham VN685273, 23 n.m. south of Chipinga – in Moçambique K-Car G-Car G-Car G-Car G-Car G-Car Intensive fire from terrs. Four terrs captured. Terr on bicycle should have been in the Olympics because he pedalled so fast! The above airstrike was recalled thus by Mike Borlace: “This was an external attack on Espungabera. I'm pretty sure Baldi Baldwin was involved in this in a K-Car - probably there were two fireforces brought together - as he made the comment in his report that some gook on a bicycle that he was firing at should have been in the Olympics he was pedalling so fast”. OPERATION SMALL BANG: FEBRUARY 1976 Operation Small Bang was a Fire Force assault, with Hunter airstrikes, on a ZANLA base at Pafuri on 24th February 1976. Special Branch intelligence stated that the south-west of Rhodesia was targeted by ZANLA as a vital supply route for Rhodesia because of its road and rail connections with South Africa. ZANLA, with its Moçambique connections, was anxious to capitalise on the railway and road running from Lourenço Marques to Malvernia, as an infiltration route. The route favoured by ZANLA to get to the Sengwe and Mtetengwe Tribal Trust Lands in the Beit Bridge area, was a dirt road running from the railway line to Pafuri where the borders of Moçambique, South Africa and Rhodesia all met. The Special Branch had information from a recent capture that ZANLA had a transit camp sited just north of Pafuri that contained about thirty terrorists. By 23rd February 1976, the assault force consisting of one K-Car and three G-Cars with an infantry force of Rhodesian African Rifles moved to Mabalauta – about thirty five minutes’ flying time from Pafuri. A Selous Scouts reconnaissance team was tasked to take the RAR stop groups to the vicinity of the camp. The plan called for a surprise airstrike by the Hunters, with close air support from the Fire Force, with the intention of netting any escaping gooks by the RAR/SS stopper groups. During the early hours of the 24th, the reconnaissance groups led in ten stop groups, each comprising four soldiers, and pre-positioned them on the outskirts of the transit camp. However, as the Selous Scouts were in the process of setting up electronically detonated flares as target markers for the Hunter airstrike, the Scouts encountered two sentries. When challenged, the Scouts fired at the sentries, who then dropped their weapons and fled. Having been compromised, with the element of surprise lost, the Scouts had no option but to call for the Hunter airstrike to commence sooner than planned. Also, the helicopter-borne force could do nothing to arrive any earlier, in view of their flight time from Mabalauta. A sweep of the area located three dead terrorists, five firearms, a large amount of ammunition and a quantity of useful documents. Radio intercepts established afterwards that the raid had disrupted the planned incursion. Forty-one terrorist survivors had fled into the bush in disorder, and independently made their way back to the ZANLA headquarters in Mapai. Operation Small Bang was thus not as successful as the SAS raid of the ZIPRA PEA base in Zambia during Operation Big Bang. However, I trust that the developments in the south-east prompted the Air Force to move me from FAF 2 Kariba to FAF 7 at Chiredzi/Buffalo Range. MAVUE ATTACK – 24 FEBRUARY 1976 & AIR STRIKE LOG 306 – 28 FEBRUARY 1976 This was a successful external attack by the Air Force, SAS, 1RAR and the Mortar Detachment School of Infantry (Gwelo) in the Gaza Province of Moçambique. The target was a ZANLA camp at Mavue, grid ref VM 398428, the attack resulted in 17 ZANLA terrorists killed, 8 wounded and one captured. The radio and radio room was totally destroyed and various weapons and equipment captured. This Repulse operation was followed four days later by an equally successful Hurricane operation, as detailed by the Air Strike Log below. Pete Simmonds recalls: “On 28/02/76 my K-Car was 5701, with my Tech Allan Hutchings. This was our biggest Op to that stage in the war. I remember it well. I was on bloody standby that day so when shots were heard coming from a village in the night, it was I who had to get up at 4am and fly the trackers to the village and reach there as the dawn cracked. The tracker's name was Smith and he was from the Game Department on call up. After dropping him with his team at the village, Hansi Steyn and I came back for breakfast by way of a little hovering and unnecessary farting about near the sleeping billets. It was a nasty, irritating trick but everyone did it for a while so it was my opportunity for some pay back time. There is no mention in the strike report that day of the Lynx pilot who I seem to remember was Phil Haigh. Throughout the day Phil was busy scouting around in liaison with the trackers, trying to read the 'line of flight' and doing a good catching up job by leapfrogging two sets of trackers along various paths with the help of a G-Car. The other tracker group, also made up of Game Dept bods, was led by a good friend of mine from school called Howard Shackleton. No Date Aircrew Target Aircraft Ammo Results 306 28/02/76 Hurricane Pete Simmonds / Hansi Steyn Ray Fitzpatrick / Thomas Steve Baldwin / Frank Robinson George Sole / Pat Graham Mike Litson / John Britton Allan Hutchings / Eddie Strever Gavie Venter / Stapelberg Reynolds / Jakes Jacobs (SAAF) US673678, 17 n.m. north east of Mount Darwin K-Car 5701 K-Car G-Car G-Car G-Car G-Car Z-Car Z-Car 170x20mm 215x20mm cannon shells 502x7.62mm MAG 17 killed and one wounded captured. Comment: An extremely good show and team work superb. See also write-up below by Pete Simmonds “By 2pm we were getting close to a group of what we thought were 12 terrs so I was sent up in the K-Car by OC FAF4, Tol Janeke, to be on hand if needed. The Army Boss with Hansi and I in the K-Car was Maj. Matkovitch of 1RLI and he decided to bolster the trackers with two sticks of 1 Commando troops. Baldy was looking after the G-Cars on the ground at Karanda Mission airstrip, which was nearby. When the trackers decided we were within 5 minutes of the group it was obvious a contact was imminent so I asked Baldy to bring in Yellow formation and their fire force. He took only ten minutes to reach us but our troops on the ground had already run into an ambush right in front of my eyes. I had been drinking with 1 Commando the night before and could easily recognise the men whom I had been with. It was awful to watch some of them go down obviously badly wounded. We opened fire and the terrs began to break up and leave the ambush area by the time Baldy brought in more troops and provided the casevacs we needed for about 6 badly wounded men. The extraction from the ambush area was fraught with danger due to the proximity of the terrs but Baldy and his team got the casevacs out fast while Hansi blasted away at the moving targets. “Then our firing pin broke. We lost 4 soldiers in that ambush including the tracker Smith, Cpl Cookson, Tpr Dietricks and Colour Sgt Pete (Bronzi) White. One of them died in Baldy's aircraft while he was flying him to Karanda Mission. Ray Fitzpatrick brought in a spare K-Car from Darwin and took over from me, as I was low on fuel. The Army continued the follow up and Ray and his Tech had a field day with their 20mm cannon. When he was low on fuel I went back to the contact area and as we landed in a mealie field nearby to get the firing pin from Ray's cannon, we flew right over a terrorist no more than 20 feet below us. Ray was coming into land just behind me and he saw the terr put his hands up when he came into the hover next to me. Ray hovered so that his gun was pointing at the terr and for some reason the terr picked up his AK47 from the ground and pointed it at Ray. Before he could pull his trigger, Ray's tech, du Preez, had planted about 10 rounds in him and he was gone in a second. Hansi collected the firing pin from Ray's aircraft and we went on with the contact. Dave Bourhill put in some strikes with the Provost on one target and at another stage I noticed a terrorist doing about 40 miles an hour along the ground quite far from the original contact area. We had been told to use our 20 mm shells sparingly so I asked Mike Litson to come in with his Tech John Britton and to see if they couldn’t do something about it. I thought that they would have a go at him with the MAG to induce a surrender so I was very surprised when I saw Mike land near the now exhausted gook. John Britton came out of the G-Car before the chopper had landed properly and rugby tackled the terr. from the side. “This was our only capture from the contact which we needed badly for the intelligence he could give us and I always have felt that JB deserved a commendation for his brave efforts. The terrorist later told us that the original group of 12 that we had been following all day had joined with a further 30 terrs just before we made contact with them. This meant there had been over 40 of them waiting for us in the ambush. The contact was deemed to have been a success but we had lost 4 of our friends and comrades from the RLI so the contact really had a very bittersweet ending”. AIR STRIKE LOG 318 – 27 MARCH 1976 No Date Aircrew Target Aircraft Results 318 27/03/76 Hurricane Cocky Benecke Mark McLean / Bert Keightley Perry Childs / du Preez Michael Borlace / Mike Upton Hutchings / Eddie Strever Slade Healey / Kreil (SAAF) Daryl Squance VS534739, 12 n.m. north east of Marymount – on Moçambique border Provost 3601 G-Car 5719 K-Car 5637 G-Car 7524 G-Car 5773 Z-Car 5771 Lynx 3401 Several signals received. Major Ainslie killed by ground fire. Perry Childs wounded by flying shrapnel. Mike Borlace / Mike Upton shot down, rescued by Dick Paxton. This airstrike is described by Mike Borlace: “This started off with the “Mudzi” fireforce being called to a perfect Scouts' set-up. It had been requested to get the Darwin fireforce joined up but this was denied. Ainslie got shot during the talk-on - only two bullets hit the K-Car both of which hit Ainslie and killed him and either shrapnel from them or one of the rounds also wounded Perry Childs. Mike Upton and I were in 7524 which had about twenty hours total time on it and were involved in a very fierce low-level gunfight with the gooks that were trapped on a small feature surrounded by open ground. Upton used all of our ammo and then that from the army MAG and the K-Car flew off with Ainslie and for some reason the other (SAAF) G-Car went with them. We eventually got shot down and Darryl - I think it may have been his first contact - tried to keep the gooks contained putting in rocket attacks, until eventually the Darwin fireforce arrived, far too late to be of any effect. Paxton saw our helo on the ground and assumed it was some sort of refuelling point, came into land and was amazed to find myself and Mufti leaping aboard before he touched down almost, with big eyes and exhortations to Foxtrot Oscar out of here.” OPERATION REPULSE: FAF 7 - BUFFALO RANGE: 16 MARCH 1976 I reported for duty on 16th March 1976 as Officer Commanding FAF 7. My appointment as OC FAF 7 lasted till November, and I was fortunate to witness the rapid development of field operations, as well as some historical external offensive joint-services co-operation. Had I jumped the gun? Most sources give 1 May 1976 as the start of Operation Repulse. My posting was thus some six weeks prior to the event! My reporting was to Boss Tol Janeke, based at Air Detachment Repulse, Fort Victoria. It will be recalled that he was my 2 Squadron Vampire, and 5 Squadron Canberra boss. FAF 7 was hard work. No 107 VR (Lowveld) Squadron, commanded by Squadron Leader Steve Fenton-Wells, was based in Chiredzi. Their personnel provided the FAF with the bulk of the Voluntary Ops officers, whereas the Bulawayo VR Squadron provided mainly Camp Commandants. My work was made a lot easier because of the highly competent Air Force volunteer personnel. The FAF was still at Chiredzi when I arrived to take up my new challenge. I took over from Squadron Leader John Digby, who then returned to Thornhill after his six-week stint. My appointment would last several months. I was instrumental in the decision to accelerate our move to Buffalo Range - much to the dislike of Camp Commandant Squadron Leader Peter Corbishley. Peter was the OC 101 (VR) Squadron - based in Bulawayo. The reason for our disagreement was that the new Air Force base constructions taking place at Buffalo Range had not yet been completed. I contended that the sooner we got there, the sooner we would settle in and establish ourselves. Works 1 at Air Force Headquarters, Squadron Leader Murray Hofmeyr, was doing a sterling job with the erection of pine constructed buildings as well as building brick and mortar billets, plus decent ablutions. I also felt that we would be better able to provide recreational facilities the sooner we occupied Buffalo Range. Top of the list was to build a pub from bar profits. We commissioned local builder Tom Preston who was quite happy to deploy his building gang to the FAF whenever sufficient funds were in the kitty. Tom even carried our debt, and would continue the work even though the cash had not come in yet. Tom Preston survived the war, and became rich in the process – even establishing his own private air charter business. I might add that the managing director of Triangle Estates, Terry Goss, funded the roof of our FAF pub. We had invited all the local dignitaries to the opening of our self-help project – hoping that some kind sponsor would come forward. Terry Goss was so impressed with our initiative in raising non-public funds, that he did not bat an eyelid when we hinted that donations from local business would be most welcome. The developers of the Buffalo Range Township, Rod and Clive Styles were also local personalities of note. It also needs to be said that all the Volunteer personnel contributed with their excellent powers of persuasion – like Camp Commandants Peter Corbishley and Ernie Deysel. Ernie was the elder brother of Air Force ‘jam-stealer’ Dux Deysel – they were both national rugby heroes. I wish to single out one particular VR Operations Officer, Peter Hingeston, who was a very successful sugar cane farmer in the Triangle area. He came from a military family (son of the well-known Brigadier Hingeston), and took to his duties like a duck to water. I felt quite comfortable for Peter to make operational decisions in my absence. John Fairlie, Steve Duvanage, Ian Stein, Titch de Waal, Jeremy Baldwin, and a host of other 107 (VR) Squadron personnel made a significant contribution to the war effort. In addition to the VR, we also had, and made good use, of local PRAW – Police Reserve Air Wing pilots. I recall Alistair Davies, a private sugar cane farmer at Mkwasine, who owned a Cherokee Six aircraft, which came in very useful for stretcher casevacs. Alistair also shared the Telstar roles with another Mkwasine PRAW pilot named Eric Harrison. Eric owned a Mooney. The FAF also had its fair share of Air Force aircraft – and I took a lot of pride when the special aircraft revetments were constructed at the FAF – providing protection against mortar and RPG-7 fire. These consisted of 44-gallon drums filled with sand, two rows of two drums about forty feet apart (to hangar Provost and Trojan aircraft, as well as the Alouette helicopters), with another single row of drums on top. These high walls then supported two layers of wire netting to catch any mortar bombs in the event of the FAF coming under terrorist attack. The hardstanding was soon littered with these neat rows of aircraft revetments. Gun pits were also constructed, and manned initially by elements of the Volunteer Reserve, and later by the Air Force Regiment, supported by AFVs – Armoured Fighting Vehicles. Airfield defence took up a fair amount of time and energy. I recall doing a perimeter patrol one night and stopped to chat to one of the security chaps. This particular Volunteer Reservist, with the lowly rank of Aircraftman, turned out to be none other than a very senior manager with the Cold Storage Commission. When I volunteered to support a military deferment at best, or possibly even a military exemption at least, the fellow pleaded in the strongest of terms. Despite my argument that it would be in the national interest for him to continue his sanctions-busting activities in exporting Rhodesian Beef, he maintained that his bush trips to guard aircraft was in fact a tonic to his hectic lifestyle. He had no qualms patrolling airfields and guarding aircraft in the middle of the night – it was a complete change to the stressful challenge of devising schemes to get our Rhodesian beef into Europe, North Africa and elsewhere. Having a military job to do that carried no responsibilities (or ‘rank’, for that matter) made no difference to him. I could only respond and say “Sir, I salute you.” Steve Fenton-Wells was also a local sugar cane farmer and was very partial to supporting the Selous Scouts, who were also building their 'fort' at Buffalo Range. If anything, Steve was somewhat biased towards the Scouts, and started to fall from favour as the appointed Volunteer Squadron Commander. The local chemist, Dave Sinclair, duly replaced him. Steve followed all the pseudo operations with keen interest, and his contacts with Special Branch Intelligence proved to be a valuable resource. I got more intelligence information from Steve than I was able to glean from the regular soldiers. Unfortunately, Steve did not survive the Bush War – he died of a heart attack some time after I left the FAF. Operation Detachment commenced shortly after my arrival at the FAF, and was but one of many during my tour of duty that lasted until mid November, early December. In fact, quite a lot happened during my couple of months as OC FAF 7. In many respects, it represented a turning point in my Air Force career, as well as a turning point for Rhodesia, as a country we knew and served loyally. We certainly were living in significant and historical times. I was also on the spot to witness the transition of a respectable “civilian airport” into a rugged military establishment. The Air Force built its camp quite close to the Air Traffic Control Building cum Tower. We could easily get meteorological info and get our flight plans done. The Selous Scouts built their fort further away, to our west. When the Army guys eventually settled in, they unfortunately chose the extreme western area, near the threshold of runway 13, and it meant quite a footslog to attend the daily JOC meetings and briefings. Their disadvantage was the distance to the aircraft. However, as the Fire Force concepts developed during the course of the bush war, it was essential that the aircrews were near the main Ops Rooms for their deployment briefings. Because of the vastly superior Brownjob numbers on the FAF, the Forces Canteen was eventually constructed near the Army camp. One No 4 Squadron pilot who served FAF 7 with distinction was Air Lieutenant Kevin “Cocky” Benecke. Cocky had qualified as an IS Pilot in April 1973 and by April 1976 had gained the justifiable reputation as an exceptional air reconnaissance pilot. His perseverance and determination provided accurate intelligence, which led to numerous successful contacts with terrorists. He was also an outstanding close support, ground attack pilot, and his FAC – Forward Air Controlling skills in directing jet aircraft strikes on to enemy positions became legendary. But I also remember Cocky as a handful – he had an airhostess girlfriend who used to visit him during scheduled Air Rhodesia flights into Buffalo Range. As OC FAF 7 I had the unique opportunity to meet and work with a large variety of military personnel and Brownjob units. On occasions Generals Peter Walls and Sandy McLean would accompany senior Air Staff officers during flying visits to the various units in the field. Brigadier Barnard was also a personality of note, and I remember him as a professional soldier who listened to grass roots opinions (my one discussion that comes quickly to mind was the temporary siteing of a sub-JOC (Joint Operations Command) at the Rutenga rail-head). Army Units that one came into daily contact with included the SAS, RLI, RAR, Artillery, Engineers, Rhodesian Regiments, Grey Scouts and the thorn in my side (for Op Parker abuse), the Selous Scouts. It is perhaps opportune to mention, in particular, the second Battalion of the RAR – Rhodesian African Rifles. They had established their battalion headquarters at Fort Victoria, and as a result thereof, tended to deploy their Companies essentially in the Operation Repulse sphere. Ever since my Operation Nickel days, I have held the RAR in high regard. Here I wish to single out the men of “A” Company, 2 RAR, ably commanded by Major André Dennison. Factually, “A” Company was the best Fire Force produced by the RAR during the war. During the period September 1976 to June 1978 this Company killed 364 terrorists and captured 39. Most, but not all, of these kills were as a result of fireforce actions. I got to know and respect André Dennison for his dynamic leadership of his white-officered black soldiers. André regrettably did not survive the war – he was killed in a skirmish. During the winter of 1976, No 3 Commando of the RLI was deployed in the vast Gonarezhou game reserve to the south of FAF 7. The terrain between the Lundi and Nuanetsi Rivers is flat and parched. However, along the rivers the foliage is lush and thick with buffalo grass and majestic mahogany trees. Water, in general during the winter months, is in short supply, both for the gooks and our security forces. The Commando had been despatched there to patrol the reserve and search for terrorist entry points into the country. Our Ops Officers at the FAF would be kept informed as to security force movements, in the event of air resupply or Telstar duty needs. The Army used A63 radios, which proved reliable during Operation Nickel and Cauldron; but they were now also starting to use the longer-range TR48 radio sets. GENTO ATTACK: 20 & 31 APRIL 1976 The SAS successfully attacked a FRELIMO stronghold at Gento, grid ref VS 502843 in the Tete Province of Moçambique on 20th and 31st April 1976. 5 FPLM were killed, one wounded and three reported missing. On the day before the latter - 30th April – two FRELIMO were killed and six wounded in an SAS attack at an FPLM Central Base at Seçuranca, also Tete Province. OPERATION TRAVELLER: 25 to 27th APRIL 1976 Operation Traveller was a Selous Scout attack on the Caponda Base, about fifty-five kilometres north of the Rhodesian border. The Scouts didn’t fancy a long foot-slog and were granted a concession to use helicopters to take them, plus two forty-four gallon drums of water, to a point half way to the target. A first abortive attack on Caponda was carried out during March 1975. However, a recently captured contact-man squealed to the Special Branch that the Caponda ZANLA staging post had again been brought into use. Granting the Scouts the use of helicopters to save them some boot leather eased limitations as to Air Force air support. A further restriction was that no evidence was to be left behind which could pinpoint Rhodesian involvement. A twenty-man shoot and scoot strike force was decided on – get in quick, get out quick – and minimise the risk of enemy follow-up. On 25th April 1976, No 7 Squadron flew the Scouts into Moçambique, to the agreed drop zone. From there, the soldiers marched to the target area, arriving on the evening of the 26th. Whilst most of the call-sign caught a bit of shut-eye, a small reconnaissance group was sent to see whether any changes had taken place. None had. The attack was launched at 05h50, with the Scouts directing their fire at a brick building believed to contain the ZANLA armoury cum-command element, and eight thatched bashas. During the sweep, one terrorist mistook the pseudo Scouts as one of their own, and was shot. Forty SKS rifles, a number of sixty-millimetre mortar bombs, clothing, blankets, camouflage uniforms and medical supplies were destroyed. A register listing the names all the terrorists who had passed through the base, and the serial numbers of weapons issued to them, and their destinations, plus the names of contact men in the Nehanda sector was a major find. The task force returned by helicopter to Rhodesia, without further incident. A subsequent radio intercept stated that seven ZANLA terrorists had been killed in the attack, and another sixteen who were wounded, were treated medically at Mague village. AIR STRIKE LOG 346

Recalled by Mike Borlace: “Alouette 7524 had just been rebuilt from its previous prang. The RLI had taken severe casualties and were pinned down close to the gooks. Having told the K-Car to move aside, Cocky and I devised a plan to extricate these guys and we landed the G-Car to coincide with his airstrike, which was about ten metres from us. I have an idea this may have been one of the last strikes of the war from a Provost. (This particular helicopter which we had acquired brand new in early 1976, had great difficulty building up hours, it seemed to be an absolute magnet for bullets). The air strike was an early morning callout from Darwin. We basically aerial-tracked a group, dropped some troops to move into an area of bush and the (SAAF) K-Car driver refused to put flushing fire into the bush prior to the troops advancing. At that time only SAAF pilots could fly SAAF aircraft - and the K-Cars were often being piloted by the most inexperienced pilots in the fireforce. Very shortly afterwards, there were two very reasonably successful fireforce actions. Unfortunately one of the casualties - Captain Len Pitch - who had been kept alive in the helo going to Bindura by some major surgery by the RLI doctor - subsequently died of an embolism during an ambulance transfer to Salisbury a few days later. I have to say that this incident coloured my own attitude towards “flushing” or “covering” fire in all future actions, and I would always use the twenty mill cannon despite the ridiculous directives emanating from AHQ about cost and the like. OPERATION DETACHMENT: MAY 1976 Major Butch Duncan was the Selous Scouts Liaison Officer at Chiredzi and was one of the many soldiers whom I got to know during my stint as OC FAF 7. He was tasked to send a mini flying column to attack Chigamane on 13th May 1976 - code-named Operation Detachment. It was also intended to test-run the pseudo Unimogs that resembled FRELIMO transport. Chigamane is a small village and was situated within Moçambique some hundred and eighty kilometres from the Rhodesian border. It was due east from Malvernia as the crow flies. Tim Bax, whom I also got to know quite well, commanded the raid, and blew up an Isuzu truck on the outskirts of the village. They also laid a scattering of Russian TM-46 mines at various points along the route. The Air Force involvement was to provide Telstar radio relay support during their cross-border attack on the ZANLA camps on the fringe of the town. This operation lasted only a day, and Tim Bax was able to cross back into Rhodesia and link up with Major Duncan in the early hours of the following morning. It was typically a Shoot and Scoot exercise. On 28th May 1976, the Scouts mounted another hit and run mission to ambush ZANLA terrorists in transit between Chicualacuala and Malvernia. A five-man patrol set up an ambush on the road leading north-east along the Rhodesian/ Moçambique border inside Moçambique. Their task was to harass ZANLA being transported to infiltration points. Early in the morning a Berliet troop carrier was spotted coming from Malvernia; its occupants were a FRELIMO driver and one guard, so the vehicle was allowed to pass through the ambush killing ground. About five hours later, the six-wheeled troop carrier was again spotted, this time returning with a load of ZANLA terrorists. The ambush was duly sprung, with the activation of a claymore mine. The vehicle was seen to carry on driving, and the Scouts scooted back across the border since they expected immediate follow up by FRELIMO troops. A radio intercept later credited the Scouts with a badly wounded FRELIMO driver and a tally of fourteen ZANLA terrorists killed. Two days later, a Trojan reconnaissance pilot from No 4 Squadron landed at the FAF and reported that he had spotted a large truck, apparently abandoned, in the bush, nearby the scene of the recent ambush site. A Scout patrol re-crossed the border and, working from the directions given by the Air Force pilot, soon located the truck. It was evident that the FRELIMO driver had kept going about three kilometres past the ambush site and was forced to stop because of a puncture from gunfire. Tracks found in the vicinity showed that FRELIMO had sent vehicles to carry away the casualties, but had not bothered to recover their vehicle. It transpired that the only damage was the puncture, which the patrol duly repaired, and drove “Brutus” the Berliet troop carrier back to Rhodesia. Brutus was used for subsequent pseudo operations into Moçambique – with a FRELIMO olive green vehicle that could be easily mistaken for “friendly” transport within Moçambique. Aside from Operation Detachment, numerous other actions were taking place. These included the following short “war stories”. During February 1976, Air Lieutenant “Baldy” Baldwin casevaced wounded security force members during a contact against a large group of terrorists. This was done despite very tight landing zones and whilst under heavy enemy fire. In the same month, Flight Lieutenant Rob McGregor was mentioned in dispatches – as a K-Car commander of a Fire Force action, Rob skilfully directed the positioning of troops as well as directing effective airstrikes during a contact in which a large number of terrorists were killed and others captured. In a separate incident, he gave accurate top cover while another Alouette carried out a tricky casevac. He then returned at night, again under fire, to resupply the ground troops with ammunition. On 28th February 1976, Major Roy Matkovitch, of the 1st Battalion, Rhodesian Light Infantry, was deployed with a Fire Force action against a group of terrorists in the north-eastern operational area. Contact was made in the afternoon, in dense bush, and in the initial clash the Fire Force suffered fairly heavy casualties. Roy maintained a cool head, effectively controlling the air effort, evacuating the casualties, and accounting for seventeen terrorists killed. Roy and I had been at school together (Guinea Fowl) and our paths crossed quite frequently during the course of the Bush War. On Easter Sunday evening 18th April 1976 a group of armed terrorists stopped and robbed two South African tourists, about twelve kilometres south of Nuanetsi, on the Fort Victoria - Beit Bridge road. Whilst the robbery was in progress, four more South African tourists, who were mounted on two motor cycles, arrived on the scene of the hold-up from the north. The terrorists opened fire on the motor cyclists, killing two outright and wounding the other two, one critically. In the confusion, the two motorists managed to get away. Shortly thereafter, a Mr Douglas Plumsteel and his wife Margaret (of Randburg, Johannesburg), drove up. They thought at first that there had been an accident, but a wounded Miss Vonda Davis told them what had happened. Douglas Plumsteel had the presence of mind to turn off his Land-Rovers lights, armed his wife with a revolver and fetched his rifle, and fired into the bush on both sides of the road. While Margaret kept on firing, Douglas lifted the wounded Miss Davis into the Land Rover. When another car drove up, Douglas provided covering fire while the remaining wounded and dead motorcyclists’ bodies were lifted into the vehicles. By now a police patrol had arrived and it escorted the parties to Nuanetsi Police Station, where arrangements were made to fly Miss Davis to Fort Victoria. The critically injured motor cyclist died before reaching Nuanetsi. Douglas and Margaret were awarded the Rhodesian Meritorious Conduct Medal for their bravery – the award being presented to them by the President and Mrs Wrathall. In other contacts, the brave action of Corporal James Makuwa (of 1st Battalion RAR) needs recognition. Corporal James was part of a Fire Force that responded to a call on 30th April 1976 when an Army sub-unit was in contact with about twenty terrorists (three of whom had been killed). James sighted thirteen terrorists attempting to escape from the contact area, called one of the G-Cars and successfully directed air power onto the target. A further two terrorists were killed. Then during follow up, contact was again made and another four terrorists were killed. While regrouping and moving to their rendezvous, Corporal James’ stick came under fire from two terrorists. The fire was returned, resulting in the wounding and capturing of the two terrorists. Corporal James was recommended for immediate promotion to sergeant, but this fine Rhodesian African Rifles soldier was wounded during a follow-up and died of his wounds on 9th May 1976. Another contact occurred on 16th May 1976, involving the BSAP CID and elements of the Rhodesia Regiment. Two members of the Criminal Investigation Department, together with Lance Corporal Malcolm Forsyth of 4th Battalion RR, were investigating damage to a civilian vehicle in the Eastern Border operational area, when they located the spoor of a number of terrorists. The three of them followed the spoor for a short distance and came under fire from about five terrorists just as they were crossing a river. Air support was summoned and with a 7 Squadron Alouette helicopter soon on the scene, with Fire Force gunfire, another successful contact was concluded. Second Lieutenant Dennis Passaportis comes to mind as a very competent and respected Fire Force operator. Dennis also served with the RAR, which I personally had a high regard for. On 13th May 1976, he dropped his stick in an area where about ten terrorists had been contacted. He was superficially wounded and one of his soldiers mortally wounded during a series of running contacts. Despite his predicament, he was able to give calm and accurate target identification for all the aircraft called to carry out airstrikes. Five days later he was involved with another Fire Force callout. On 18th May 1976, the Fire Force commander dropped Dennis’s stick close by the contact to effect a capture, as the terrorist had dropped his weapon some distance away. The terrorist threw a grenade and Dennis and another soldier received serious injuries – the remainder of the stick killed the gook. Despite receiving sixty-two shrapnel wounds from the grenade, Dennis Passaportis was back in the operational area within five weeks. On 17th August 1976, Air Lieutenant Mick Delport was under OCU instruction when the pilot and captain of his aircraft (Cocky Benecke) was injured during an airstrike on a terrorist target. The aircraft sustained aileron damage affecting roll control, and Mick, despite his limited experience on type, took over control of the crippled aircraft and flew it back to base for a safe landing. In order to do justice to this short ‘war story’, I felt it necessary to repeat Cocky’s side of the story (with thanks to Eddy Norris and his ORAFs circulation). Cocky reports thus: - “Grey Scouts were on tracks north-east of Mount Darwin of a group of 40 plus gooks who had crossed the mine field. I was training Mike Delport in Recce, and we went out in a Lynx to see if we could help with some aerial tracking. Normally the student sat behind me so we could both look out of the same side for instructional purposes, but as it turned out, Mike very fortunately strapped himself into the front seat next to me. We estimated that we were about five kilometres from the Grey Scouts when I heard the familiar sound of bullets flying past the canopy and I knew the gooks had found us. “I went into a left hand orbit and immediately saw one of them running across an open field. As I turned into the attack we both saw a large explosion on the ground and then about six seconds later, what appeared to be six or eight airbursts in front and slightly lower than we are. I pressed home the attack and it looked as though we hit a few of the gooks on the first dive. We then climbed back into the orbit to tell Mount Darwin to send the Fire Force and we continued in the orbit looking for more gooks. Again we saw a large ground explosion followed by seven or eight airbursts. “We then saw about 20 gooks running through the trees and as I banked we came under very heavy ground fire. I heard rounds going through the fuselage, some very close to my head. It turned out that one of the rounds had come through the top of the cockpit, passed through the back right hand seat and exited through the side of the fuselage. It just missed my head because I had been craning my head to the left during the turn in for the attack. “I continued with the attack and as I fired the rockets and started my pullout I was hit in my left thigh by a bullet. I shouted to Mike that I had been hit and he took over the controls. I was looking at my leg when I heard Mike shout, “We’ve got no ailerons.” “I looked up to see the aircraft in a right hand bank 50 feet above the trees. The aircraft started rolling to the left and I instinctively started pushing right rudder to stop the roll. I then noticed out the corner of my eye that Mike’s leg was juddering on the left pedal and I realised that we were now fighting each other. I slowly removed my leg from the rudder pedals so that it didn’t cause a sudden roll. The control wheel was completely useless and could rotate freely, although we still had elevator control. We were at treetop height with rising ground ahead of us so I pushed full throttle and left Mike to control the rudder pedals and elevator. I jettisoned the frantan and rocket pods, as we didn’t want those with us in the event of a crash. When I looked out of my side of the aircraft I did a double take – the aileron was completely deflected for a left roll. When I looked at the right aileron it was completely deflected for a right roll. I then realised what had happened – a round had severed the aileron cable and the low-pressure area on the top of the wing had sucked both ailerons into the vertical position. This accounted for the low airspeed we were encountering due to the extra drag. “Mike was doing a magnificent job at controlling the aircraft and we managed to claw our way to a reasonable altitude of about two thousand feet. It took us a few seconds to gather our senses before we called Mount Darwin to tell them of our predicament. There were numerous dirt runways in the area but we didn’t want to attempt a landing in case we crashed and there were no fire-fighting or medical facilities. The nearest place which had good medical facilities was Mt. Darwin but they only had a small fire jeep so we decided to continue to Salisbury which had the longest runway in Africa as well as fire-fighters and a station sick quarters. “We were not issued with parachutes in the early days of the Lynx so baling out was not an option and Mike and I both said that we wished we had parachutes. In addition to these problems we were now presented with a further potentially catastrophic situation – there was a strong smell of fuel in the cockpit and I was getting very dizzy. Mike kept asking if I was okay. Then my feet started slipping on the floor. Mike thought it was blood but when I looked down I noticed fuel was leaking out of a non-return valve. The round that had hit me in the left leg had damaged the non-return valve before ricocheting into me. We now had a huge fire risk. We were also leaking fuel from the left tank and were getting right wing heavy. We couldn’t be able to keep flying if we continued to lose fuel so I did a cross-feed to the front engine, which normally feeds from the left tank. This worked and we were able to keep the aircraft in balance. “Our next problem was the undercarriage. When the Lynx undercarriage is activated the doors and wheels open at different rates causing quite a bit of rolling action until the gear is down and locked. It is not a problem when you have ailerons, but in our case we didn’t. Mike and I discussed having the runway foamed and that we would do a wheels-up landing, working on the premise that it would have been a shame to have got all the way to Salisbury and then lose control at the last minute. However there was a chance of missing the foam and all that was needed was a small spark and I don’t think any fire engine would have been able to save us. “We contacted Salisbury Tower who had already been notified by Mt. Darwin. Leon Keyter answered, which was ironic, as Leon had been a trainee ATC on Mike and my pilot’s course. Here were the three of us working our butts off to try to land safely. “We went for broke and with bated breath selected the wheels down. After what seemed eternity we had three green lights. We then discussed using flaps but we were unsure of their condition. The flaps are connected to the ailerons to form flaperons and we didn’t want to select the flaps in case only one moved. That would have been bad news. We also needed added speed to provide airflow over the rudders, as they were our only means of directional control. Because Mike had been doing such a great job of controlling the aircraft up till now we agreed that he should do the landing. He did a superb job and brought the aircraft to a halt. We opened the door and ran like hell to put as much distance as possible between the plane and us. “I remember standing at the edge of the runway looking at the aircraft with fuel pouring out of the bullet holes and the fire engines foaming it down. Air Commodore McLaren, who had been airborne in a Dak, had been informed of our predicament. He landed shortly after and came across to talk to us. “I paid a quick visit to SSQ to have my leg checked out (it was only a minor flesh wound, thanks to the NR valve) after which Mike and I went to the Officers’ Mess for a few well-earned beers. “It turned out later that when Fire Force arrived at the scene of the contact the gooks were waiting for them and it was one of the few contacts that we came second in. I believe a number of gooks were killed from our original attacks but I think we lost a few troopies in the ensuing action. The explosions and airbursts that we saw during our attacks were very interesting. When the terrs crossed though the minefield they lifted some of the mines and brought them with them. They then set up an aerial ambush by burying a land mine in the ground and laying six to eight stick grenades on top. The stick grenade pins would be attached by wire to a stake in the ground and a hand-cranked generator would detonate the mine. All they had to do was entice an aircraft overhead. The stick grenade would be propelled into the air and explode, and the aircraft would hopefully fly through the shrapnel. Fortunately for us their timing was a little out, so while it looked very intimidating it proved to be relatively ineffective. “Mike was awarded an MFC (Operational) for outstanding flying in bringing back a valuable aircraft.” OPERATION LONG JOHN: 25 JUNE 1976 Operation Long John was a cross-border raid into Moçambique for a strike against a ZANLA base at Mapai and a staging post at Chicualacuala in June 1976. Casualties were some nineteen killed, and eighteen wounded for the loss of Sergeant Major Jannie Nel and permanent paralysis of Lieutenant Dale Collett. The operation was mounted from Chiredzi while I was OC FAF 7. Air support consisted of Trojans and Alouettes to support the 58 ground troops who crossed the border on 25th June. The Trojan was used for Telstar (radio relay, at high altitude), ground attack and subsequent casevac. The helicopter was on standby for hot-extraction and casevac. Meanwhile, enter Flight Lieutenant Basil Moss - who was the OC 'B' Squadron, General Service Unit at Thornhill. Basil was recruited by the Selous Scouts because of his skills, abilities and knowledge of African culture. Basil was sent into the Kruger National Park, in a civilian Land Rover, to drop off a two-man patrol to trek the thirty kilometres due east to Mapai. Their mission was to reconnoitre Mapai before the mobile column was committed to the trans-border raid. The Scouts had intended using the Danie Theron Boer War dual bicycle - or quad cycle, which could be pedalled on the railway tracks - but had to be abandoned when it was discovered that there was insufficient ballast on the Moçambique sections of rail. When the Special Forces got to Mapai and engaged FRELIMO, Jannie Nel was fatally wounded. The armed Trojan was called in to fire its rockets, which the pilot did with pinpoint accuracy. The fierce fire which immediately erupted in the arms-store building soon engulfed and killed all the enemy who had been resisting with such determination. The Alouette was then called in to pick up the casualties at Mapai, allowing the column to reform and retrace their steps for the return journey. The Scouts had salvaged a 50-seater Mercedes bus, and used it to take the lead in surprising the ZANLA gooks in hiding at the Chicualacuala staging post. The compound of prefabricated tin huts was subjected to effective ground fire. Operation Long John, with air support, was rated successful. Morale at FAF 7 was extremely high. However, abuse of air power on the contrary, was very demoralising as seen below. OPERATION PARKER Standard SS procedure was to load “funnies”, pseudo groups, in covered trucks, and take them to the far end of the runway where they would deploy in fixed wing or choppers. Through the use of Operation Parker, or misuse thereof, the SS discovered that deployment by road was too cumbersome and they had found a better system of deployment (why not use helicopters, which were in short supply?). At first they kidded themselves that they could only use a few trusted helicopter pilots. But as soon as the pressure built up, it became impossible to restrict the piloting of helicopter borne deployment to only a select few and it was not long before every helicopter pilot helped the SS out to satisfy their so-called Smersh taxi service requirements. The frequent and unjustified misuse of Operation Parker disillusioned me to the point that I acquired an extreme disrespect for the Selous Scouts. In my view Lieutenant Colonel Ron Reid-Daly's lieutenants contributed much to the large number of “lemons” caused by Operation Parker misuse. Many years later – in 2005 in fact, I came across a very interesting SB Scout named Jim Parker who had written “Assignment Selous Scout”. His novel set my mind to wondering whether he was not the bugger who had given me all the grief at FAF 7? He was a Lowveld farmer who served most of his call-ups in the Repulse area and knew the Buffalo Range SS fort intimately. He often referred to Scouts like Bert Sachse, Rob Warracker, Athol Gillespie, Steve Fenton-Wells – and every other Scout who shouted “Op Parker“ whenever they could not get their way with me. In retrospect, it wouldn’t surprise me if in fact the last laugh was with Jim Parker all along! It seems if I had been truly duped all along – because no other Bluejob ever mentioned that they were hassled by Op Parker. AIR STRIKE LOG 363 – 366 (OPERATION THRASHER) No Date Names Target Aircraft Weapons Result 363 01/06/76 Thrasher Michael Borlace / Henry Jarvie Chris Dickinson / Philip Tubbs Dave Atkinson / Griffon Ray Bolton VP506534, Odzi river, 15 n.m. north of Hot Springs and 28 n.m. south of Grand Reef. VP502542 – slightly further south of above. K-Car 5701 G-Car 5277 G-Car 7536 Lynx 240x20mm 700 7.62mm MAG, 700x.303, 36 37mm SNEB 4x15-gall Frantan 13 terrs killed. Griffon shot in both feet. 365 03/06/76 Thrasher Ray Bolton Michael Borlace / Henry Jarvie Chris Dickinson / Philip Tubbs Dave Atkinson / Chris Rademan VP638779, Mpudzi river, 10 n.m. west of Burma Valley and east of Umtali-Birchenough Road Lynx K-Car G-Car G-Car Frantan Results not confirmed. 366 08/06/76 Michael Borlace / Henry Jarvie Chris Dickinson / Philip Tubbs Ray Bolton Dave Atkinson / Chris Rademan Mike Thoms Retief Honde Valley, north east of Umtali. K-Car 5701 G-Car 5177 Lynx 3146 G-Car 5776 Hunter 1821 Hunter 8116 150x20mm, 2x7.92mm, 2x15-gall fran 36x37mmSNEB 3x68mm Matra, 2x30 gall-fran, 540x30mm Michael Borlace wounded in the leg. 363 – Mike Borlace recalls: “I think that this was the first fireforce success in Thrasher. We had had several lemons, it was a Sunday; SB turned up with a village headman, and the army company commander decided the intelligence wasn't up to much so declined to mobilise. But he agreed that we could take two sticks on an “armed recce”, with the SB guy and the headman both carried in the K-Car. We hit the “coke” and had a duck shoot, the village headman made a fortune in bounty money and poor old Captain Morgan-Davies was kicking himself for days. Dave Atkinson's helo got revved and one round went through both the techs feet - apparently he used to sit with one foot resting on top of the other. Another round came off the top of the cyclic and I think hit Dave's cigarette case or something, which was yet another excuse for him to continue smoking like a chimney”. ~~~OOO~~~ 365 – 02/06/76: I don't think we scored. 366 – 08/06/76: “This was in the Honde valley, and we got a real snot-squirt. When the K-Car got revved, apart from my leg, Henry jumped out of his seat when a round hit the seat pan, and smashed the gunsight with his nose”. DÉTENTE The collapse of Détente at Victoria Falls spawned a truce between Nkomo's ZIPRA and ZANU's ZANLA - and their combined forces formed ZIPA (Zimbabwe People's Army) under 27 year old Rex Nhongo. Russian rifles and ammunition, originally destined for Nkomo, arrived through Moçambican ports, together with Chinese weapons as well. Nearly a thousand terrorists infiltrated early in 1976. Many were raw and fresh from training camps in Tanzania. Their mission was to attack white farms and stores. But it was a military fact that the SF claimed many enemy dead for each one of ours. In February 1976 the Front Line presidents Machel, Nyerere, Kaunda and Seretse Khama met Mugabe at Quelimane for a summit. Mugabe stated, “The worst they (the Rhodesians) have feared all along - the factor of Marxist Communism - must now inevitably be introduced in Zimbabwe because majority rule must now be decided on the battlefields.” Peter Walls was quick to reply. “We will not be pushed around or surrender to any Marxist-inspired land grab,” he said. “We are going to fight.” Days later, the Rhodesian Air Force attacked a village inside Moçambique, and Machel closed the border. Machel also gave Mugabe permission and full support for the northern province of Tete to be used as a base for military strikes on Rhodesia. Mugabe sought and got a handout in Zurich. The Kampfendes Afrika presented him with 10,000 Swiss francs. He vacated Quelimane and relocated to a Portuguese-style villa in Avenida Dona Maria Segunda in Maputo, where he was then based for the next four years. During April 1976 more than 500 terrorists infiltrated from Moçambique into the Eastern Districts. In June, a further 300 were dispatched, to the south-east and Lowveld areas. The terrorists were generally pinned down in the border areas - but as their training and organisation improved, they were able to make some inroads. Now for the first time, by their own admission, they started succeeding in subverting the local population. In the sugar and wheat-growing country around Chiredzi and Chipinga, they started issuing orders to plantation workers to stay away from work: if they were disobeyed, the terrorists ambushed company buses en route to work. They mined the roads, even used mortars on mills and pumping stations. The reply from Salisbury, in August, was a large-scale raid into Moçambique itself. There had been hit and run attacks in the months before and by the time the Rhodesians attacked a camp at Nyadzonia, about 35 miles from the border, our SF were well rehearsed. They advanced in convoy, wearing FRELIMO uniforms, with FRELIMO insignia on the trucks, even singing FRELIMO songs. 700 terrorists, who were in the camp, gathered to welcome the invaders. The SF had a field day. The so-called guerrillas were quick to cry 'foul.' The SF were adamant that it was a guerrilla training camp. Mugabe and Machel insisted it wasn't. The United Nations envoy sent to investigate told the press that 670 refugees had been killed – but note the subsequent admission that “there were also about 700 guerrillas”, in the David Smith and Colin Simpson biography of Mugabe. The abortive Geneva Conference followed. HOT EXTRACTION: 1 AUGUST 1976 The Air Force was called upon to extricate a four-man SAS recce call-sign who found themselves being pursued by a group of about 100 ZANLA in the vicinity of Zamchiya Business Centre – in the Manica Province of Moçambique. The writer was not able to establish which pilots carried out this hot-extraction on 1st August 1976. OPERATION ELAND: 8 to 12 AUGUST 1976 Operation Eland owes its origin to my old No 5 Squadron Boss, Randy du Rand who photographed the massive ZANLA terrorist base camp known as Nyadzonia/Pungwe. Actually, it was a rather switched on Canberra navigator who spotted the camp from the air, some fourteen kilometres from where ground intelligence had said it was. No 5 Squadron had been sent on numerous lemons along the Pungwe River, where the river bisected the main road from Chimoio to Tete, in Moçambique. The base was used for infiltration into the Operation Thrasher area. I was still at Buffalo Range, as OC FAF 7 - with my area of operations being Repulse. The Canberra flown by Randy was on an unrelated photographic mission, and in view of excessive cloud over their Moçambique target, was forced to abort the mission. It was then that the eagle-eyed Navigator picked up the details of a large complex in the bush below, pressed the camera 'tit', and photographed about eight hundred terrorists on parade. This made it the largest single concentration of gooks that had ever been seen in the war until then. The Special Forces commanders were summoned to appear before the Special Operations Committee to do a feasibility study on methods of mounting an attack on the base. Both Officers Commanding SAS and Selous Scouts could not come up with a plan without air support. They were not content with just casevac only restrictions, but had to rely on the Air Force completely, to stand any chance of getting over the border and to the base . . . then getting back home after the attack. Plans to attack the camp were shelved. The Air Force, meanwhile, continued to photograph the camp regularly to monitor developments, and reported its growth to at least 1,000 terrorists. Shortly thereafter, a captured ZANLA Detachment Commander, Livisoni Mutsati confessed that the Pungwe camp was indeed the main logistics base for infiltration into the Eastern Districts - and that there were many more than 1,000 ZANLA gooks based there - in fact 5,250 - at least (which included 604 “Povo”). This development was again confirmed by Canberra missions, and renewed ComOps' interest in carrying carry out airstrikes on the base. Then on Monday 9th August 1976, the Special Forces armoured column (with Vampire Hispano 20mm cannon, I might add) carried out a daring Shoot and Scoot raid on the ZANLA base. However, as soon as they were subjected to mortar fire, the Air Force was called in for a 'rescue' mission. A pair of Hunters was scrambled and arrived over the column. After a little guidance from the ground, the 30mm cannon from the section of Hunters quickly neutralised the FRELIMO mortars. Noticing that return anti-aircraft fire was being directed at them from the 12,7mm gun that the Scouts had spotted earlier, the Hunters pursued their airstrikes. Their target was a roofless hut where the ack-ack gun was emplaced, as well as a nearby store. Direct hits were scored on both, and enormous explosions erupted where the store had been, indicating that it had been an ammunition store. Once the fire had died down, an Alouette was summoned to drop off picks and shovels (for the convoy to bundu bash their way back to Rhodesia), and casevac one serious battle casualty. A Lynx was also requested for top cover, to plot their position and progress, as well as indicate the easiest cross-country route to the border. Early the next morning, No 5 Squadron sent a Canberra to do photo-reconnaissance of the camp. The photographs, once they had been developed and scrutinised by the photo-interpreters, showed hundreds of bodies strewn around the whole area of the devastated camp. The figure of 300 terrorist casualties was put out in a press release. After a roll call it was discovered that two soldiers were unaccounted for. A Lynx was called in for a search and rescue mission on Wednesday 11th August, but failed to find any trace of the missing soldiers along the columns exit route. The good news, however, was that the two missing chaps had walked their way out by a more direct route, arriving back in Rhodesia on the 12th. Terrorist documents subsequently captured (at the Air Force, SAS and RLI attack on Chimoio on 23rd November 1977), gave the ZANLA casualty figure as 1,028 killed, 309 wounded in hospital and a 1,000 missing – 14 were captured and 200 believed drowned. Operation Eland / Thrasher certainly could boast of a successful cross-border raid. This was despite the Selous Scout claim that they were without air support. OPERATION PRAWN: AUGUST 1976 As OC the SS fort at Chiredzi/Buffalo Range (where I was OC FAF 7), Major Bert Sachse successfully derailed two trains on the Malvernia railway into Moçambique. That is, with the use of forward airfield Alouette helicopters. With this success it was decided to paradrop the Scouts by helicopter further south, towards the Barragem rail head - and thereby achieve the objective of taking out another three trains at different places along the line - and possibly Moçambique’s only steam crane when it came to re-rail the trains. The plan depended on the helicopters to deploy teams tasked with demolitions. It also so happened that the Moçambicans also operated a yellow-painted Alouette to fly a Maputo engineer on a weekly line inspection. They would fly up the line of rail to the Malvernia rail and road junction, from where they would then fly north-east and follow the Cabora Bassa power line to the Troposcanner, some twenty-five kilometres away. Radio intercepts confirmed that these flights occurred weekly on Tuesdays - and thus it did not take a rocket scientist to hit on the idea of the Air Force painting one of our own Alouettes the same colour. The deception proved successful for several weeks. As pilot of the Yellow Submarine, Flight Lieutenant John 'Planks' Blythe-Wood was tasked to fly Special Forces demolition teams to a point on the line of rail between the power-lines and Chicualacuala. Rob Warracker had boarded a FAF 7 Lynx and was flying at high altitude to watch the westward progress of the train, which was pulling several large water bowsers. Bowsers were the only means by which Malvernia could be supplied with water. Plank's demolition team stayed under cover while the train passed on its way to Malvernia. Our telstar Lynx then warned the demolition-cum-ambush party of the return journey of the train that had delivered its water bowsers to Malvernia. It was travelling at speed, with empty bowsers and coaches loaded with FRELIMO soldiers. The explosion that followed completely derailed the entire train, including all the coaches containing the enemy soldiers. RUTENGA DETACHMENT For a short time during the winter of 1976, I was deployed to Rutenga as the Senior Air Representative on the mini-Sub-JOC. For my sins I was once again obliged to work with my Army counterpart – Major Fluff Templar. Somehow, he and I just did not see eye-to-eye, and invariably ended up having diametrically opposed opinions as to how the bush war should be prosecuted in this part of the country. The line of rail from Vila Salazar to Shabani was an essential communication and transportation link to keep imports and exports flowing to and from landlocked Rhodesia. The railway line was being sabotaged and blown up with increasing regularity. Additionally, the main road convoys between Fort Victoria and Beit-Bridge routed through this vital railhead. Although the BSAP escorted the vehicular traffic, I remain convinced that the military presence at Rutenga provided a measure of reassurance to civilians and other motorists. Who can forget the sterling job these BSAP Reservists did to keep the wheels turning? The convoys were led by a police Mazda pickup, with another at the back and on occasions a third in the middle of the convoy, depending on how large the convoy had ‘grown’ by the time of departure. The vehicle at the back was manned by (often elderly) police reservists, armed with a Browning machine gun – providing the retaliatory firepower in the event of the convoy being ambushed by terrorists en route. The slowest vehicle regulated the speed of the convoy, but more often than not the odd motorist had no option but to travel flat-out to keep up. I recall providing top cover for one such convoy run, where a poor caravaner ended up with a wrecked caravan. He either got a fright when he saw the aircraft, or travelled too fast and lost control. So much for his holiday. In the event of being ambushed, drivers were pre-briefed to get out of the killing ground, keep left, pull over and dive for cover into the nearest gully or culvert. The Mazda support vehicles would then engage and hopefully cause the gooks to “take the gap”. While at Rutenga I remember our world class golfer, Nicky Price, serving his National Service in the Air Force, driving his golf balls down the grass runway. He had envious admirers wondering how he could drive a golf ball so far - several hundred metres! I was also reminded of my stint at Rutenga, and Brigadier Barnard – who possibly took note of an earlier comment I had made during one of his frequent visits to the front. When asked where I thought a good site would be for military operations, I had replied that the rail intersection and road infrastructure would favour Rutenga (I was thus not surprised that FAF 9 / Rutenga came into frequent use). I also remember one “hairy” Trojan sortie from Rutenga to FAF 7. The cloud base was very low during the odd winter guti (low cloud base associated with drizzly rain), and I pushed the No 4 Squadron pilot to take me home for some R and R. This was also one of those stupid but lucky occasions of flying very low-level into eight eighths cloud, pulling the aircraft into a steep climb and hoping that there were no gomos looming directly in the flight path. The good work that the Grey Scouts did in the south-east also warrants special mention. On 27th August 1976, Sergeant David Scott was in command of a small group of horsemen when they located the tracks of a large party of terrorists and recruits. The horse-mounted infantry were in a natural environment for rapid follow up and could cover great distances in short periods of time. The Grey Scouts were thus able to follow the tracks for a considerable distance with determination and speed, and this resulted in a most successful contact. But bush life in the forward areas was not all wine and roses. Dark clouds lay ahead. Demoralising political developments were to follow. CAPITULATION: 24 SEPTEMBER 1976 24 September 1976 is a day I will not easily forget. As Forward Airfield Commander of Buffalo Range - OC FAF 7 - I was summoned, together with all the other Air Force and Army field commanders, to New Sarum for a briefing by General Peter Walls. PRAW Pilot and Flight Tasking Officer Sheila Anderson (the first operational woman pilot in the BSAP) arranged my flight to Salisbury - I did not want to take any of my own allotted aircraft, which were needed to prosecute the local war in the Chiredzi Sub-JOC area. Henry Kissinger, the American Secretary of State, nicknamed ‘Super Kraut' was determined to pull off a diplomatic coup to enhance Gerald Ford's re-election to the White House in November - and the only way of getting Ian Smith to bend was through South Africa's John Vorster. With threats, bribes, promises and lies, Kissinger cajoled the South Africans into “reading the riot act” to Salisbury. Already strange delays - “congestion in the Transvaal” it was called - had been disrupting Rhodesia's vital oil and armaments lifeline to the South. Air Support was suddenly withdrawn without reason. 50 South African pilots and technicians were recalled to South Africa. Ian Smith had gone down to Loftus Versveld to watch rugby with John Vorster - but it was Smith and Kissinger who talked, whilst John Vorster was closing the tap. It was a time of trial for the Rhodesian premier; he was required to accede to black majority rule in his country within two years - something he had always opposed (“Not in a thousand years - not in my life-time”). But he was over a barrel – The South African Foreign Minister, Dr Hilgard Muller, stated on 9th August 1976, that he supported majority rule in Rhodesia. The record needs to be put straight about the 1,000-year statement. Smith has always been misquoted on this, and wisely, he has never tried to justify it. What he said was true – what he meant was that he was opposed to “majority rule”, not to a black government. A competent black government was acceptable, but not simply because they were in the majority. General Walls briefed us, psychologically persuading the field commanders, simultaneously while Ian Smith was meeting with his full Cabinet. I can unashamedly record that the tears ran down my cheeks - the end was in sight – it was capitulation. All the Commanders returned to resume their duty in the field - to await the outcome of Smith's mammoth Cabinet meeting. But there was no other option. Having been pre-briefed, I assembled the FAF together for OC Air Det Repulse Group Captain Tol Janeke to break the news to the fighting airmen. On 24th September 1976, Premier Ian Douglas Smith gave a solemn 24-minute address to the nation - he dressed up what was in fact a stark ultimatum; he said, “ The alternatives to acceptance of the proposals were explained to us in the clearest of terms which left no room for misunderstanding...” The Sunday Mail's editorial read “..no choice. Accept a majority rule constitution or you will be crushed, economically and militarily.” The tap had been turned off. Let history record: - (1) Ford lost the November 1976 Presidential elections and Kissinger was out of a job. (2) Ian Smith stuck to his word - he introduced black majority rule. (3) The British failed to recognise Zimbabwe Rhodesia. (4) South Africa recalled 50 pilots and technicians. (5) John Vorster did not last long. In retrospect, I felt feathers for his infamous “Too ghastly to contemplate” speech. We capitulated - the trade-off was that the tap was suddenly opened again - but it was indeed a time for tears. The Rhodesians were brave but they could not fight the entire world. “Battles were won, but the war was lost”. 1976 certainly proved to be one of the most eventful years of the entire Rhodesian Bush War for me. Operation Thrasher was opened in the Eastern Highlands in February; Operation Repulse in the south-east in May, Operation Tangent in August, for the length of the Botswana border (including the Victoria Falls and Wankie areas); my deployment as OC FAF 7; capitulation; and my return to operational flying duties. ~~~OOO~~~ With the recall of all the SAAF pilots, the Air Force was faced with covering a much larger area than hitherto, and could no longer afford to make permanent Air Force field deployments – like OC FAF 7. There was a need for me to help with relief flying duties on No 4 Squadron. Squadron Leader Chris Dixon flew in to Buffalo Range in order to take over the FAF from me (on a temporary basis), and I returned to Thornhill to commence conversion onto two types – the Trojan and the Lynx. Squadron Leader John Bennie gave me my conversion to the Trojan, No R3248 on 10th November 1976. The next day, we celebrated our 10th year of Independence post UDI and I was thus only able to record my first solo to type the day thereafter. Boss Peter Cooke was not keen for me to fly the Trojan when he had taken command of No 4 Squadron way back in 1967. Now, at last (even though it was nine years later), I was able to add the Trojan, as well as the Lynx, to my list of aircraft types. AIRSTRIKE LOG 538: 23 NOVEMBER 1976 Hugh Bomford recalls: “I was part of the ground troops - all 4 of us - a Cpl Roy Orchard, L/Cpl Al Currie, Rfn Gary Kenny and myself as Rfn H Bomford. There was a sighting on an island in the Zambezi. Why I remember it was that we set ourselves up to be picked up as we had been trained (and done before) with the wind to our backs. The G-Car landed with its tail to us so round we went and emplaned. The chopper could not take off so we were deplaned and had our gear checked - we only had webbing - no packs as we expected to be in and out. Back in and we did these bunny hops until we were facing into the wind, then off we went. The pilot had a picture of a nude woman in a rather welcoming posture on the back of his helmet. I wondered to myself as to how many stick leaders this was the last woman's fanny they ever saw and why the pilot seemed to my non-flying expertise to have made such a tadza of the landing and take-off. My stick leader Roy Orchard did actually get killed but that was 6 months later on 22nd July 1977 in a land-mine explosion. “Anyway this all stuck in the memories until I came across Joe Syslo who said that he had a helmet like that. The result of Ian Armstrong’s airstrike was un-ignited napalm all over the reeds which we had to pick our way through and no sign of the gooks although we suspected they may have been a couple of very frightened fishermen. We destroyed the dugout we found – by shooting the bottom out”. CASEVAC 27th November 1976 was an eventful day. I had just gone solo on the Lynx the previous day when I was tasked to carry out an urgent courier flight on the Trojan. My mission was to take Flight Lieutenant Tudor Thomas and Sergeant van Rooyen to FAF 8 - Grand Reef. The three of us got airborne quite early on the 27th in Trojan R 4320 and I duly dropped off my passengers. However, instead of heading back to Thornhill as expected, I was then directed to proceed to FAF 7 - Buffalo Range for an urgent Casevac. I duly complied and hastened to my diversion destination, which I knew quite well. On landing, and refuelling, I awaited the arrival of the patient that needed to be taken to Andrew Fleming hospital in Salisbury. . No 4 Squadron Trojan – Close air support aircraft I was soon advised of a delay, because the terrorist ambush victim, Mr Colin Williams, had taken a turn for the worse and needed the best medical attention available locally. After a short while Dr Paul Canter arrived, with Colin Williams, and requested that he accompany his patient to Salisbury. We took off at about 5 o'clock in the afternoon and headed for New Sarum as quickly as the Trojan could make it. We encountered a headwind, and despite flying at near full power, the flight took two hours - unfortunately all in vain. As dusk fell, at ten minutes from landing, the doctor was not able to revive his patient, and Colin Williams died from his wounds. There was thus no need for Doc Paul Canter to accompany his patient in the awaiting ambulance - we instructed the ambulance to deliver the body to the city mortuary instead, boarded the Trojan and we then cruised back to Buffalo Range to drop off the Doctor. Our return journey, at economic cruise settings, consumed half the fuel it had taken us to Sarum, and even our flight time reduced by fifteen minutes. It was nearly midnight when we landed at FAF 7, so I decided to night-stop Just as well. Another unscheduled airtask awaited me. I had to borrow shaving kit and chewed on a toothpick in the absence of any toiletries. Then on 29th November I uplifted Special Air Service Captain Martin Pearse on a courier mission to the School of Infantry in Gwelo. I had got to know Martin quite well during my FAC courses, and had a high regard for the professional soldiers, that the SAS were. It was thus with profound regret that I learned of his death, killed in action in June 1979. Soon after landing at Thornhill in the Trojan, I flew my second solo sortie in the Lynx aircraft, as part of my conversion to type. I ended the three-week month with over 36 flying hours - so much for No 4 Squadron not permitting me to convert to type shortly before my posting from the Squadron nine years earlier. The following month I had another casevac with Doctor Paul Canter from the Lowveld. On this second occasion we moved civilian David Voster with spine and abdominal injuries sustained in a landmine incident in the Matsai area. The good doctor was getting in a fair amount of night flying with me, in addition to treating patients with war inflicted injuries. FORWARD AIR CONTROLLING Forward air controlling has been mentioned quite intensively so far, mainly because the Air Force was at the cutting edge of developing tactics. It would have been noted that the first formal training of the Rhodesian Army professional soldiers was held as early as April and June 1965 (for Captain Peter Burford and Lieutenants Meyer, Lockley, Ian Pullar and Thorne), which was well before the commencement of internal hostilities against infiltrating terrorists. The Army FAC Course that ran during June 1966 for Captains Geoff Atkinson, Peter Hosking (later Colonel, commanding the RAR Regiment) and Bert Sachse (of SAS, then Selous Scouts and finally of South African Special Forces fame) resulted in subsequent spectacular air-to-ground strikes. While the earlier courses entailed air orientation and demonstration solely with Provost aircraft, this was later extended to involve and include all strike aircraft - Vampires, Hunters and even Canberras. I personally flew some 39 Brownjobs on both simulated FAC attacks as well as on live airstrikes and target marking missions. Some of the Brownjobs that performed particularly well include the likes of Graham Wilson, Martin Pearse and Colin Willis (SAS), Bert Sachse, Dale Collett and Gisseppie Gillespie (Selous Scouts), as well as numerous others like Majors Peter Matkovitch, Pat Mincher, and Parker. The vast majority, at some stage of their military careers, passed the stringent selection for Special Forces duties during which very effective use was made of air-power in both Coin-Ops and conventional warfare roles. They appreciated the significance of air support use in combined operations. Graham Wilson and Bert Sachse were exceptional soldiers. Graham Wilson, known by the nom de guerre of Dave Dodson, sometimes as the 'Phantom Major', was only the second soldier to win Rhodesia's VC, the Grand Cross of Valour. The first was Captain Chris ‘Schulie’ Schulenburg of the Selous Scouts. Unfortunately for Graham Wilson, although he wore the medal and everyone knew he had won it, the award was not gazetted. (Possibly due to ZANU PF winning the 4 March 1980 elections, or more likely because of his abortive attempt with South Africa's 4 Reconnaissance Commando in February 1979, to assassinate Mugabe in Maputo). I also recall a Zambian cross-border SAS raid with Graham Wilson that necessitated a hot extraction across the Zambezi, with us providing top cover for the helicopters, and at the same time dodging SAM-7 surface-to-air missiles. Graham was all “a bok for stonking the gooks”. I will mention Bert Sachse later, as related to Operation Manyatela, during late December to mid-January 1976/77. The natural professional soldiers also quickly appreciated the value of having the ground commander airborne – and hence the development of the Command Lynx (as forerunner of the Command Dakota). This technique was immeasurably better than the Lynx pilot performing purely telstar functions relaying messages between all the ground units. The airborne Army commander could thus direct his ground deployments more efficiently. Graham Wilson, Bert Sachse, Martin Pearse and Colin Willis certainly made maximum use of my services whenever they flew with me. OPERATION IGNITION: NOVEMBER 1976 Operation Ignition entailed the destruction of ZIPRA House in Francistown by the Selous Scouts, without the need for Air Force support. A group of nine Scouts drove into Botswana in two Land Rovers, with appropriate vehicle number plates, and using little-frequented dirt tracks, they cut inland until they bisected the main road. The operation was carried out during the night of 18th September 1976. The trip to Francistown was uneventful, and the men arrived at their target at 01h15 hours. Having fed the security dog’s poisoned meat, the sabotage party placed suitcase bombs outside the ZIPRA house. An occupant who was roused by the barking dogs happened to open a window and spotted the Scouts outside. The window was slammed shut, followed by a pandemonium of shouts. As the raiders made good their escape, three satisfyingly loud grumbling explosions erupted behind them. A team member had been left behind, and when the missing Scout failed to arrive at the crash rendezvous, they feared the worst – their mate had either been killed or captured. The main party arrived safely back in Rhodesia at 04h45 – some seven-and-a-half hours since entering Botswana. To everybody’s surprise, the missing Scout walked his way out, arriving at the border around mid-morning. The result of the operation was five occupants injured in the blast, and ZIPRA’s safe house in Francistown demolished (despite one suitcase bomb failing to detonate). OPERATION REPULSE On 26th September 1974, Air Sub-Lieutenant Paddy Morgan and I had carried out a two hour photo-reconnaissance sortie of Chiredzi in Canberra R 2519 for JSPIS - the joint services photo-interpretation section, in order to permit future planning as a result of Portugal abandoning Moçambique. This was still nearly two years prior to opening the south-eastern front in May 1976. It was prompted by the major incursion of somewhat less than 150 terrorists from Gaza a month earlier. The main JOC for Operation Repulse was based at Fort Victoria, and controlled all combined Security Forces operations in the south-eastern region of Rhodesia. The second Battalion of the Rhodesian African Rifles had also established its base there - to the north-east of the town and in close proximity of Fort Victoria's airstrip. The senior Brownjob was Brigadier Barnard, with Group Captain Tol Janeke spending a fair amount of his time serving on the JOC. A Sub-JOC was established, initially at Chiredzi, but this was later moved to the all-weather tarred runway at Buffalo Range. I recall a couple of ground stints at the Main JOC, with VR Dave Stephens (of Sub-JOC Darwin and transcendental meditation fame) as the Operations/Intelligence Officer. ~~~OOO~~~ Following my posting from FAF 7 to No 4 Squadron, to resume flying duties, I flew fellow No 16 PTC Course mate Squadron Leader Chris Dixon to Buffalo Range in Trojan R 3248 on Friday 19th November 1976. My return to Thornhill also entailed conversion onto the Lynx aircraft, going first solo on type on 26th November 1976. My first operational sorties in the Lynx on Operation Repulse started shortly thereafter, with armed reconnaissance, weapon demonstration, air escort of road convoys, casevac, transborder and target marking for jet-airstrike sorties. Details of missions flown will be covered under the numerous operations, which I participated in - such as Operations Mardon and Manyatela. Meanwhile, also during December 1976, ZANLA terrorists murdered twenty-seven black workers at the Katiyo Tea Estates, near the Honde Valley in the Eastern Highlands. The terrorist gang entered the workers’ compound one night and rounded up most of the men folk, many of them migrant workers from Moçambique, which made the massacre all the more inexplicable. They forced the wives and children to watch, while they systematically shot or bayoneted the workers to death. The terrorists struck ‘soft targets’, mostly where the locals saw their power as omnipotent. Atrocities committed during the war were sickening. Then, in early 1977, in the Mudzi Tribal Trust Land, just south of Mtoko, near the All Souls Mission, another sickening rape and murder was committed. It is best described by a survivor who relayed the following story: - “The vakomwana (people) came last night and demanded food and beer. The village is poor with barely enough food to keep us alive through the winter. We were frightened so we did as we were told. The vakomwana got very drunk and began smoking dagga. The leader shouted at the headman, who was very frightened. They then forced the villagers to gather around by the fires and watch while they tied the headman up with wire and forced him to kneel. “Then the terrorists killed him, but they did not let him die quickly. First they cut off his ears, and after that his nose which they made him eat. Finally they cut off his lips. When they had done, they stabbed him many times with their bayonets. The people were too afraid to make a sound. “Then they got hold of the headman’s youngest wife. She screamed pitifully as one of them pulled her baby away from her. He then gave another woman a stick and ordered her to batter the infant to death. What could the woman do? She smashed the baby with a stick and killed it because she had no choice. When the baby was dead they took the mother and raped her many times in front of every man, woman and child in the village. When they had had enough they bayoneted her to death. “They then killed the headman’s’ relatives and shot his cattle. The cattle were innocent and they did nothing. The people were also innocent and they did nothing…. I do not know why they were killed.” ~~~OOO~~~ I know of at least two occasions when our troops committed atrocities. The one relates to a machine gunner in Support Commando of the RLI who came across a group of small children playing by a stream in a rural area. He shouted to them, trying to entice them with sweets to come over to him. Most were too afraid, but one little chap braver than the rest, approached him. For no apparent reason the machine gunner raised his weapon and shot the child dead. The second occasion I actually overheard while on Fire Force duties. A captured Gook was interrogated following a successful contact. I was the Lynx pilot who relayed news of the capture to the FAF, for inclusion in the daily Sitrep. That night I was surprised to hear that the prisoner had been shot whilst trying to escape. The truth came out in the pub. The RLI Major relayed how the poor capture had been beaten about the head and shoulders to reveal where the now-scattered gooks intended to rendezvous. Having given whatever information the prisoner could give in order to effect an immediate follow up, he was invited to get himself a drink of water. No sooner had he turned to see where the water bowser was, when a pistol was drawn and the poor fellow flopped down with a wound to the back of the head. Sunray Major was heard to mutter ,”Look, the silly bugger was trying to escape. I had no other option but to shoot the fellow.” Sickening. Small wonder that many civilians (and prisoners) become victims in war. OPERATION MARDON: 30 OCTOBER to 16 DECEMBER 1976 Operation Mardon was a trans-border operation in Moçambique, involving the Air Force, SAS, RAR, 1 Indep Coy and Selous Scouts. The Scouts' column crossed the border in the Gonarezhou area and penetrated some 350 km into Moçambique in four days. They moved south-west, south and then north, cutting and slashing at ZANLA's and FRELIMO's soft logistical underbellies and lines of communication. They successfully attacked ZANLA bases at Chigamane, Maxaila, Jorge do Limpopo and Massangena. 2 RAR together with 1 Indep were tasked to take out the ZANLA / FRELIMO Chitanga base camp. My task was to support the transborder operations for the latter in the south-east, including target marking for the Canberra Air Strike. In the north-east the SAS and RLI, using the horses of the Grey Scouts to carry 81mm mortars and ammunition, crossed into the Tete Province on foot and attacked primary targets. Afterwards, trucks were driven into Moçambique to pick up the troops. They then thrust 100 km north towards Tete, attacking FRELIMO and ZANLA military targets and capturing or destroying tons of arms and ammunition. At Nura (grid ref VS 058908), the SAS and 5 Battery Rhodesian Artillery accounted for 9 FRELIMO, 5-8 terrorists killed, as well as one AMA (African Male Adult) and one AMJ (juvenile) killed, for the loss of Trooper E. Lotringer killed and one SF wounded. Chitanga was known to be one of the main staging posts into the Matibi 2 area, and reports that it housed groups up to forty gooks at a time, with the odd sprinkling of FRELIMO, were not uncommon. In fact, Andre Dennisons’ ‘A’ Company 2 RAR, had carried out two earlier hot pursuit and assault missions on the camp. The first was on 31st August 1976, when four FRELIMO were killed, a dozen tents and a Landrover with water-trailer was destroyed, plus the recovery of a wide range of weapons and ammunition effected. The second raid was carried out two months later at the end of October 1976, when six gooks were killed (a group of ninety had passed through the camp a mere twelve hours earlier). The JOC had taken the decision to mount pre-emptive strikes against all known Moçambique camps in the 2 Brigade area. On the way back from Chitanga ll, the RAR vehicle hit a TMB3 – Russian anti-tank mine – flanked by three AP – anti-personnel mines – resulting in the wounding of nine soldiers, six badly. The current action called for the 2 RAR call-signs to cross the border after dark on the 15th, and be in position just prior to the Canberra airstrike that had been laid on for first light. 1 Indep stood by with the FAF 7 Fire Force helicopters to react to any significant contacts. On 16th December 1976, whilst flying with Captain Irvine and Sergeant Price in Lynx R 3154, I marked the Chitanga terrorist camp with two frantans for the Canberra airstrike. My 16 PTC colleague Al Bruce was flying the Canberra, and his navigator was Jim Russell. They dropped their bomb load of 100 Mk2 Alpha bombs. After frightening the hell out of any occupants, the Fire Force swooped in with their two K-Cars and two G-Cars. The K-Car pilots were Planks Blythe-Wood and Ginger Baldwin, with the troop-carrying pilots being Mark Knight and Chris Dickinson. Meanwhile, 2 Platoon had an inconclusive contact with a group of CT’s at first light, getting a mean “snot squirt” (stonking) from a 7.62mm long MMG – Goryonov medium machine gun. However, three gooks tried to break clear while we stonked (mortared) the camp, but they were brought down by joint air and ground actions. The K-Cars were effective in the use of 20mm cannon – JR firing some 54 cannon shells and Ginger some 42 cannon shells. Chitanga Air Strike – 16 December 1976 AIR STRIKE LOG: 16 – 19 DECEMBER 1976 No Date Name Target Aircraft Weapons Result 560 16/12/76 Mardon Repulse (External) Prop Geldenhuys / Capt. Irvine Al Bruce / Jim Russell John Blythe-Wood / Doug Sinclair Steve Baldwin / Alan Shields Mark Knight / John Chamberlain Chris Dickinson / M. Summersgill UL921754 Moçambique – Chefu River, Chitanga terr base, north east of Malvernia Lynx Canberra K-Car K-Car G-Car G-Car 2x15-gallon Frantan, 100 Mk2 Alpha bombs, 54x20mm, 42x20mm cannon Four terrs killed - one by K-Car 5178, three by ground forces. Chitanga terr camp in Moçambique – Op Mardon – with ‘A’ Coy 2 RAR and 1 Indep Coy 561 17/12/76 Repulse (External) Prop Geldenhuys John Blythe-Wood / Doug Sinclair Steve Baldwin / Alan Shields Mark Knight / John Chamberlain Chris Dickinson / M. Summersgill UL915854, UL938845 Moçambique, north of Chefu river, 22 n.m. north east of Malvernia and 38 n.m. south of Chipinda Pools Lynx K-Car K-Car G-Car G-Car 5x37mm SNEB rockets, one 15-gallon Frantan 15x20mm cannon shells, Two terrs and one African man killed and one African man casevac’d. 564 19/12/76 Repulse Prop Geldenhuys TL540468 Approx. 5 n.m. north of Limpopo and 35 n.m. east of Beit Bridge. Lynx 3407 1x37mm smoke SNEB rockets Tshiturapadzi – Matsai contact, casevac’d one AMJ. Flew with SAS G. Wilson 565 19/12/76 Repulse Prop Geldenhuys / Capt. Wilson Steve Baldwin / Alan Shields Mark Knight / Beaver Shaw Chris Dickinson / Rob Nelson Rick Culpan Four juveniles at UN 8738, 4 n.m. east of Matsai and 40 n.m. north east of Buffalo Range Lynx K-Car G-Car G-Car Dakota 1x37mm SNEB 73x20mm cannon shells Tshiturapadzi We remained airborne just short of six hours, landing back at FAF 7 after dark. That night, five FRELIMO snivelled back into the camp but were ambushed by the Brownjobs (Lt Schrag), who accounted for two dead and a fair amount of gook equipment - including a large wet battery and an array of aerials (but no radios). The next morning I flew back into Moçambique, this time with Bluejob Flight Lieutenant Eric Bone (VR), where we found a new looking tractor and trailer partly camouflaged under a tree. We duly dropped one frantan and fired five sneb rockets at this opportunistic target. Although there were kraals nearby, it appeared abandoned - it was probably used to transport the enemy and/or supplies to inaccessible places. 2RAR remained in the area for the next two days finding several rest areas and assorted items of kit. The ground assault forces withdrew to Chikombedzi siding, just west of Boli, at the completion of my involvement on Operation Mardon. The next day, after a Lynx change, I carried out an armed reconnaissance sortie of the Operation Repulse Sengwe area. Then on December 19th, I had another lengthy sortie with SAS Captain Graham Wilson, and an AMJ - African male juvenile, for casevac. We had a contact at Tshiturapadzi in the Matsai area, fired one 37mm sneb rocket, and recorded a casevac in Mashoko. Then on the 21st I flew with Major Pat Hill on an Operation Repulse HDF - high-density force reconnaissance sortie in the Nyajena area. THE BATTLE OF BANGALA – 22 DECEMBER 1976 On 22nd December 1976 Brigadier Barnard and SAS Squadron Commander Captain Graham Wilson joined me on a successful airstrike. On this particular mission, we flew for a mammoth six hours ten minutes in Lynx R 3407, fired 33 x 37mm sneb rockets, dropped our two frantans, and claimed five CT killed and one wounded. But we did not come away unscathed - the Lynx was also hit by ground fire, fortunately without casualty to my high powered Brownjobs. No Date Name Target Aircraft Weapons Result 568 22/12/76 Repulse Prop Geldenhuys / Brigadier Barnard / Captain Wilson John Blythe-Wood / Doug Sinclair Steve Baldwin / Alan Shields Mark Knight / Beaver Shaw Nick Meikle / Mario Venutti Ten-twelve Terrs at UN015235, 10 n.m. north west of Bangala Dam, Lowveld Lynx 3407 K-Car K-Car G-Car G-Car 33x37mm SNEB rockets 2x15-gall Fran 36x20mm cannon, 5x 20mm cannon Five terrs killed and one captured. SAS Boet Nel and Gerry Seymour killed. Torty King shot and badly wounded. Lynx hit by ground fire. Beaver Shaw recalls: “On 20th December 1976 we positioned at Bangala for a HDF – High Density Force deployment. It took the fireforce 40 minutes consisting of a Lynx R3407 flown by Prop Geldenhuys, K-Car R5178 with John Blythe Wood and Doug Sinclair, K-Car R5817 crewed by Ginger Baldwin with Alan Shields as gunner. Two G-Cars followed, crewed by Mark Knight with me as gunner and Nick Meikle with Mario Venutti as his gunner. Flying time to Bangala dam Airstrip was about forty minutes where we found the Air Force security section and the army had prepared a camp for us blues next to the SAS camp which was close to the gravel airstrip. Bangala dam airstrip was surrounded by high kopjes and was close to the TTL surrounding the white farming area. Conditions at camp were quite rough as it was the rainy season and everything was wet and muddy.” The Nyagena TTL south of Fort Victoria was a hot-bed of terrorist activity, and a major incursion route to the Chibi and Belingwe areas. A HDF was planned by the main Repulse JOC (Joint Operations Centre) and involved the Buffalo Range Sub-JOC / FAF 7. The HDF in Matibi 2 TTL, south east of FAF 7, was drawing to a close, but elements of 2RAR (Andre Dennison's A Company) was tasked to remain in the Boli / Chikombedzi area - and with back-up by elements of 1Indep Company to recce and re-locate the Chitanga lll base camp just across the border in Mozambique. The HDF force for the Nyajena TTL assembled at strategically appropriate 'locstats', Fort Victoria, Rutenga, Ngundu Halt, Morgenster Mission and naturally FAF 7 - Buffalo Range. While flying with Brigadier Bertie Barnard he mentioning to me that the Nyajena HDF involved something like 14 to 16 Companies, a whole Brigade strength. Its aim was to disrupt the terrorist stronghold in the Tribal Trust Land completely. On the 15th December I had carried out a recce of Belingwe for E Company 2RR. [The next day I target marked the Chitanga Camp for a Canberra airstrike]. On the 19th December I flew with the 2 i/c SAS Captain Graham Wilson on an airstrike at Tshiturapadzi. Two days later, with the HDF well under way, I flew a lengthy armed recce with Major Pat Hill. We circled and covered the whole of the Nyajena TTL, but especially the northwest corner were a Hunter airstrike had been carried out a month earlier (see map below - Airstrike # 514 - 10 n.m. north-west of Bangala Dam). The Battle of Bangala was fought the whole day on 22nd December 1976. I took off from FAF 7 with the Brigadier and SAS Captain on-board. Sightings were reported from OP's for ground and air elements tasked to check out all suspicious areas. The Lynx was used as a form of army airborne 'command cyclone', because keeping track of literally dozens of call-signs was no easy matter. Our Army colleagues were conducting tracking, sweeps, ambushes, hut searches and things they do best. The odd sighting and skirmishes / contacts were taking place here and there. The gooks by and large would shoot and scoot. They generally avoided coming into contact, but there were exceptions. Before long, the Lynx was called in to strike a rocky outcrop next to a tributary of the Nyamawanga River which runs into the top end of Bangala Dam. The GAC (Ground Air Control) went something like this: "From my Tango / Smoke, go left 10 O'clock 300 metres is a waterhole in river, from river go 12 O'clock 200 metres is rocky, wooded outcrop. The rocky outcrop is your target!" From my perch I would see hundreds of outcrops, so choosing the nearest one to about 200 metres north of the stream I fired off a couple of 37mm Sneb rockets. At best I would get an excited "On Target", or "Add 100 (or Drop whatever)". Once positively identified, I emptied one rocket pod, and dropped a frantan on the target or immediate surrounds. The second rocket pod would be kept in reserve and used as dictated by circumstance. Beaver Shaw relates his side of the story: ”After sorting out our sleeping arrangements and helicopters Mario Venuitti and I went to chat to the SAS troopies and compare ration packs with them as the SAS troops were issued with better rat packs than the Blues (we preferred the pilchards to the Bully beef). We sat and chatted to Gary Seymour and some other troopies and compared notes about things in general before calling it a night. “We woke up early on the morning of the 21 December and spent most of the day moving troops from RAR and Selous Scouts to O.P. and ambush positions in preparation for the H.D.F. It was a wet and rainy day and must have been really miserable for the troops in the bush. Then the morning of 22nd December started off quietly with us Blues hanging out at the operations tent listening to the radio chatter and drinking tea waiting for a call out. Some time during the day an O.P. reported sighting a group of ten to twelve terrorists moving along a ridge line at the base of a big kopje about 10 nautical miles from our Bangala Airfield base camp at UM015235. We scrambled to the aircraft and emplaned our SAS fireforce troops before winding up and scrambled down the wet gravel runway to the terrorist sighting with John Blythe-Wood and Doug Sinclair K-Car 1 (I can clearly remember that John commanded this contact himself from the K-Car as the SAS commander Captain Wilson was in the Lynx with Prop Geldenhuys and Brigadier Barnard see comment by Prop). “K-Car 1 pulled up into the contact area and threw smoke to mark the target. Pink Section which consisted of three G-Cars and the Lynx circled the contact area with our SAS stop groups. The stop group in my G-Car was Andy Chait, Torty King, Gary Seymour and a Lance Corporal Boet Nel. After some time in the orbit we turned into the contact area to drop our stop on a slope on the side of the kopje. The troopies debussed and ran into their defensive positions as we blasted off overhead them and back into an orbit around the kopje. “I had fleeting glimpses of the terrorists running along the side of the huge kopje and heard the crack of small arms fire as they took pot shots at the helicopters. (After the contact I found a bullet hole going through one of the G Car’s elephant ears for the sand filters). John moved the stop group higher up the kopje and when he was happy with their position told them to hold a position next to a large log and wait for the enemy to run uphill into their stop group. As we orbited the contact area we could hear John calling over the radio and warning the SAS Stop that the terrorists were heading toward their position, he kept repeating that the terrorists were moving up the kopje and for the stop to keep their eyes peeled as the bush was too thick for K-Car to put down suppressing fire. Suddenly the radio came into life and someone was yelling “I’m hit, I’m hit!” over and over again (The troopers in the SAS Stop group had stood up to see if they could see the terrorists as the terrorists ran into their Stop position and the terrorists opened fire killing Gary Seymour and L/Cpl Boet Nel instantly, Torty King had been shot in the arm and a round had smashed his nose and destroyed his eye, only Andy Chait was untouched by the ferocity of the attack). “John immediately spoke our G-Car on to a small LZ downhill from the Stop position on the side of the Kopje. As we were flaring Willie yelled at me to deplane and assist Andy with the wounded. I grabbed my FN and cocked it only to find it jammed with dust from the previous landing. (F_ K what now, I don’t want to f _ _ _ g go out there the friging gooks are going to shoot the S- -T out of me. Look what they bloody well did to the SAS!!!) “I told Willie my FN had jammed and he threw his at me yelling to get the f- -k out there and sort it out. I took off in the direction of the firefight and ran into Andy who had moved a short distance from the kill zone, the two of us ran to the smashed up troopers on the ground. I could clearly hear RPD and AK 47 fire and the occasional thump and explosion of the K Car 20 mm cannon firing as the contact continued up the kopje. During the entire contact K-Car 1 fired 36 cannon shells and K-Car 2 fired 5 cannon shells. I was still wearing my bone dome but the noise was tremendous but there was no time to f- -k around thinking or even being scared. The sight of the Stop group lying in their positions all shot up was chilling. Gary Seymour and L/Cpl Boet Nel were laying face down dead from gunshot wounds; there was not much blood, just clear mucus mixed with twigs and grass sticking to their weapons and kit. “Torty was in a terrible state and looked like he was dying with blood spurting from horrific wounds where a round had smashed the bridge of his nose and gouged his into his right eye, his right arm and right leg and thigh and it looked like his right elbow was severed by a round. The SAS stick had been shot to shit. We had no time to return to the LZ to get stretchers so we removed the dead and wounded trooper’s sleeping bags and made makeshift stretchers to move them out of the contact area in a hurry. Andy and I did what we could for Torty under the circumstances and hurriedly placed Torty onto his sleeping bag and dragged him down the Kopje with us taking fire from further up the kopje to the G-Car where Willie was waiting with rotors running. I could hear the rounds snapping and zipping through the bush all around the path down the side of the kopje as we moved towards the waiting helicopter. There was also the distinctive whine of the Alouette engine as the K-Car continued its orbit above us. Everything happened at such a fast rate yet at times; like when I first saw the wounded and dead SAS troops; time wound down to a stop, even now 31 years later it’s like looking through blood stained shattered glass. We loaded Torty on to the G Car and headed back up the Kopje to collect Boet Nel and Steve in the same manner. Once we had all on board Willie blasted out of the LZ with K-Car giving cover and set a hasty course for Bangala Dam airstrip to unload our casevacs to a team of medics awaiting our arrival. As we touched down the medics approached the helicopter and moved the dead and wounded to a spot where they could do what they could. “There was nothing anyone could do could do for Steve or Lance Corporal Boet Nel. “After we had shut down I removed their gory weapons and kit from the G-Car with a heavy heart, I could still feel the adrenalin dashing through my veins as I attempted to calm down make sense of what had just gone on. I looked at Willie and my jammed FN there was nothing to say, I just shook my head. I walked over to the fuel dump and just about carried the 44 gallon drum over to the G Car on my own; my eyes were smarting with sadness and anger. As I refuelled someone offered me some tea, I just turned my back on him as my emotions were running high. As soon as we refuelled we headed back to the contact area and were told by the K Car to patrol in an orbit at the back of the contact Kopje. “Willie over flew a village and shook his fist violently at the villagers. We saw some unusual movement in a thicket near the village and Willie told me to put down some flushing fire into the suspect area. I fired a burst of .762 MAG at the area to no result. I had fired my first shots in anger and had seen the first of many of the horrors of war. After that things became a blur but I do recall seeing the five dead terrorists lying on the runway with their weapons nearby being inspected by SB. There was one capture with a hood over his head being shoved into the SB Landrover. “(Torty King’s cousin Pat King joined Seven Squadron some time after this incident and I understand Torty survived his wounds but lost his eye.) “The contact had lasted until last light and when Prop Geldenhuys landed that night Ken Turner his technician reported that the Lynx had been hit by small arms fire in the tail plane. My whole attitude towards life changed that day and from then on I ensured that my FN was cleaned daily and the working parts covered with mutton cloth as it was difficult to keep a weapon clean while working from a G-Car. “I was not going to get caught up in an incident like that again, even though it was a constant battle to keep our weapons clean. To this day I still think that aircrews should have been issued with AK 47 assault rifles as they were ideal for our situation. The HDF lasted until December 25 1976 where we repositioned back to FAF 7 and Chris Wentworth took over from Willie Knight as my pilot.” The author met Torty in July 2007 just before his departure for Sierra Leone and was pleased for him to re-connect with the helicopter technician who had carried out his casevac so very long ago. He gave me his side of the story, and for the record book, recalls: “Andy Chait was not in that contact - he was on the airfield on standby in the para role with Daks as far as I remember. Boet Nel and Gary Seymour - both killed were in Ken Roberts’ callsign. I was the only casualty in mine. We were in extended line with Ken on the far left flank, and me in the middle with my men on my right, Gary was on my immediate left, and next to him was Boet) They were shot through the back from an RPD from behind us, and I think what saved me from the same fate was that I spun around and faced him; that’s when my elbow was shattered and a bullet went through my right thigh, unable to use my rifle, and with no cover, I ran towards the bastard hoping to use the ground as leverage for my left arm in some cover on his right (rather be a moving target than a static one). I basically ran through a wall of lead an as I got next to him I was felled by a bullet that passed through my right eye, rupturing it and then through my nose. I must add that if it was not for the excellent medical aid given to me in the field by Ken Roberts, and the unbelievably quick casevac by the Air Force I would not be here today. I am eternally grateful to you all”. The SAS paratroops based Bangala airstrip was also dropped by Dakota into the contact area. Amongst these were Joubs Johan (also called JJ) Joubert, who many years later, befriended the writer and gave me his side of the story, which he is putting pen to paper. That, to coin is phrase, is another “fact-story”! So ended the Battle of Bangala. But the war had to carry on. The next morning, while my aircraft was being patched up, I got airborne again, this time in Lynx R 3048, and with Colonel Peter Hosking for a Nyajena high-density operational reconnaissance. Operation Mardon – I marked the Chitanga target for the Canberra airstrike on 16th December 1976 Then on Christmas day, I was tasked on a transborder telstar mission and relayed the message that three terrorists had been killed. On Boxing day the Selous Scouts called for a night telstar in the nearby Matsai area. My next sortie was also a night mission, but this time for three SF casevac’s that nearly cost me my life. Three civilian soldiers from D Company, 5 Rhodesia Regiment had been injured in a landmine explosion in Matibi 2 TTL and were being taken to the nearest airfield which was Boli in the Gonarezhou area where Joshua Nkomo had been interned. When I landed at Boli, the petrol that the ground forces had thrown on the ground for my night landing ran out before I could bring the Lynx to a stop. I was not very charmed - Christmas and all - with my wife and children in Gwelo. And here I was, in the middle of the night, with no runway lights, no gooseneck flares, and only a bunch of Territorial Force soldiers trying to siphon fuel from their vehicles so that I could casevac their mates out of this hellhole. I duly loaded stretcher cases Captain Irvine and Rifleman Johnson, with Rifleman Erasmus, an enormous overweight farmer sitting on the floor. Despite my appeal to the Brownjobs for a decent flare path for take-off, I found to my horror running out of lights with the overloaded Lynx just managing to scrape the trees on the far end of the runway. I was barely able to climb, and any attempt at turning 180 degrees for Buffalo Range, meant losing precious height. Anyway, I survived the trip, just!. AIR STRIKE LOG 557 & 569: 17 and 26 DECEMBER 1976 Mike Borlace recalls: “The gunner's name was SAC Brian Booth. I think there may be a mix up here. We had a contact on the 17th but it was near Marymount. I think the one you have is one we had on the 26th - Boxing Day - on the escarpment. All the farmers and their families drove up and had a braai on the escarpment whilst the air show went on. At one stage they had to move back as rounds were coming up the escarpment - the gooks were trying to get down and we caught them just below the rim. No Date Aircrew Target Aircraft Weapons Result 557 17/12/76 Hurricane Cocky Benecke Michael Borlace / Brian Booth Trev Baynham Nick Meikle US262648, 17 n.m. north east of Centenary Lynx G-Car 5170 K-Car 7514 G-Car 5176 6x37mm SNEB smoke, 9xboosted 37mm SNEB, 3x37mm SNEB 1x15-gall Fran One terr killed. 569 26/12/76 Hurricane Michael Borlace / Doug Sinclair Nick Meikle / Billy Watt Mark Dawson / Marty Hulbert Leon du Plessis Ter position at US1580, 8 n.m. south of Hoya in Mavuradonha mountains K-Car 7514 G-Car 5177 G-Car 5170 Lynx 108x20mm 1x15-gal Fran, 36x37mm SNEB rockets Two terrs killed OPERATION MANYATELA: 30 DECEMBER 1976 to 17 JANUARY 1977 Operation Manyatela was a trans-border airstrike of a ZANLA transit camp in funny land Moçambique. Special Branch intelligence intercepted FRELIMO radio transmissions indicating that ZANLA had re-established their transit base near Madulo Pan, some 80 km south of the Rhodesian border and to the west of the Malvernia-to-Maputo railway line. Canberra photo-reconnaissance confirmed evidence of the staging camp for terrorist infiltration into the Repulse area. I had been detached to FAF 7 since 8th December 1976. The day after my hairy casevac of D Company 5 RR soldiers from Boli, I was called out for an armed recce with top cover for troops following up a terrorist presence in the Matsai area. This led to an airstrike when contact was made; I fired 18 x 37-mm Sneb rockets and dropped two frantans - logging one CT killed. The next day, 29th December, I was airborne again in my Lynx when there was a report of another landmine in Matibi 2 TTL. I was still hopping mad from the earlier night casevac and felt the need to take revenge. I noted a nearby village to the second landmine scene and was about to attack the village occupants standing around, when the Sunray Major suggested that I “Cool it.” Villagers were standing around, purposely ignoring my flying antics, and despite suffering some battle fatigue, I was able to restrain myself and reserve my weaponry for confirmed military targets. I did not need to wait too long. On 30th December 1976, I flew my first Operation Manyatela mission. Special Forces Selous Scout Captain Athol Gillespie and I flew into Moçambique for telstar duties in support of their ground call-signs engaged on pseudo operations in the so-called “Russian Front”, aptly named because of the presence of Russian advisers within ZANLA and FRELIMO. The pseudo call-signs carried target acquisition marker flares for a RAMS - radio activated marker system - that had been perfected by Squadron Leader Randy du Rand whilst I was still on No 5 Squadron. The sortie was uneventful and we landed back at FAF 7 after our four-hour-ten-minute sortie. After a quick lunch, my return to Thornhill for some well earned R&R was authorised - just in time to celebrate the New Year back at base. My relief had arrived in Lynx R 3094 so my tech Flight Sergeant Ken Turner and I duly returned to Thornhill. I might add that the Air Force was considerate when it came to looking after the welfare of the aircrews. My R&R for the New Year was pre-arranged in view of my Christmas deployment. Whilst I was not able to spend Xmas with my family, New Year was the next best thing. The brief R&R was just long enough to do my laundry and repack my IS kit for my next return trip to FAF 7 – and Operation Manyatela. Although I had not flown a Trojan for nearly a month, Squadron Commander DAG Jones roped me in as his safety pilot. I ended the month with a whopping 89 hours 25 minutes flying - all on the Lynx except for the two Trojan sorties totalling less than two and a half hours. That was no mean achievement – for any, not only current bush pilot. My R&R lasted until 10th January 1977, when I was again called upon as the safety pilot for Air Lieutenant Phil Haigh. This proved to be my last sortie with Phil - he was posted to No 2 Squadron, only to be killed in a Vampire later on in the year - with my unpleasant duty of notifying his wife Dot. I will cover the details later. On 12th January 1977, I positioned at FAF 7 again in support of Operation Manyatela. I flew down in a Trojan with Air Sub-Lieutenant Darrel Squance - on what turned out to be a tragic day for the Air Force. I had hardly settled down when I was summoned by Group Captain Tol Janeke to scramble to the Moçambique border to conduct a search and rescue mission for downed Echo Five - Ian Donaldson, with navigator David Hawkes and Selous Scout Rob Warracker. The planned Operation Manyatela airstrike had gone in during the early hours of the 12th. Special Branch intelligence reported that the Madulo Pan camp would be occupied by a large number of terrorists between 10th and 12th January. This intelligence was also verified by the Selous Scouts pseudo operators when I had flown Gillespie on special duties on December 30th. Reports had filtered in that food and ammunition was cached in a wide area of the surrounding bush at Madulo Pan. Infiltrations were resupplied from these transit camps. The JOC had decided in favour of an airstrike because a ground attack would probably be less successful. Surprise was essential, because any early warning would result in the gandangas (gooks) “bomb-shelling” at the first signs of a ground assault. On 10th January the Selous Scout recce team was parachuted by Dakota about 12 kilometres west of the target and proceeded to position the inner RAMS marker 800 metres from the camp and withdrew to their safe distance of 2 to 4 km with the outer marker. The plan called for the Scouts to activate their flare manually, the pilot to line up his run-in and the lead Canberra navigator to activate the inner marker remotely. The Canberra RAMS airstrike was targeted for 04h00, to be followed by a heli-borne sweep at first light, with close support provided by a pair of Hunters if needed. Flight Lieutenant Ian Donaldson, with his navigator Air Sub-Lieutenant David Hawkes and Selous Scout Rob Warracker were orbiting at altitude, as reserve Canberra with its full load of Alpha bombs, and Rob communicating with his ground call-signs. The Canberras carried out their high-speed low level airstrike right on target. But when the helicopters arrived at first light, they encountered heavy anti-aircraft and small arms fire - by heavily armed FRELIMO who had reacted to assist their ZANLA shamwaris (bosom friends). The helicopter-borne troops were outnumbered and so the Hunters were called in to fire their 68mm Matra rockets and 30mm cannons. Then Ian Donaldson was called in to drop his load of Alpha bombs. Ian descended through the layer of clouds, breaking through right over Malvernia. The Canberra was immediately subjected to intense ground fire. No one saw what struck the aircraft, but it suddenly banked steeply, flipped over and flew straight into the ground, exploding on contact and sending up a pall of smoke. The crew were killed instantly (the wreckage of R 5203 and the bodies of the crews were later displayed for public viewing in Maputo. FRELIMO claimed a hit by SAM, but this was never confirmed). Both Ian and the B2 Canberra were now no more. Both will go down in history as casualties of Operation Manyatela. I, meanwhile, continued my search for Echo Five for another two hours forty minutes, without success, landing at the Mabalauta forward base. After a bush night-stop at the Scout camp, with Major Bert Sachse (Manyatela commander), I was tasked to continue with the search for the downed crews. I might add, the Army placed armed guards at the airstrip to guard my Lynx; I then got aboard one of their RL trucks, and set off along a sandy-softened land mined track, for their hidden bush camp. I must admit, I felt a lot more comfortable facing the enemy from the air, rather than being liable to getting caught in an ambush or detonating one of the enemy landmines. Anyway, my night-stop was uneventful - except that I pitied my old instructor Peter Petter-Bowyer who (as another ‘re-called’ pilot like me) had been intimately involved since the start of Operation Manyatela. Both Group Captain Tol Janeke and I continued with our Echo Five search on 13th January. I think he was flying in a Trojan, while I piloted a Lynx. Sergeant Mike Guy was my passenger cum air-observer for our two hour twenty minute search. Boss Tol radioed me to be wary of SAM-7s and be on the lookout for the give-away white pigtail when the heat seeking guided missile is fired. I maintained a healthy altitude, ensuring that I kept the bright sun in line with the known enemy fortified positions. Evasive tactics included a steep wing over into the sun so that the surface-to-air missile either latches onto the sun or airbursts out of range. However, after a while, I was recalled to FAF 7 for an urgent casevac. Rifleman van Schalkwyk, from No 1 Independent Company, was uplifted, together with a Doctor Hale, and flown to Salisbury. I had left my night-stop kit behind at the FAF (to make room for the stretcher case), so then flew back to Buffalo Range, landing at about half past eight at night - too late for supper and too tired to eat anyway. On 12/13th January 1977 I had flown over nine hours. My short R&R spell had spoilt me with a more casual and relaxed lifestyle. January 15th was another long day. My mission was top cover in the Belingwe/Pande area when the BSAP made contact with a group of terrorists that had penetrated inland. Two African and one European policemen had been killed, as well as one terrorist. The next day I was called upon to carry out top cover for two contacts in the Matsai and Mashoko areas. These resulted in one terrorist killed and two captured, wounded. I uplifted one Army stick consisting of Riflemen Hall, Freeland and Mdlulu. That night I provided top cover and escort duties for a K-Car to the Mwagazi Gap. For these two days I had flown four sorties for a total of over twelve hours. The 17th brought mixed fortunes. Major Bert Sachse and I carried out a telstar for a Selous Scout contact at MacDougal. Bert was one of the few Scouts that I got along with. As a professional soldier, he served the country well, and carried out some “very hairy” operations for the South Africans following the disbanding of the Scouts. Bert was also the main ground commander for Operations Prawn and Manyatela. He commanded the Chiredzi Fort while I was OC FAF 7. The other good fortune for the day was my appointment as OCAW Thornhill - I packed my bags and returned to the Air Force base with Sergeant Grant Domoney. The ‘Push-Pull’ Lynx During January 1977, 3 Commando RLI manned the FAF 5 Fire Force. A Selous Scouts OP – Observation Post sighted a column of over two hundred ZANLA terrorists infiltrating the country just north of the Nyamapanda border post. The siren wailed and soon helicopters deployed the first waves of troops. As was normal at this stage of the war, support troops would deploy by road for uplift nearer the contact area. In this case, a Dakota was also used for paradropping elements of the SAS. In view of the large sighting, Comops also tasked the Canberras of No 5 Squadron to put in an airstrike ahead of the Fire Force arrival. Elements of the RLI were dispatched to the Kotwa airstrip, as the sighting was just outside the border, near the Mazoe River, for stop group purposes to ambush terrorists. Unfortunately, the terrorist columns were too strung out for the Canberra airstrike to be effective, but fifteen gooks were killed. It was not always a case of all work and no play at the FAFs. I remember seeing my first blue movie at FAF 5. I can’t recall the date, but it must have been early 1977. Although I was quite disgusted with the pornography and the weak story line, it was more amusing to see the effects that the blue movie had on some of the younger bush fighters. The movie only lasted about 20-minutes, but it was quite hilarious to watch the Brownjobs who remained seated at the end – too embarrassed to stand up from their cross-legged stances so as not to reveal their rampant erections. Then there was also the occasion of flying a troupe of strippers down to FAF 7. I can honestly state that I was no longer the OC, but a regular retread (i.e. re-called to active duties) pilot doing a bush stint at the sharp end at that time. NCOs tended to scramble for the front row seats, while Officers tended to take a more respectable position at the back of the FAF 7 pub. The buxom ladies certainly knew their stuff and soon had the lads roaring approvingly as bits of clothing were sexily shed. Provocative gesturing had the crowd roaring, “Take it off. Take it off.” The chants even persisted when the peroxide blonde ladies had bared all. They had no qualms dancing off the makeshift stage and mingling among the airmen and troopies. I did not escape their attentions, and became a victim of having my face smothered by oversized wriggling mammary glands. Fortunately, I was spared public embarrassment because the bulk of the audience was engrossed in watching a feat beyond description. A second stripper performed a disappearing act with a beer bottle. The performance left a lot of macho men feeling somewhat totally inadequate. Enough said. AIR STRIKE LOG No Date Aircrew Target Aircraft Weapons Result 591 16/01/77 Repulse External Prop Geldenhuys Michael Borlace / John Britton Tudor Thomas / Bob Thompson Mark Aitchison / Harding Bill McQuade / Doug Sinclair VN8250, 6 n.m. north east of Espungabera, in Moçambique Lynx 3048 K-Car 5178 G-Car 5872 G-Car 5778 G-Car 5276 200x.303 Browning Mk2 20x20mm cannon One terr killed, one captured. 592 16/01/77 Repulse Prop Geldenhuys Michael Borlace / John Britton Tol Janeke VN3927, 18 n.m. north east of Chisumbanje and 15 n.m. south east of Sabi Exp Stn Lynx 3048 K-Car 5178 Kiewit 732 18x20mm cannon shells 594 19/01/77 Repulse Michael Borlace / John Britton Mark Aitchison / Mario Venutti Bill McQuade / Doug Sinclair Dick Paxton / Ronny Scott Daryl Squance UM8505, 26 n.m. south of Chipinda Pools and 7 n.m. north west of Chalanda (on Moz border) K-Car 5718-5178 G-Car 7578 G-Car 5276 G-Car 5872 Lynx 240x20mm cannon shells, 250x.303 Browning Mk2 19 terrs and recruits killed, 16 terrs and recruits captured. Good shooting by John Britton. 591/592 – 16/01/77, Mike Borlace recalled: ”The day was spent with an external, and then Tol came up with some target at night that he wanted the K-car to have a crack at. We went over and made some holes with the twenty mills in the dark. I remember it was ‘black as the proverbial witch’s tit’ and there was a lot of smoke in the air so we were having trouble keeping the world the right way up, and then began to run desperately short of fuel trying to get back to Chiredzi. I was preparing to put down in the cane fields for the night, when the Ops Officer at Chiredzi, Ian Stein I think, who had been following the exchanges between myself and Tol, got Alistair Brown to turn his lights on at his farm. We snivelled in there on about seventeen minutes' red light and spent the night in some very convivial company.” 594 – 19/01/77: “There were actually two K-Cars that were involved in this punch-up. We arrived in 5178, which collected a snotty as we came overhead and put all the radios out – we also had used up all our ammo. We got straight into a sort of GT model we had at Chiredzi for some SAS externals we were covering at the same time, whose number was 5817 - it had extra ammo trays but no commander's seat. The ground troops involved in this included a troop of armoured cars that was cavorting around in the bush like Daleks, and Greys' Scouts, and from the air the whole thing was like a three ring circus. I remember JB's shooting was exemplary, and the donkey wallopers (Grey Scouts) were rounding up horses for about a week afterwards.” OPERATION VIRGO: JANUARY to JULY 1977 Operation Virgo was an extension of Operation Polo, whereby Rhodesian crews trained on and flew South African Air Force Impala aircraft, based at SAAF AFB Durban. Amanzimtoti, with its golden beaches and holiday atmosphere, proved a popular rental location for the wives of servicemen. Advanced flying training was carried out on Impalas, before progression to the supersonic Mirage aircraft. OPERATION BLUEBELL: 16 JANUARY to 19 FEBRUARY 1977 Operation Bluebell was an SAS canoe Operation on Cabora Bassa Lake, Tete Province, and Moçambique. The initial deployment was 12 men on 16th January to carry out recces and mine-laying. Ten days later a mine exploded north-east of Caponda, at grid ref UT 624478, followed by a night attack on Nhende Aldeamento (UT 8675) in which one vehicle was burnt and houses and barracks raked by fire on 31st January. Mines were also laid on the roads to Chinhanda and Chioco. The mine on the latter was detonated on 12th February. Then later the same day a successful ambush was carried out by the SAS in which 11 FPLM were killed, one wounded (who managed to escape), and a tractor, trailer, and a large quantity of supplies destroyed. A FRELIMO casevac vehicle detonated a mine placed on the road. OPERATION KODAK: JANUARY to MARCH 1977 Operation Kodak was a battle of wills, in south-east Rhodesia, at Malvernia, between January and March 1977. Air support and resupply was provided from FAF 7 Chiredzi/Buffalo Range. Territorial Army Captain John Murphy was tasked to bombard the FRELIMO garrison there, and to lay mines and ambushes with the objective of denying a safe haven through which the terrorists could infiltrate the Repulse operational area. With FRELIMO's support for ZANLA, the gooks had a safe haven in Moçambique, food, shelter, arms and ammunition. It was hoped that the FRELIMO garrison would abandon the town and withdraw to Mapai. The Rhodesian Artillery had also taken up positions about six kilometres from Vila Salazar, and would fire their long-range 122mm shells during the night. I had the odd occasion to visit their camp in a helicopter, and partook of that dreadful tea concoction that was brewed in a galvanised bucket - with bits of sadza floating about (the same receptacle would be used for all their meals – be it cooking mealie meal, bully beef or brewing their tea!). The Selous Scouts sulked when the use of air support was denied them for their landmine laying parties into Moçambique. The Scouts were weary of the sandy soils in the area, which made anti-tracking difficult. A casualty of Operation Kodak was Sergeant Clive Mason - he was shot in the head during an early morning attack on an outpost outside Malvernia - but he also accounted for six Freds (FRELIMO). OPERATION COWBOY: 2 to 6 MARCH 1977 Operation Cowboy was a No 7 Squadron helicopter insertion of a 4-man SAS stick to carry out a recce of the Mungari – Luenha road in the Tete area of Moçambique (grid WR2496). I can’t recall whether the helicopters were used for extraction, which ran the risk of compromise - but I would think the SAS would have called for helicopter uplift as well. OPERATIONS WRESTLER, STRIPPER AND STARJUMP: 2 MARCH 1977 These three operations were all launched on the same day. On Wrestler the SAS carried out a recce and ambush of the Chioco Crossroads, Tete Province, and Moçambique. For Stripper a helicopter insertion was required for the 8-man, 7-day ambush of the Choa-Catandica (Vila Gouveia) road in Manica – at grid ref WR 125187 (see the map section, at the end of the book). Starjump was a one-day recce and ambush of the Manica Guru-Gaerezi road. OPERATION HUSTLER: 7 MARCH 1977 This was a successful SAS ambush with land-mine detonation by a Land Rover on the Changara – Chigwara road, Tete, which resulted in 2 FRELIMO killed and four wounded. LYNX 4312 CRASH AT FAF 5, MTOKO: 15 MARCH 1977 FAF 5, Mtoko, was not the easiest of runways. If you were taking off on runway 23, then all was in your favour as the end of the runway just fell away into the Tribal Trust Land. Not so with runway 05 - the last 500 metres was a downhill slope towards the stream and the overshoot was a gradual incline - certainly not the ideal situation for night take-offs, especially if there was no moon. Major Brian Robinson of the SAS had arrived at Mtoko so that he could be uplifted by Lynx to fly out over Moçambique to talk to one of his call-signs that was in contact on a covert mission. At just after 20h00 on 15 March 1977, Lynx 4312 with Air Sub-Lieutenant John Kidson at the controls got airborne. It was a particularly dark night and Kidson was new to this type of flying, having completed his conversion onto the Lynx a mere couple of months ago, and only done a few bush trips. Max 'Sticks' McKersie, an ex co-student on John Kidson's flying course, was at Mtoko in his new role as an Intelligence Officer with Special Branch. This is his story: - “As I was interested in aircraft I approached the Lynx, got into a conversation with John and caught up with news of other pilots from No 28 Pilot Training Course. He did not recognise me at first, but he soon remembered me and we chatted about our antics on selection course. I hinted at the possibility of a flight around my area of jurisdiction (Mudzi/ Mayo). The Major finished his meeting and so I hopped out of the Lynx and wished John farewell. I was certainly very envious of him and the other successful pilots from our cadet course. Then I made the usual 'friendly' remarks like “You will never get this plane off the ground. You need experienced pilots like me to show you how. Don't forget to set your flaps on take-off and watch out for the gum trees at the end of the airstrip”. With these ‘callous’ remarks echoing in his ears, John started up his aircraft and I went back to my intelligence caravan, sulking because I was not flying his aeroplane. “I took off,” said John, “and was in the process of raising my undercarriage when there was a loud scraping sound and we were thrown forward in our seatbelts. I knew immediately what had happened – having raised the undercarriage too soon. The aircraft came to a halt in a few yards and I shouted to Major Robbie to get out. As we exited the doors the aircraft burst into flames.” Brian Robinson takes up the story “My guys had a contact in Mozambique at last light. When we got airborne, it was pitch black. I glanced at the VSI (vertical speed indicator) and saw it pointing in the six o’clock position – we were heading straight for the ground! I shouted to John ‘What the hell are you doing’ (or words to that effect – quite mildly?)”, while apparently adjusting his engine synchronisation. “I heard the Lynx take off,” continued McKersie, “and then there was suddenly a great commotion as people were rushing to vehicles and driving away down the airstrip. I didn't know what was going on and certainly did not think that John had crashed the Lynx, so I didn't join in the initial exodus. When I heard the news of his accident I burst out laughing (I suppose we were a little bush-whacked by that stage of the conflict), not knowing whether anybody had survived the accident or not. I jokingly thought: 'The stupid idiot didn't remember my valuable instructions about setting the flaps'. By the time I had mustered up some transport to get to the scene of the accident, everything was under control and the Dakota crew were being readied for casevac. Major Brian Robinson and John Kidson were put onto the Dakota and were flown to Salisbury by Flight Lieutenant Bob d'Hotman for the mandatory check-up by the Doc.” Lynx 4312 was destroyed in the ensuing fire. Brian did confirm with the author, many years later, that the accident was pilot error (and not technical defect), and that they both were indeed lucky to be alive. Brian concluded “The crash impact was on the other side of the Mtoko road. Several hundred metres from runway 23 threshold. I have a photograph in my study”. AIR STRIKE LOG: 23 MARCH 1977 No Date Crews Target Aircraft Weapons Result 657 23/03/77 Repulse Michael Borlace / Lionel Davel / Willem Joubert Rutenga area G-Car 7584 600x.303 Browning Mk2 Assisted in contact initiated by Ian Harvey 657 – Mike recalls: “I think I called en-route to assist at this, and the contact was initiated by Ian Harvey from Rutenga, where he got a couple of scratch sticks together of cooks and bottle washers, and the Chinese cook or laundry man or someone slotted (shot) a gook.” OPERATION DRIVER: 9 to 29 MAY 1977 This was an SAS operation in the Tete Province of Moçambique. It started off well when on the first day contact was made by call-sign 19 and a FRELIMO was killed. Meanwhile call-sign 21 carried out a jitter (to scare the enemy) raid on Chioco with small arms, mortar and RPG harassment. With the reinforcement of six call signs, the attack on Chioco was carried out on 13th May – one FRELIMO was killed during the attack on the SAS mortar position, another wounded – and the entire settlement was taken without resistance. Seven •303 rifles, 9 AK’s, 54 SKS, 11 RPG2 rockets, 28 B10 heat projectiles, 81 and 82-mm mortar base plates, 82-mm mortar bombs and 60-mm mortar bombs were recovered. Also small arms and ammunition, grenades and medic packs. Call-sign 19 also had a successful day on 13th May – two FRELIMO were killed in a contact, four ferries and four boats were destroyed and a night attack was carried out in the vicinity of grid ref VT 3675. On the 22nd call-sign 32 carried out an ambush, killing one terrorist. Call-sign 19 had better luck the following day, the 24th, with their ambush accounting for nine terrorists killed at grid reference VT 3948. On the 27th call-sign 21 made contact with a group of 40 at VT 4248, killing one FPLM, four terrorists killed, and 4-5 terrorists wounded, for one SF wounded. On 29th May 1977 call-sign 19 did the Air Force a favour by attacking an anti-aircraft gun position at Mague, UT 664524, Tete, capturing one 14.5-mm HMG, one 82-mm mortar, 5 AK’s, 3 AKM’s, ammunition and destroying a camp. The SAS also reported that the enemy were doing the job for them, by firing on each other! Then in another country – on 1st June 1977, the SAS scored a victory by attacking Nyamuoba Farm, Zambia, and killing 17 terrorists. OPERATION AZTEC: 28 MAY to 2 JUNE 1977 Operation Aztec was a combined forces’ attack on Jorge do Limpopo, Madulo Pan and Mapai, in Moçambique, from 28th May to 2nd June 1977. It was a sad day for No 16 PTC - because it was on this operation that the first pilot from No 16 PTC was killed on operations - Flight Lieutenant Bruce Collocott. I had carried Bruce as a passenger in a Canberra trip flown nearly five years earlier - on 13th June 1972. Operation Aztec involved sending the Rhodesian Light Infantry to clear Madulo Pan while the Selous Scouts were tasked to take out Mapai and demolish sections of railway in the Gaza Province. Helicopters of No 7 Squadron trooped the RLI assault force into the ZANLA complex known as Rio, on the Nuanetsi River. Another group of RLI was para-dropped into the Madulo Pan ZANLA base area - the same area that had been previously neutralised by the Air Force. The Selous Scouts, meanwhile, launched a motorised column assault towards Jorge do Limpopo. Major Bert Sachse commanded the Scouts, from their fort based at FAF 7. On 29th May 1977, at 11h00, a pair of Hawker Hunters from No 1 Squadron attacked the ZANLA terrorist base at Madulo Pan. The airstrike was followed by the para-drop of forty RLI commandos. As the RLI chaps swept the area, they came across a vast litter of skulls and human skeletons, which could only have been the relics left over from the Canberra bomber raid. Meanwhile, the Scouts, en route to Jorge do Limpopo, encountered scattered rocket and mortar fire on the outskirts of the town, and called for air support. A second pair of Hunters was scrambled and duly neutralised the enemy positions. A large quantity of enemy stores, equipment and vehicles was captured. Having cleared Madulo Pan, the RLI assisted the Scouts to garrison Jorge do Limpopo. At the Mapai airstrip the Scouts encountered a large contingent of FRELIMO and ZANLA, well dug in, and equipped with 60mm mortars and 14,5mm anti-aircraft guns. A brief firefight ensued. By now night had fallen and the ground troops had to wait through the night to commence their assault on Mapai town itself at first light on the 30th. Once again the Hunters from No 1 Squadron were called upon to carry out dawn strikes on the ZANLA and FRELIMO strong points forming a defensive perimeter around the village. After they had been softened up, the Scouts advanced. As they did so, they came under a severe mortar barrage, and the Hunter air support was again called for. Unfortunately, the Scouts couldn't pinpoint the mortar positions for the Hunter pilots. However, the mere presence of the Air Force made it easier for the Scouts to take the village - but the bulk of the ZANLA arms and ammunition had by now been dispersed into small dumps around the village. Because the Mapai airfield was still in a serviceable condition, Ron Reid-Daly (OC Selous Scouts) called for a Dakota to airlift in a team of mechanics. He wanted the mechanics to make repairs to some of the captured ZANLA vehicles which were non-runners, because of neglect or mechanical ignorance. He then later called for a further Dakota to fly in an extra demolition team. Then during the afternoon the Scouts were running low on explosives and mortar bombs - and they wanted extra men – so a third Dakota resupply was called for. By the time all the arrangements were made, it was already late and the ill-fated Dakota, co-piloted by Bruce Collocott, arrived after sunset. At 20h00, after having been unloaded, the Dakota pilots prepared for their night take-off with the aid of truck lights and strobes for runway lights. They taxied to the end of the runway, and had just commenced their take-off when an RPG-7 rocket slammed into the starboard engine, immediately setting it alight. The aircrew had no option but to abort the take-off, but had no control as the aircraft ground-looped, ripping off the undercarriage. In no time, the aircraft was ablaze, and everyone aboard, except Bruce, abandoned the burning Dakota. It was evident that Bruce had been shot - he was killed by the first burst of terrorist tracer fire (according to the Scouts’ report). ~~~OOO~~~ At first light the next morning, the Air Force salvage team arrived by No 7 Squadron helicopter, and salvaged what they could from the almost totally burned out wreckage. Then ironically, explosives that had been airlifted in, were used to destroy what was left of the Dakota. The Air Force maintained flying patrols in order to keep a watchful eye on the possibility of enemy reinforcements being moved up from Barragem. The Air Force strategy paid off. Six FRELIMO vehicles loaded with troops were destroyed in airstrikes. The result was that FRELIMO made no more attempts to send up relief forces. This gave the ground forces the respite to blow up a steam crane and massive concrete culverts under the railway line which effectively immobilised rail traffic until after the war. The Air Force lost a valuable pilot, and aircraft on Operation Aztec. Estimated terrorist losses were reckoned on sixty plus, as well as the final elimination of the Moçambique railways in the Gaza Province along which the ZANLA terrorists, their equipment and stores had been moving to the Rhodesian border. The destruction or capture of a large number of military vehicles being used for the same purposes, and the capture of a vast quantity of terrorist war material were added bonuses. No 5 Squadron – March 1974 Seated: Pilots Keith Goddard, Mick Delport, John Bennie, Ian Donaldson (QFI), Sqn WO George Heron, Prop Geldenhuys (‘A’ Flt Cdr), Randy du Rand (Sqn Cdr), navigators Bernie Vaughan (‘B’ Flt Cdr), Glob Pasea, Starry Stevens, Paddy Morgan, Rich Airey and Jim Russell Canberra Vic Formation Canberras, Vampires and Hunters – Rhodesians main strike aircraft used during the Bush War Operation Hurricane – 20 Ton Week – February 1974 Aircrews: Bernie Vaughan, Starry Stevens, Rich Airey, Mike Delport, Keith Goddard, John Bennie, Prop Geldenhuys, Glob Pasea and Squadron Commander Randy du Rand (Authors note: The left-hand bomb trolley is loaded with 500lb High Explosive bombs. The bomb box rack, on the right, would hold up to 96 x 20lb Fragmentation bombs. It was the latter that malfunctioned, and resulted in the death of Rich Airey and Keith Goddard) Operation Marble – No 5 Squadron, after dropping 20 tons of bombs in a week. Keith Goddard and Rich Airey were killed shortly after this photo was taken Hawker Hunter – COIN Course - May 1974 Hunter and Canberra – Nos 1 & 5 Squadrons – two of the jet strike aircraft that fell under the Strike 1 portfolio at Air Headquarters Lynx Aircraft – No 4 Squadron – Operation Mardon An impressive RAF No 111 Squadron Hunter formation flypast at the Farnborough Air Show – led by Squadron Leader Roger Topp – in 1956. The barely recognisable remains of Bruce Collocott’s Dakota at Mapai in the ‘Russian Front”. The Fin and engine cowlings, with propellers, of what was Dakota R 3702 can be seen. Bruce Collocott was the only No 16 PTC pilot killed on air operations during the Bush War Fire Force fire-power Aircraft Lynx and Alouette K-Car (Photos: from Eddy Norris of ORAF’s – acknowledged with thanks) Hunter and Vampire’s arsenal of weapons 6.

MAHOGANY BOMBER MAHOGANY BOMBER / SEEK AND STRIKE

I was appointed OCAW Thornhill on 17th January 1977, whilst still at FAF 7, as a Lynx jock on No 4 Squadron. I still had two operational sorties to fly with the Selous Scout Major Bert Sachse, who commanded Operation Manyatela. An attack had been carried out on Madulo Pan, and Bert wanted a current Sitrep (Situation report). On landing, I handed over the Lynx that I had used ever since my search mission for the downed Canberra crews of Ian Donaldson and David Hawkes. My ferry flight to Thornhill was with Sergeant Grant Domoney. After handing the Lynx aircraft back to No 4 Squadron and changing from IS kit into Air Force blues, I duly reported to the Base Commander, Group Captain Tol Janeke. OC Thornhill briefed me on my duties, saying that I would be accountable to him and would be held responsible for all the administrative functions. These included the Accounts Section, PARO - Pay and Records Office, 'B' Squadron General Service Unit (GSU), Security, SWO - Station Warrant Officer, Guard Room, SSQ - Station Sick Quarters, NCO Messes, Gardens, Canteen, and all Department of Defence dealings regarding Estimates Submissions such as Major and Minor Works. I would also be the link man between Headquarters and Station on all administrative matters. This seemed a formidable task, but very competent personnel that made the challenge quite exciting headed each Section. The beauty of this Mahogany Bomber staff position was that I would still be required to maintain my flying currency in case of operational needs. I did not have long to wait. On 22nd January 1977 I was tasked to uplift the Rhodesian Army Commander in a Lynx. I duly positioned Salisbury airport to uplift Major General John Hickman plus his Aide De Camp Major Harrison and flew them to Gwelo. Once they had finished their business at the School of Infantry, I again flew them back to Salisbury. Two days later, I flew two passengers down to FAF 7 Buffalo Range in a Trojan. This OCAW job certainly had its benefits - a desk-cum-flying job. I found myself flying some 108 sorties, as OCAW, logging more than 278 hours. Whilst my first love was still flying, the Mahogany Bomber also had its ups and downs. My Mahogany Bomber was going nowhere - but an administrative posting is a fact of life in the GD/P mustering - general duties/pilot meant Mahogany responsibilities sooner or later. Flying a desk instead of an aircraft comes in various forms. I was privileged to land the plum OCAW Staff Appointment job because there were only two such posts in the Air Force: New Sarum and Thornhill. Both bases had three wings - OCFW, OCAW and OCTW - for Flying, Administration and Technical wings respectively. The three “wing” commanders reported to the CO or Station Commander. GD/Ps of Wing Commander rank commanded the senior wing, OCFW, whereas the other two wings were commanded by Squadron Leader-ranked officers. The other Squadron Leaders on the base, as Squadron Commanders, reported to OCFW. As OCAW reporting directly to the CO, I would be considered part of senior management as far as all administrative matters were concerned. The SWO - Station Warrant Officer, equivalent to the Army Regimental Sergeant Major, is THE most powerful, and often feared, non-commissioned officer on the base. When he bawled “Jump.” everybody responded with a “How high Sir?” - even most commissioned officers! I had Warrant Officer Class I Wally Jefferies as my SWO. The SWO was also responsible for Parks, Gardens and Recreation. Flight Sergeant Hennie Pretorius and Sergeant John Childs assisted Wally. I often had to be wary of sticking to the proper chain of command in relaying my orders to Hennie and John through Wally. Because if not, the SWO would make damn’ sure my orders were ignored whenever I by-passed him. Needless to say I got on extremely well with all my staff and we even strengthened our own esprit de corps and traditions. The Security Branch headed by Flight Lieutenant Peter Cowan and assisted by John Cox and Ted Barnard commanded the largest number of airmen on the base - the GSU - General Service Unit ground staff. Air Lieutenant Basil Moss commanded OC 'B' Squadron GSU. Squadron Warrant Officer 'Danger' Ncube ably assisted Basil - a highly respected Ndebele who was likened to Shaka Zulu. SSQ - Station Sick Quarters - controlled by the MO - Medical Officer - included an eight-bed Station Hospital with separate ward facilities for Officers and ORs - Other Ranks. The MOs were Aviation Medicine experts who carried out annual flying medical examinations on all pilots. Thornhill also boasted the only decompression chamber in the Force. Experiencing the effects of anoxia or explosive decompression are career events, which all pilots are subjected to. Pilots would be grounded when they failed their annual medical and the MOs could determine within minutes whenever pilots' physical and mental fitness had slipped. I had full confidence in their methodology of measuring heart beat after only a couple of jumps up and down the dreaded 'box' in the examination room. Flight Lieutenant Bryan Byars was in charge of the Accounts Department, which also included the Pay and Records Office, Typing Pool, Registry and Telephonist. I was a co-signatory for all cheques concerning public money expenditures. A Warrant Officer was also in charge of the MT - Motor Transport Section and I was required to authorise all Forms 658 requisitions - Request for Transport. The management of the base Canteen (in effect a medium sized Supermarket) and specifically the Warrant Officers’/Sergeants’ and Airmen's Mess were also my specific responsibility. As already mentioned, I was also solely responsible for all Major and Minor Works preparations and submissions to the Secretary for Defence and co-ordination-cum-liaison with PWD - Public Works Department. I then also had co-responsibility for Stores - controlled by the SEO - Station Equipment Officer. One 'jam-stealer' who readily comes to mind was the all-round ball player and national Rugby Team player Dux Deysel who could kick like a donkey - and all perfect ‘torpedoes’ too! These wide-ranging responsibilities meant never a dull moment. That was so in my case and I thoroughly enjoyed my stint as OCAW - and appreciated the excellent ”grounding“ (to coin a phrase) that the Air Force equipped me with. It was a real handful when I started, but I owe Tol Janeke a debt of gratitude for imparting his Staff College skills to me. OPERATION PEPTIC: 27 JUNE to 2 SEPTEMBER 1977 Operation Peptic was carried out in the Tete Province of Moçambique and consisted of recces, ambushes, mining and general harassment of the enemy by the SAS. Areas concentrated on included Chintopo, Zumbo and Seçuranca – where a large quantity of terrorist arms and ammunitions was destroyed. These included 150 82-mm mortar bombs, 150 60-mm mortar bombs, 12 RPG7 rockets and 10 boxes of 7.62-mm rounds destroyed on site. This also led to the Air Force carrying out an air strike by Lynx, Canberras and Hunters on the latter on 8th September 1977. AIR STRIKE LOG 8 SEPTEMBER 1977 No Date Crews Target Aircraft Result 724 08/09/77 Glen Pretorius JR Blythe-Wood A/T 900 – Seçuranca, Tete, Moçambique Canberra 2504 Hunter 1827 Unknown casualties, cache destroyed. SAS ground sweep No 724 – 08/09/77. This related Air Force and SAS operation was pieced together when I came across an “Operations Table, by Captain JRT Wood, Rhodesian Intelligence Corps”, which appeared in an SAS book. It is apparent that towards the end of Operation Peptic, the SAS destroyed a large armaments cache on 2nd September. Wood’s Operations Table lists the Air Force as having carried out a camp attack at Seçuranca, Tete, Moçambique, resulting in unknown casualties. The Lynx, Hunter and Canberra strike was followed by an SAS ground sweep. The cache destroyed included 6,000 7.62-mm rounds, 150 60-mm and 150 82-mm mortar bombs, and 12 RPG7 rockets. OPERATION BRISKET: 29 JUNE to 29 JULY 1977 Operation Brisket was a recce of the Kavalamanja – Feira roads, Ditande area of Zambia by the SAS (see also Operation Turmoil for more detail). OPERATIONS GRAPPLE AND TANGENT: 1 AUGUST 1977 Operation Grapple was situated in the Rhodesian Midlands province. Thornhill Air Force base was bang in the middle. As OCAW my duties were essentially administrative. The operations personnel were responsible for prosecuting Coin operations from the Gwelo School of Infantry base. Every now and again I would find myself involved with various Operation Grapple functions. In June 1978 a Hartley PATU - Police Anti Terrorist Unit of Reservist farmers made contact with a pseudo group, killing Selous Scout Corporal Obasi and his group of three Scouts, mainly because Inkomo (now called the Andre Rabie Barracks) had failed to communicate a frozen area to the Grapple JOC. It was a tragic failing of the need-to-know principle whereby it unnecessarily cost the lives of ground forces fighting on the same side. I for one did not blame the farmers - they could not afford to take any chances after the murder of the Hartley couple Johannes and Barbara Viljoen during Operation Pagoda in June 1966. Operation Tangent covered the south-west border area next to Botswana, and specifically Matabeleland. Operations were conducted from Brady; the Army's No 1 Brigade Headquarters. With more operational areas opening up, the Air Force was being stretched to its limits. OPERATION TERMINATE: 19 SEPTEMBER to 21 OCTOBER 1977 Operation Terminate with an attack at Cangudzi, Tete in which 1 ZANLA, 4 FPLM and 17 recruits were killed. Then eight days later, on the 27th, an opportune target presented itself to the SAS at WS 158804 in which a further 19 terrorist recruits were killed, as well as two incriminating AK weapons recovered. The next day an ambush on a vehicle column resulted in 2 FPLM and 17 terrorists and recruits killed. Ambushes sprung during early October added to the bag. On 12th October the Air Force was called upon to air strike a FRELIMO vehicle column on the Mague – Mukumbura road, near Mague in the Tete Province of Moçambique. Planks Blythe-Wood and his wing man did pretty well. AIR STRIKE LOG 12 OCTOBER 1977 No Date Crews Target Aircraft Weapons Result 736 12/10/77 Terminate JR Blythe-Wood Hunter Convoy of three trucks in the Russian Front: Mague-Mukumbura Rd Hunter 1198 Hunter 30mm cannon 68RP Merc, Toyota and Isuzu destroyed. 3+ FRELIMO killed, 14 wounded and 3 missing. Richard Wood, from his position in the Rhodesian Intelligence Corps logged that 3+ FPLM killed, 14 seriously wounded, 19 slightly wounded and 3 missing. Destroyed Mercedes-Benz, Toyota, Isuzu, food, war materials and medicines. The SAS engaged on Operation Terminate enjoyed further successes on the 19th, 20th and 21st October 1977. Terminate ll was carried out from 15 March 1978 and ended 15 August 1978. AIR STRIKE LOG 11 OCTOBER 1977 No Date Crews Target Aircraft Weapons Result 735 11/10/77 Rich Beaver Attack on Terrs Lynx .303 Night air to ground attack 738 18/10/77 Tangent Rich Beaver Spook Geraty Rich Brand Zambezi Gorge crossing Lynx Hunter Hunter .303 37mm Sneb Boat with terrs sunk. FAC for jet strike across river It was during early October 1977, on 11th, to be exact, that my old Air Force buddy Rich Beaver acquitted himself rather well. He was rewarded for his bravery with the award of the MFC - Military Forces Commendation (Operational). His citation reads as follows - “As a (Lynx) pilot on No 4 Squadron, he assisted ground forces to withdraw from an untenable position by delivering a hazardous air to ground attack on terrorists by the light of flares which he had dropped. On 18th October, over dangerous terrain in the Deka - Zambezi River Gorge, he successfully attacked terrorists attempting to cross the river by boat, and then provided highly effective control for a strike by jet aircraft on a terrorist position adjacent to the crossing point.” According to Beav, he had been scrambled from FAF 1 and was given an in-flight briefing by the PRAW aircraft flying at altitude on border patrol duties. After plotting the boat crossing point on his map, he realised that attacking from the west, over the mountainous terrain, would jeopardise the element of surprise. He accordingly elected to remain low-level, and approach from the east, pulling up at the last minute to his 'perch' position. This plan was duly executed to perfection. Rich fired his front guns on his FRA - first run attack - in order to keep the terrorist heads down, and then fired a salvo of rockets at the boat, which was in the middle of the Zambezi river. Because he was flying the Lynx straight towards the rising mountains on either side of the river gorge, he was forced to pull up steeply as soon as he had fired his Sneb rockets. The boat was no more. Because he could see no sign of movement, he queried developments from the PRAW pilot circling overhead the airstrike. The PRAW pilot confirmed that the boat had sunk. It was only then that Rich noted numerous bodies being swept downstream by the fast flowing current of the Zambezi River. Rich remained in the vicinity and successfully directed jet pilots Spook Geraty (who had just returned from Operation Sand in South Africa) and Rich Brand onto the terrorist position adjacent to the crossing point. I might add that Rich Beaver also excelled during Operations Modular, Hooper and Packer, as a pilot with the SAAF. During August 1977, on the 2nd, a mortar bomb attack was carried out on Zimbabwe House in Lusaka. A victim in this attack, suffering “hearing damage/impairment.”, was a certain Chenjerai “Hitler” Hunzvi – who subsequently became the self-styled leader of the so called ‘War Veterans’ that spearheaded the white farm invasions in the mid 2000s, and thereby averted a narrow defeat for Mugabe’s ruling ZANU P/F party. Hunzvi was also in Botswana, during either 1977 or 1978, when he again sustained injuries during a Rhodesian attack. A pity he wasn’t knocked off. OPERATION DRAGON: 21 SEPTEMBER to 13 October 1977 The SAS recce’d DK and Kafwambila camps in Zambia, presumably with photographs taken by No 5 Squadron. OPERATION GRINDER: 18 to 24 OCTOBER 1977 Operation Grinder resulted in 16 terrorists killed when the SAS attacked the Nyamuomba Camp in Zambia. AIR STRIKE LOG 15 OCTOBER 1977 No Date Crews Target Aircraft Weapons Result 737 15/10/77 JR Blythe-Wood Hunter No 2 Op Melon – Convoy VK270500 Gaza Moz. Hunter 1827 Hunter 30mm 68RP 3 vehicles destroyed. 2 SAS wounded (JRT Wood) Captain JRT Wood, of the Rhodesian Intelligence Corps, records that the SAS made contact at Grid Ref VK 270500, Gaza, Moçambique, on 15th October 1977. He states that there was an “airstrike on convoy”, and noted that “2 SAS wounded. 3 vehicles destroyed”. John Blythe-Wood is the only pilot known to have carried out an airstrike on that day, and author’s licence is taken to draw obvious conclusions with regard to Air Strike Log No 737. MOHOGANY BOMBER TRADE-OFF: OCTOBER 1977 To get back to some more of my own flying experiences - because I enjoyed the best of both worlds, I could trade in my Mahogany Bomber for a real flying machine. My flying currency had lapsed because I had not flown for quite a while. As mentioned, the Air Force was being stretched as more operational areas were opening up - and the need arose to fully utilise pilots, even those holding down desk jobs. We “retreads” could thus provide a small measure of relief to Squadron pilots who were in dire need of some R&R. Trading in my OCAW desk for a Lynx on operational duties injected a lot more variety and challenge into this GD/P - general duties pilot. At the end of October 1977, Officer Commanding No 4 Squadron, Squadron Leader Dag Jones, gave me an urgent, quick, re-familiarisation and standardisation sortie on the Lynx aircraft. I had not had my bum in the air since my return from FAF 1 in the latter part of the month before. My solo general was a disaster - I experienced undercarriage failure and had to cut my sortie short, but was able to land successfully without any mishap. The Squadron technicians did what they could to clear the snag. Dag Jones then came up with me to check out the aircraft (Lynx R 3417), but we had to abort the sortie because of another undercarriage failure. The only other aircraft available for my instrument and night flying currency was Lynx R 3411. I logged a respectable four hours flying for the day The following day, 1st November 1977, Dag Jones flew safety pilot for me while I got in over two hours of simulated instrument flying. That night I flew a solo single line flare sortie with instrument flying letdown. There was obviously some urgency to get me fully operational on type as soon as possible, and so it came as no surprise that my next sortie was flown with a very, very senior pilot indeed - as my safety pilot. I needed to be instrument rated in order to undertake field deployments. On 2nd November 1977, Group Captain John Mussell was my safety pilot whilst I practised a VDF and NDB simulated instrument/cloud flying letdowns. This certainly was the most senior Air Force GD/P officer I had been privileged to have as a safety pilot. John Mussell had been my Squadron Commander when No 4 Squadron moved from New Sarum to Thornhill way back in 1964. Looking back, this was only the second occasion on which I had flown with him (the previous was in a Provost). John's elder brother, Frank Mussell, was the current Air Force Commander. On 2nd and 3rd November, I flew the Lynx with Flight Lieutenant Tony Oakley and OC 4 Squadron to round off my minimum instrument requirement. Then early on 4th November Dag rated me White Card and I flew to Kutanga with Mick Delport for a quickie weapons re-familiarisation, firing 700 x •303 rounds front gun, dropping 12 Bubs (break-up bombs frantan profile) and 10 x 37-mm Sneb rockets. This rushed mini OCU re-familiarisation was indicative of the urgent need to get as many pilots as possible ready for field deployments at short notice. I was now ready. My quick conversion had taken a mere five days. A four-day detachment to FAF 1 for Operation Tangent / Ranger duties followed immediately after my Lynx conversion. I uplifted Sergeant Kevin Nelson from Thornhill and positioned Wankie late on 4th November 1977 - having flown six sorties for the day, and logging a total of six flying hours for the day. Kevin's younger brother Rob had been killed in action earlier in the year - on 8th May, and as fate would have it, his turn would come a mere seven months after my sortie with him. Kevin was killed in action in Moçambique in a South African Z-Car (on 28th July 1978. A tragic sequel was that his mother, who had now lost two sons killed in action, committed suicide). I obviously felt very much at home at Wankie, due to my Operation Nickel days. The purpose of this trip was to use the Air Force re-tread pilots for maximum effect and release the battle weary squadron pilots for well earned R&R, or even for re-deployment duties elsewhere. My Operation Tangent detachment had its own highlights. Early on 5th November 1977 I was tasked with armed border reconnaissance cover from Kazungula to Victoria Falls, landing and operating from Sprayview airstrip. Later in the day, I got airborne again. I recorded one Zambian soldier killed. Kevin Nelson accompanied me on this one hundred-minute recce in Lynx R 3048. South African forces were conducting offensive operations against SWAPO in Zambian bases. I was not aware that the South Africans were operating out of Katima Mulilo in the Caprivi Strip of South West Africa - later Namibia (Special Force Recces were based at Fort Doppies). I landed at the new Victoria Falls Airport. There was not much activity the next day, so I practised night flying and non-directional beacon letdowns, with circuits at FAF 1. The FAF had certainly developed over the years and the Wankie airfield could now be considered an all-weather airfield, boasting its own Rhodesian-developed glide-path approach lights. These lights were positioned at the touchdown point and would either glow red if the pilot is low on glide path, or orange if okay. It consisted of slits in a box, through which beams of coloured lights were projected at the exact angle of the glide path to aid pilots approaching the runway. On 7th November my relief arrived and I returned to Thornhill in Lynx R 3094. Then it was back to the grindstone, and my rather enjoyable, albeit mundane OCAW duties. Any spell away from Thornhill invariably meant catching up with unattended business. I didn't mind. The fly boys were doing a splendid job. The Mahogany Bombers had it easy in comparison to the long hours demanded from those at the sharp end. On 23rd November, I was tasked to conduct ground air control training for the Army Cadets, in the Bulawayo area. Sergeant Curwen accompanied me on the three hour Lynx flight to the 1 Brigade area. On the same day, Operation Dingo got off the ground. OPERATIONS RANGER AND SALOPS Operation Ranger covered the North-west Border area, stretching from the Tuli area in the south, through Kazungula on the north-west corner of Rhodesia, and up to approximately Binga on Lake Kariba. Although operational headquarters was originally centred at Bulawayo, Operation Ranger took over from the Matabeleland-focused Operation Tangent, and concentrated its activities mainly around Wankie – thereby exercising control mainly on north-west border operations. Its establishment coincided with Operation Grapple (Midlands) Salops concentrated on Salisbury and Districts. These structures facilitated command and control by Comops. OPERATION DINGO: WEDNESDAY 23 to SATURDAY 26 NOVEMBER 1977 Operation Dingo was a major air-initiated cross border strike against the Chimoio terrorist base in Moçambique, involving every serviceable operational aircraft the Rhodesian Air Force could muster. It was the biggest attack so far mounted in the war, and necessitated putting even the highly suspect Vampire FB 9 (i.e. without ejector seats) in the front line. Chimoio Base, to the north of the town of like name, housed eight thousand inhabitants, and had become the official headquarters for all the ZANLA forces led by Robert Mugabe. The huge complex was situated three hundred and twenty kilometres from New Sarum, and its administrative core was well established with offices, great stores of arms and ammunition, vast stocks of food, a hospital, two schools and several substantial buildings roofed with corrugated iron, and concrete floors. It was a military base heavily defended with 12.7mm and 14.4mm anti-aircraft batteries. War refugees, numbering about twenty thousand at the time, were concentrated at Doeroi, some fifty-five kilometres further east. The raid against Chimoio was to be followed by over thirty cross-border strikes before the end of the war. The operation got off the ground late due to guti (drizzle) conditions, filthy weather for airmen. The cloud base at Chimoio was barely three hundred feet. This however, was no problem for the large ground forces that also took part - the whole of the Special Air Services and almost the whole of the Rhodesian Light Infantry. Six No 5 Squadron Canberras, each armed with three hundred anti-personnel Mark II Alpha bombs, took off from New Sarum at 07h05 on that Wednesday morning, 23rd November 1977 and joined up with the Hunters from Thornhill before crossing the border. Half an hour after take-off, and with nearly five minutes to target, the Hunters of No 1 Squadron accelerated to four hundred and fifty knots and pulled up to their perch position for their first run attacks. The Cans followed at three hundred and thirty knots dropping their bomb load, landing back at New Sarum an hour twenty minutes after take-off to load up with more Alpha bombs. Meanwhile the K-Cars went in with their 20mm cannons while the Dakotas from No 3 Squadron dropped their paratroops and the G-Cars landed their sticks of soldiers. Then six Vampires from No. 2 squadron followed, attacking their specific targets, including anti-aircraft emplacements, with their three-inch rockets and cannon. Other strong points were attacked when called upon to do so by the ground forces. Because Chimoio was on the limit of the Vampire range, they were also operating from New Sarum. Despite this, one of the Vampires did not make it back - see later. The Lynxes of No 4 Squadron were also in the thick of things. They took off from the FAF at Grand Reef. Armed with 37mm Sneb rockets and mini-Golf bombs, their task consisted of target marking for the strike aircraft and close air support of the army units. Being the most vulnerable, two Lynxes were hit by ground fire. A counter-insurgency tactic developed was the use of code names when communicating with the various aircraft types such as Panzers for the Hunters, Goblins for the Vampires, Hornets for the Lynxes, Kiewiets for the Cessnas and Spiders for helicopters. “Cyclone” was used by the ground troops to call or attract any of the various aircraft types. I was Officer Commanding Administration Wing of Thornhill Air Base at the time, and my Station Commander had “jammed” (connived to obtain - in Air Force jargon) himself a Vampire T 11, with the result that I was left behind to hold the fort. Unfortunately, Air Lieutenant Phil Haigh, flying a Vampire FB 9 without an ejector seat, had an engine failure on the way back from Chimoio, having sustained a hit in one of the bottom gas burners of his Goblin jet engine. Phil put the Vampire down, well inside Rhodesia, with a good wheels-up belly landing. But by sheer bad luck the Vampire slid into a gully and exploded. Phil was killed. The responsibility then fell on me to inform his wife Dot that her husband had been killed. (Note: Refer to the Air Strike Log section – see # 753. Map kindly reproduced by permission of Covos Day books) OP DINGO AIRSTRIKE LOG No Date Crews Target Aircraft Weapons Result 753 23/11/77 Dingo (External) Rich Brand Vic Wightman Steve Kesby JR Blythe-Wood Randy du Rand Glen Pretorius Tol Janeke Varky Varkevisser Ken Law Phil Haigh Vic Cook / Jeff Dartnall Harold Griffiths John Annan Bill Sykes + whole of 7 Sqn Mark McLean Chris Tucker Bob d’Hotman Norman Walsh Jack Malloch / George Alexander Chimoio – Vanduzi Camp WQ030525 Manica and Tembue Camp, VU815525, Tete Province north of Cabora Bassa Hunter x 6 Hunter 1188 Hunter Hunter 8122 Canberra Canberra 2502 Vampire 4152 Vampire 1380 Vampire Vampire Vampire 1386 10 K-Cars 21 G-Cars Lynx Dakota x 6 Command Dak DC 7 30mm cannon 68RP Golf bombs 1200xAlpha bombs 20mm cannon RP’s Phil Haigh killed, during forced landing in Vampire. Vampire targets were the northern part of the Chimoio training element, anti-aircraft weapon sites and barrack blocks. JRT Wood tabulates 800 terrorists killed, 750 wounded. In addition to Haigh, Trooper G.J. Nel killed and 6 RLI wounded. Camp and all equipment destroyed. See also Peter Petter-Bowyer’s Winds of Destruction, pages 457 to 465 754 24/11/77 Dingo (External) Vic Wightman JR Blythe-Wood Glen Pretorius Varky Varkevisser (top cover) Tembue base – VU 815525 Hunter 8122 Hunter 1188 Canberra 2085 Vampire 1380 30mm 68RP 20mm & RP’s Alpha bombs (JRT Wood logs 400 terrorists killed at Tembue, VU 815525 on 26.11.77) 755 26/11/77 Virile (External) Chris Tucker Vic Wightman JR Blythe-Wood Rich Brand Spook Geraty Tol Janeke Varky Varkevisser FRELIMO – ZANLA convoy Espungabera / Dombe road, Moçambique Lynx Hunter 1188 Hunter 1827 Hunter Hunter Vampire 4152 Vampire 1380 Frantan, SNEB and .303 front gun 30mm 68RP RP’s + 20mm Support of Scout column, against enemy convoy and targets – over 1000 Terrs strong. (JR – 3 sorties, Tol – 2 sorties) See Peter Petter-Bowyer’s book, page 470. 756 27/11/77 Virile (External) Vic Wightman JR Blythe-Wood Lynx Op Virile: Clear Dombe – Espungabera road for Scouts flying column. Hunter 1188 Hunter 1817 Lynx x 2 30mm 68RP Destroyed several vehicles – See page 289 Selous Scouts Top Secret War Vampire FB 9s had been built before ejector seats became standard. Had he tried to bale out, there was a strong danger of him hitting the tail plane. Many years later, while doing research for this book, I established that the Vampire was in fact hit by FRELIMO anti-aircraft fire at Vanduzi cross roads after attacking Chimoio. Phil Haigh is also listed on the Roll of Honour as published on the Internet, and connected with Chas Lotter’s “Echoes of an African War”. Advising next of kin of a fatality is a job I would not wish on my worst enemy. I had to pick the right time and place, but also needed to do it as soon as possible, before the news leaked out. Staff Officer Personnel at Air Force Headquarters, Wing Commander Peter Knobel, had called me on the secra-phone. After having done the 'deed', I was then required to confirm my 'duty carried out'. I was fortunately able to establish that Dot was not at home - but had just completed her shopping at the base canteen and was on her way to visit a friend at the Security section. As soon as she came out of the building, I intercepted her with idle chatter, escorted her to her motor car, and told her I had bad news and that I would be driving her home. Once inside her car, I broke the news to her. I must add that she took the news very well and only broke down in the privacy of her own home. I had meanwhile arranged for the Station Medical Officer to follow a short distance behind us - with the intention of administering a sedative to offset the subsequent shock. I then had to arrange a Committee of Adjustment, to wrap up Phil Haigh's affairs, and also helped Dot to make her travel plans back to Britain. I managed to get financial assistance from the Victims of Terrorism Relief Fund, which enabled Dot Haigh to return to the United Kingdom. In addition to Phil Haigh being killed, one Rhodesian soldier was killed and eight wounded. The price of the Rhodesian casualties was 2000 enemy killed (admitted by the guerrillas themselves), while unofficial estimates put the figure nearer 3000. The Rhodesians occupied Chimoio for about thirty-six hours, returning to their bases by dusk on 24th November. An account, from the receiving end, warrants repeating. It comes from Anne Tekere, as mentioned in Mugabe's autobiography by David Smith, published 1981. “It was about 7.30 in the morning of 23 November when the Rhodesian squadrons reached Chimoio. There were jet bombers, fighter planes, and helicopters carrying paratroopers from the Air Force base at Umtali about 60 miles away. They strafed the camp, and then bombed it; finally the paratroopers were dropped to finish off whoever and whatever remained. “Anne Tekere, Edgar Tekere's wife, was found by Tongogara three days later in a 'long drop' latrine pit, where she stayed out of sight from the units of the Rhodesian African Rifles who stayed for 48 hours after the first attack. Her account of the raid is worth recording here not just for its gruesome testimony - but also for the deep-rooted hatred of the white government it engendered in her husband and some of his colleagues on the ZANU Central Committee. “The attack began just as we were gathering for morning assembly. We heard first one aircraft (possibly the decoy), but the sky was overcast and so we did not see the bombers until they came above our heads. We were trying to disperse when there were explosions all around us and on top of us. The children were told to run into the bush. “From then on it was impossible to gather the children in one place. We were not trained in military operations and we did not know what to do. There were smaller planes as well as the jet bombers, and some of them dropped paratroopers. And there were helicopters which machine-gunned people as they ran away. We had a security force of about 100 soldiers who fought back with machine-guns, but their ammunition ran out after a few minutes. The bombs seemed to be a kind of acid or inflammable. They burned the people and set fire to the bush. “I knew I could not run very much. When I looked towards Chimoio town I saw paratroopers landing and I decided to run and hide in a pit latrine. The sewage came up to my waist. Worst of all were the worms that crawled around me, but I felt safe because the bombs did not destroy the pit. All the time I was in the pit I heard explosions and shooting and I was too frightened to come out. I was afraid that if they had dogs they might find where I was and when I heard voices I was too frightened to call out. “Then I heard an engine, a long distance away, and later recognised people speaking in Shona. I called out and they found me. They tried to haul me up with a rope, but I had hurt my arm getting into the pit and could not tie the rope around me. They broke the pit, removing the log.” DINGO BATTLE PLAN SKETCH The above sketch was drawn by the author and is intended to show the positioning, to scale, of the various complexes that constituted the targeted areas. The obvious ‘out of the box’ targets T for Tango and L for Lima – the Recruits and Passindina camps respectively, received special attention. The Recruits Camp (T) was struck by four Vampires with mopping up by two K-Car gunships. Passindina 2 was struck by Hunters with frantan, followed by a Canberra with Alpha bombs, and then a couple of K-Cars. Space and complexity considerations do not, unfortunately, warrant further elaboration here. Winds of Destruction and Pride of Eagles do more justice in documenting this brilliantly executed battle plan. ~~~OOO~~~ Another account is documented in Cowderoy and Nesbit’s War in the Air, where a terrorist survivor stated: “Within a few seconds planes were moving about in the air and we were all scared. We couldn’t think what to do except run. I rolled and rolled across the ground and hid under a bush. Then a bomb dropped on the spot where I had just been. I rolled again and fell into a pit and broke my arm. I had to leave my gun. Now people were running in all directions and helicopters were firing at random and the jets were moving up and down. The attack seemed to start on our headquarters and on Base number two simultaneously. We walked and walked.” Cowderoy and Nesbit also relate several first hand accounts regarding the Rhodesian Air Force. They concluded that by any standards, Operation Dingo must be considered a triumph for the newly created Comops and the exceptionally high quality of the security forces. As was par for the course, the victims claimed that it was not a military camp, but a refugee camp. You be the judge. I question terrorist Josiah Tongogara extricating Anne Tekere from the long-drop, Edgar Tekere's war mongering reputation, admission of 100 soldiers, presence of 12.7 and 14.4mm anti-aircraft batteries, ZANU admission of their 'Chitepo College' at Chimoio (where military trained cadres of above-average ability were given intensive political courses), and even the subsequent finding of the Tanzania/ Moçambique critique. Surely, there was adequate evidence that it was indeed a terr camp, and not only a refugee camp. The raid did give Ian Smith breathing space to pursue a settlement independent of Washington, London and Pretoria. An additional spin-off was the rift the attack created amongst the ZANU leadership. The raid also prompted Mugabe's own dissidents to overthrow him. For some time leading members of the ZANU Central Committee had questioned Mugabe's leadership on ideological and military grounds. They now tried to feed on the disarray and discontent created by the Chimoio raid to stage a coup against both Mugabe and Tongogara. Rugare Gumbo, information secretary, and Henry Hamadziripi, manpower secretary, led the 'dissidents'. Several capable ZANLA commanders in the camps supported them. In trying to gain support, they made Mugabe's leadership and the direction he was taking the main issue. He was attacked for lack of military knowledge, for reluctance to go into the field with the so-called guerrillas, and for even allowing himself to be seen to negotiate with the likes of Owen and Young. Mugabe and the High Command were blamed for the Chimoio debacle. According to the rebels, the Chimoio camp was pitifully short of a decent defence system (even the Tanzania and Moçambique governments were appalled) Above all, they accused the leadership of failing to foster seriously the “Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse Tung thought” as laid down by the Chimoio Central Committee meeting the previous September. They wanted greater political power for the guerrillas themselves. The operation was rated a great success, even though ZANLA commanders Josiah Tongogara and Rex Nhongo escaped the net and . . . . the Vampire FB 9s were thereafter taken out of service. CHIMOIO MEMORIAL In August 2007 Bob Manser forwarded to the writer pictures of the Chimoio Memorial that had been constructed by his civil engineer landlord Kevin Tidy after the end of the war. The Memorial commemorates the day that the Rhodesian Air Force initiated Operation Dingo – 23 November 1977. Up until then, the main battle casualties occurred firstly during Operation Eland – 8 to 12 August 1976 (base camp known as Nyadzonia/Pungwe). ZANLA casualty figure was determined as 1,028 killed, 309 wounded and a 1,000 missing – 14 were captured and 200 believed drowned; and secondly during Operation Dingo – 23 to 26 November 1977. Casualty numbers were very conservatively estimated at 800 Zanla killed and 750 wounded (some sources says it varies from 2000 to 3000). In addition to RSF airman Phil Haigh killed, Trooper GJ Nel was also killed and 6 RLI wounded. Chimoio Memorial constructed by Kevin Tidy These were not the only Chimoio casualties. More than thirty cross-border strikes were carried out against Chimoio and surrounds, before the end of the Rhodesian ‘Bush War’. Kevin Tidy was commissioned by the Zimbabwe Government to construct the war memorial designed by architect Peter Jackson in 2000 at the site of the mass graves at the old Tembwe (not to be confused with Tembue, north of Tete) camp about 20km north west of Chimoio town. Construction was held up until the head of the National Monuments and Museums in Mutare, Mrs. Traude Rogers, devised a scheme for funds to be channelled through the Zimbabwe Beira Consulate. Kevin reiterated that visa payments were made over a two year period. Bob commented: “In some of the photos you will see the mass graves plus marble plaques engraved with many hundreds of names. It is estimated that there are about 4000 bodies interred there but no one really knows. A Zimbabwe army officer said during the construction that there was about 14000 bodies, this seems overly high as there seem to be about 2000 or so known names on the marble plaque, naturally many of the deceased were mujibas and were not on any register. It was said that there were about five mujibas to one armed trooper. It is however estimated by others that there may be 4000 or so bodies in the graves. Not all were casualties of Rhodesian attacks, many died of malaria and dysentery so the Zimbabwe army officer said”. Rhodesian Intelligence were aware that so-called war refugees, numbering about twenty thousand at the time, were concentrated at Doeroi, some fifty-five kilometres further east. It is very likely that burials there have been re-interned at this memorial site. The Chimoio notice board below, reads: “Chimoio – Zimbabwe Liberation War Shrine • Here lie the remains of freedom fighters who fell during Zimbabwe’s liberation war. These brave men and women were killed during a Rhodesian air and ground attack on Thursday 23 November 1977. National Museums and Monuments of Zimbabwe”. Chimoio Notice Board A List of Names The base was heavily defended with 12.7mm and 14.4mm anti-aircraft batteries – evidence of which was unearthed at the site and placed on the properly constructed mass graves – as can be seen in one of the pictures below. Chimoio Anti-Aircraft Weapons and Guns Mass Graves Wall Murals - Photographs of two colourful wall murals by local artists and shows how they depicted the military events of the past. One is on a wall at a roundabout in Chimoio Town and the other on the wall of a ‘waterhole’ at Inchope. Wall Mural – Armed Fighters or Attackers Mural – Aerial Attack The success of Operation Dingo has attracted USA military interest, and is believed studied for its strategic planning and brilliant execution in cost effectiveness. OPERATION MELON: 26 OCTOBER to 11 APRIL 1978 Operation Melon was carried out in November 1977 in the ‘Russian Front’. It was a highly successful airstrike on FRELIMO’s 4th Brigade HQ (Mobile) and a couple of ZANLA trucks. The SAS were initially tasked to ambush the expected ZANLA convoy, which was on its way from Maputo docks to Mapai, the major military garrison in the Gaza province of Moçambique. The area was well known to the SAS – as the month before Jack Malloch had dropped 22 paratroops free-fall, from his DC-7 aircraft, just east of Mapai. The Russian presence and support for the terrorist forces had resulted in the SAS dubbing the region “The Russian Front”. On 1st November a No 3 Squadron Dakota uplifted 16 SAS paratroops under the command of Captain Colin Willis from Mabalauta and dropped them after dusk, some 120 kilometres (75 miles) into Moçambique. On the return journey, the Dakota came under a barrage of 23-mm anti-aircraft cannon and 12,7 millimetre heavy machine fire from Mapai – sustaining no fewer than 23 hits (with some holes as big as a man’s fist). Fortunately, nobody was injured. During the night Colin Willis trekked the 15-km to the Mapai-Maputo road and laid landmines and claymores in the road. Despite a brief skirmish with two FRELIMO and one ZANLA – who were shot – the sound of an approaching convoy was heard, apparently of much greater strength than originally expected. The SAS withdrew to a safe position so as not to compromise their position as a result of the three dead enemies left at the ambush site. As luck would have it, the lead vehicle was an ammunition truck – and it went up in a blazing fireball when it struck the landmine that had been laid by the SAS. This effectively blocked the road, preventing the other convoy vehicles continuing to Mapai. The decision was then taken by Comops to send in the Hunters at first light the following day. Flight Lieutenant Giles Porter (one of my earlier OCU students), piloting a No 4 Squadron Lynx, had the SAS ‘A’ Troop commander, Captain Bob McKenna aboard in order to get the latest Sitrep from the ground forces. The ammunition truck was still ablaze, but the pilot could see the remainder of the convoy vehicles hidden under dense trees. As Giles flew lower, he was greeted by the deafening roar of some 400 automatic rifles, several 23 millimetre anti-aircraft guns, machineguns and assorted missiles including the dreaded Strela. Colin Willis was heard to comment: “I rate that as the heaviest concentration of firepower that I have witnessed”. Amazingly, neither the aircrews nor the Lynx had taken a single hit. Just as well, because shortly thereafter, No 1 Squadron came to the rescue. The Hunters swept in, locating their targets from the muzzle flashes of the weapons firing at the Lynx, and from the windscreens reflecting in the early-morning sunlight – a point the enemy had overlooked when attempting to hide their vehicles. By the time the Hunters had carried out their first few strikes, the scene below them resembled something out of a Vietnam movie. Ammunition trucks were burning and exploding terrorist rockets were zigzagging all over the show, the wrecks of vehicles were cart-wheeling in every direction and there were massive fireballs everywhere. The smoke from the Hunters’ 30 millimetre cannons added to the spectacle and often, as one Hunter swooped in to attack and a truck blew up behind it, the second Hunter would be flying through the debris from the first strike. For the next five hours an intense and spectacular land/air battle raged. The Hunters kept up the momentum, making strike after strike, hitting the vehicles, with one pair of aircraft replacing the next as their weaponry was exhausted and their time over target ran out; and they had to return to base to rearm and refuel in readiness for their next strike. And the defenders grimly hitting back with everything they had. After the fourth airstrike, the Browns raiders decided discretion was the better part of valour and leaving the Blues to sort out the convoy, they vacated their foxholes and quickly made good their departure. However, Comops ordered the Browns back to make a full report on the damage inflicted. OPERATION MELON AIRSTRIKES (Log extracts) No Date Crews Target Aircraft Weapons Result 736 15/10/77 JR Blythe-Wood Hunter No 2 Op Melon – Convoy VK270500 Gaza Moz. Hunter 1827 Hunter 30mm 68RP 3 vehicles destroyed. 2 SAS wounded (JRT Wood) 745 31/10/77 JR Blythe-Wood A/T 1181 Hunter 1286 Take over 746 01/11/77 Melon Giles Porter Hunter Moçambique – ZANLA convoy Mapai / Maputo Rd Lynx Hunter Hunter Airstrike on FRELIMO Fourth Brigade HQ (Mobile) 748 03/11/77 Glen Pretorius Op Melon? Canberra 2502 (with Hunters?) 749 07/11/77 JR Blythe-Wood A/T 1216 Hunter 1286 (with Cans?) 750 13/11/77 Melon Vic Wightman Hunter No 2 Convoy Mapai – Mabalane Rd, Gaza Hunter 1188 Hunter 30mm 68RP 17 vehicles destroyed. Tank spares, ammo and Russian dictionary found After the apprehension of returning to the scene, the SAS to their relief found the place totally devoid of the enemy. Around them lay the remains of what had been a convoy of brand new vehicles. All told, there were 21 damaged vehicles. Only one had managed to escape the carnage. They found a mobile operations centre, and the more they looked around, the more obvious it became that the Air Force and their Brownjob friends had taken on the whole FRELIMO 4th Brigade Headquarters. They had been moving up to Mapai in compliance with their orders to supply closer support to ZANLA and to set up a forward base to conduct the war against Rhodesian Security Forces. The security forces found enough evidence to convince them that the convoy was led, managed and organised by Russian advisers. It was the first time that the Rhodesians had seen definite proof that the Russians were operating in Mapai. The damage inflicted by the airstrikes was virtually complete – it was gratifying to see the amount of brand new Russian trucks, trailers, fuel and water bowsers, operations and command centres, support weapons and spares which had been rendered useless on their first trip from the Maputo docks. There were also bogies, track and ammunition for T34 tanks, making it the first indication of tanks in the Gaza Province – and the first time tanks had been found so close to any Rhodesian border. A ZANLA presence was also found in the form of two trucks, the remains of which carried ZANLA literature, uniforms and documents. Because it was assessed that a few of the vehicles could be repaired and just to prevent that happening, the Hunters screamed in a few days later to put them out of action for good. There was only one body, but the evidence of used medical equipment, bloodied uniforms and helmets with skin attached to them, indicated that many had been wounded or killed. Subsequent intelligence confirmed that there had been fifty casualties. The enemy, and their Soviet advisers in the Russian Front, had been dealt a very severe blow indeed. OPERATION PARTISAN: 29 OCTOBER to 5 NOVEMBER 1977 Operation Partisan consisted of mining ZIPRA routes in Zambia. The operation accounted for one Zambian National Defence Force officer and 1 ZNDF soldier killed, and 5 ZNDF injured (one of whom died later). OPERATION VIRILE: NOVEMBER to 19 DECEMBER 1977 Operation Virile entailed the blowing up of six road bridges, between Espungabera and Dombe, by the Selous Scouts, with air support by a K-Car, one G-Car, two Lynxes and a pair of Hunters. FAF 6 Chipinga was used by the Air Force for the close air support aircraft. I had another reprieve from desk jockeying by being detached to FAF 1 - Wankie, in Lynx R 3048, on 9th December 1977. This was because of the need to release more operational pilots in the field. I had just got settled in my new, albeit familiar, surroundings when I was tasked to provide top cover over Victoria Falls. A break of three days followed because of a strained neck injury that made it extremely difficult for me to turn around to look in the small mirror on the port tail-boom. This twisting of the neck was necessary to verify rear engine propeller rotation during start up and in flight. The Wankie Colliery physiotherapist soon had me on the mend after connecting an interferential therapy machine (those machines that cause involuntary muscle spasms). The Nurse switched the machine on, turned a couple of knobs, and then left the therapy room. She had no sooner left than I started convulsing violently. The body twitching became progressively more pronounced, with me resembling a complete spastic. I didn't return for more torture. Then on the 13th I carried out brief night flying circuits and NDB - non-directional beacon letdowns on the Wankie airstrip. Corporal Bezuidenhout came along for the ride. On the 15th, Army Colonel Mike Shute requested an air reconnaissance of the minefields along the Zambezi. I got airborne with the Colonel and we landed at Sprayview airstrip at the Falls Township. I was briefed on the Bus Bleeper trials that were due to take place the next day. This was a Smersh (secret) operation that was planned to transport Rhodesian troops in a commandeered civilian bus. Then on the 16th, I flew a Mr Goodfellow from the Prime Minister's Department on the Bus Bleeper mission - all went according to plan and only minor fine-tuning adjustments were needed. I still don't know whether Goodfellow was the guy's genuine name, but suspected that this was used so as not to arouse undue suspicions. I for one disliked, and even distrusted, a lot of the abuse that the Selous Scouts often subjected the Air Force to. However, in this case, SS Major Bert Sachse had been tasked to destroy the road bridges around Dombe. While Bert was doing his thing in the south-east, I was deployed in the opposite direction – in the north-west, doing my thing. I duly got airborne in my trusty Lynx R 3048 on the 19th and carried out the two hour thirty minute top cover in the Panda-Ma-Tenga area as demanded from me. The mission was successfully completed without any undue risk or major dramas. On landing, my job was complete, and so I loaded up my Lynx with Sergeant Wepener and LACs Sephton and Dormer and headed back to Thornhill. My No 4 Squadron Detachment to Wankie had lasted a mere ten days and I was thus able to chalk up another operation, successfully completed. Although it meant me returning to my desk job, I was well pleased by the fact that life in the Air Force permitted me to spend my R&R and the festive season with my family. AIR STRIKE LOG: 08 to 10 FEBRUARY 1977 - refer # 618 to 621 No Date Aircrew Target Aircraft Weapons Result 618 08/02/77 Hurricane Ted Brent / Jim Al Bruce / Doug Pasea Greg Todd / Tony Merber Michael Borlace / John Jacobs Bill Sykes / Mark Jackson Mike Litson / Brian Crystal Ian Sheffield Bill Dawson / Carlos da Silveira VR067907, 10 n.m. north west of Mtoko Canberra 2502 Canberra 2085 K-Car 7514 K-Car 5278 G-Car 51700 G-Car 5705 Lynx 3094 Dakota 3711 250 Mk2 Alpha Bombs, 100 Mk2 Alpha Bombs, 413x20mm cannon shells, 2x15-gall Fran 23x37mm SNEB Five Terrs killed, four African women killed, one African woman wounded. 619 09/02/77 Hurricane Rich Brand Martin Lowrie Nyamzuwe, VR109901, 8 n.m. north of Mtoko Hunter 8122 Hunter 1286 128x30mm cannon shells 620 09/02/77 Hurricane Mike Borlace / John Jacobs Bill Sykes / Mark Jackson Mike Litson / Brian Crystal Bill Dawson / Carlos da Silveira UR647365, 8 n.m. south west of Mrewa. K-Car 5170 G-Car 5074 G-Car 5705 Dakota 3711 20x20mm cannon shells Six terrs killed, four African local men killed, eight locals taken for questioning. (Suspect wrong grid ref – place called Hokodzi) 621 10/02/77 Hurricane Mike Borlace / John Jacobs Bill Sykes / Mark Jackson Mike Litson / Brian Crystal Ian Sheffield Bill Dawson / Carlos da Silveira VR647365, 13 n.m. south east of Elim Mission. See above – Hokodzi? K-Car 5170 G-Car 5074 G-Car 5705 Lynx 3154 Dakota 3711 130x20mm cannon shells, 2x15-gallon Frantan, 18 37mm SNEB One terrorist killed Mike recalls: “This (No 618) was a big punch-up along the side of some big bricks (hills) and the gooks were well holed up in rocks and caves, so the Cans (Canberras) came in and softened the whole area up with a couple of very good strikes. These were not easy to deliver on the side of the mountain. “09/02/77 - One of the grid refs here is wrong, as the second contact was a return trip to the same place the next morning. I think the place was called Hokodzi.” FAF 8 – GRAND REEF Dick Gledhill, who was a PJI (Parachute Jump Instructor) in the Air Force, also served in One Commando of the Rhodesian Light Infantry. Dick committed some of his bush war experiences to paper and wrote a very interesting novel describing Fire Force tactics. Of particular significance is the historical fact that he was a Brownjob at Grand Reef when the FAF was attacked by some 200 gooks on 17th December 1977. His vivid description of the events preceding, during and after the incident, albeit fictionalised to some extent, does not detract from what goes through the minds of the Rhodesian airmen and soldiers who had witnessed the horrors of war. FAF 8 was described thus: - “The airstrip at Grand Reef, not far from the town of Umtali, is quite a beautiful place with its rugged backdrop of the Vumba Mountains rising majestically to the south-east. The sealed runway, gently sloping with the contour of the land, gives the impression of following the curvature of the earth. In peacetime it would be a pleasant enough place to idle the time away waiting for a plane. War had transformed the place into a rough, stark fortress. On the western side of the runway, earth revetments surrounded the Fire Force base, dotted at intervals with bunkers and machinegun posts. At the northern end, high walls constructed from fuel drums filled with sand protected the aircraft from attack, with ceilings of wire netting to stop mortar bombs from landing. Inside the base were buildings and tents found in any camp to house the personnel required operating a military establishment. Surrounding the whole area was a minefield with a barbed wire fence.” Dick Gledhill, as a matter of interest, was born in Kenya, completed his schooling in the UK, joined the Australian army for three years, and in mid-1970s returned to Africa and enlisted as a trooper in 1 Commando, RLI. He saw action on Fire Force operations inside Rhodesia and on external raids during the bush war. He later transferred to the Rhodesian Air Force where, as a Sergeant at the Parachute Training School, he instructed Rhodesia’s paratroops. He has more than 2000 parachute jumps to his credit. He left Zimbabwe after Independence in 1980 and returned to Australia. Squadron Leader Derrick de Kock (elder brother to Harry Harwood de Kock, who was one of our fellow pilot trainees on 16 PTC – but who failed to make the grade), had this to say in his foreword to Dick’s book: - “While reading this book, memories of the hundreds of tough, dedicated young men, both black and white, who passed through the Parachute Training School, came flooding back. In 1961, five Royal Rhodesian Air Force volunteers, including myself, went to RAF Abbingdon in England and underwent training as Parachute Jump Instructors. Later that year, with the help of four Royal Air Force secondments, the Rhodesian Air Force Parachute Training School at New Sarum was in business. Initially we only trained ‘C’ (Rhodesia) Squadron of the British 22nd Special Air Service, with a limit of twenty men on each course. “After Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence from Great Britain in November, 1965, our RAF secondments went home and nothing much happened until 1970. At this time the Rhodesian SAS were operating outside our borders and it became evident that High Altitude Low Opening (HALO) Fee-fall training was required. It also became apparent that it was necessary to deploy more troops into the Fire Force contacts and the only way this could be achieved in Rhodesia was by parachute. “The RAF had left us with a book of parachute rules but, by the early 1970s, with our bush war escalating on all fronts, these became obsolete and new methods had to be employed to gain the upper hand. The methods devised by us subsequently changed the way paratroops were deployed the world over. Our staff grew to five officers and over 75 PJI sergeants and dispatchers. The number of men trained in each course increased from 20 to 240 and three Fire Forces were permanently in the field (each with a PJI and two other dispatchers). “Static line drop heights were reduced from 1000 feet to 500 feet, and, on many occasions, as low as 300 feet. HALO drops were increased to over 20,000 feet and often conducted at night with the navigation being done by a PJI with his head sticking out of the door during the final run-in, map reading the way to the target. Trees were deliberately used as drop zones as they provided cover on landing and open ground was avoided. Yet the injury rate remained below 0•7 %. “During my last year as the Commanding Officer of the Rhodesian Air Force Parachute Training School, over 14,000 operational jumps were recorded and some troops of the RLI and the RAR recorded three operational jumps in one day. Most were done from DC3 Dakotas but on occasion troops, fuel and ammunition were dropped from a DC 7F. “The staff of the Rhodesian Air Force Parachute Training School came from all corners of the globe including British, Welsh, Irish, Scottish, Australian and American. I was privileged to lead such a diverse, multicultural band of dedicated instructors, one of whom was Dick Gledhill.” Derrick de Kock wrote this foreword to Dick’s book in January 1997 – over 20 years after the attack on FAF 8. ATTACK ON FORWARD AIRFIELD 8 – GRAND REEF: 17 DECEMBER 1977 On about 16th December 1977, Air Headquarters sent a warning signal to Officer Commanding FAF 8 – Grand Reef – Squadron Leader Rob MacGregor that the Forward Airfield was soon to be attacked. The message indicated that Security Forces had captured a detailed map of Grand Reef, presumed to have been made out by a casual worker on the camp. The contents were passed onto the Army Colonel, but he was sceptical that the large military complex would, or could be attacked. The following night, the Brownjobs were all watching the TV “Bless ‘em All Show”, and thus no patrols were deployed. It seemed that a night summer storm was brewing, with thunder and lightning evident in the distance. At about ten o’clock that evening, Camp Commandant Robin Watson hit the sack. Robin was using one of the Department of Civil Aviation Authority – CAA – buildings, at the lower end of the camp, as his bedroom-cum-office. Then an hour before midnight, the Air Force Camp Commandant was awakened by what sounded like thunder, and with hailstones drumming on the roofs of buildings. When he peered outside, he discovered that the ‘hailstones’ were aglow, and that a steady stream of tracer was passing overhead. The ‘thunder’ turned out to be a tattoo of mortar bombs and rockets landing for the most part on the Army Camp. Shrapnel, or a bullet, pierced his windowpane. Robin got dressed and reported to the Command bunker, and was joined by SWO Phil Clarke, who had a narrow escape when a rifle grenade exploded on the sandbag parapet outside his room. The explosion expedited his arrival at the Command bunker, absolutely starkers – and had to be reminded by the Camp Commandant to cover his nakedness, before volunteering for ammunition re-supplies duties. Meanwhile, Gun-pit No 1 was laying down sustained gunfire on the attacker’s flank. The MAG gun operator, Air Force Territorial Force member Corporal Anstee, called the Command bunker on the radio for a resupply of ammunition. SWO Phil Clarke, and another TF, volunteered to cross the open space of the aircraft parking area to go to the armoury from which to supply the gun-pit with enough 7•62 ammunition to continue repelling the attackers. This they did commendably, considering the hazards and that both remained at the gun-pit to assist the TF MAG gunner in re-loading and changing over-heated barrels. In addition, both AFVs (Air Force Regiment Armoured Fighting Vehicles) left the comparative safety of their revetments to join the battle, but were driven back precipitously by rockets aimed directly at them. They had both fired flares, but unfortunately without arming the fuses. In due course, all the firing ceased. The Air Force escaped injury. The Brownjobs were not as lucky – a signals operator was killed by an air-burst, and two soldiers were severely wounded by mortar/rocket-fire. Squadron Leader Rob MacGregor casevaced the injured to Umtali General Hospital with the FAF spare Alouette helicopter, and in Robin Watson’s words “had to play trains, because of the extremely low cloud base, by following the railway line through the mountains.” The Gooks also suffered losses. One was found dead, abandoned. His clothing was blown off and this was thought to have been caused by firing his last mortar bomb without the base plate, the bomb had landed very close to his own position. Blood spoor was also found during the retreat, so presumably there were other casualties as well. OPERATION ACROBAT (RUSSIAN FRONT): 12 FEBRUARY 1978 Operation Acrobat was carried out by South African troops disguised as Rhodesian Special Air Service soldiers, operating from Chiredzi and FAF 7 Buffalo Range, into the Gaza Province of Moçambique In December 1977, fifty-five SADF ‘A’ Group 1-Reconnaissance Commando members assembled in Durban for a period of intensive training for a Smersh operation, destination unknown to the individuals. They expected to be deployed to SWA/Namibia, but when they boarded Dakotas instead of the expected C-130 Hercules aircraft at Louis Botha Air Force Base, they soon discovered that their destination was Rhodesia. Once on board, they changed into Rhodesian camouflaged uniforms and were given an in-flight briefing that they were headed for Funnyland – otherwise known as the ‘Russian Front’ or Moçambique. They received their orders from the SAS at Chiredzi – with tours of duty being about three months long. Rotations were made with 1-Recce’s ‘B’ Group, with several soldiers doing up to four tours, for the whole of 1978. Amongst the early deployments was Lieutenant Corrie Meerholz – with the SADF personnel forming ‘D’ Squadron of the Rhodesian Special Air Service. From FAF 7 Buffalo Range, the commando established its forward base at Mabalauta. Captain Hannes Venter commanded the unit, and spent most of his time on Telstar and control as a passenger in a Rhodesian Air Force Lynx. He spent a lot of time over-flying the Gaza Province, taking off from FAF 7 in the mornings, and using Mabalauta for refuelling stops during the day. They would locate patrols, establish radio contact and carry out supply drops. Airborne times would be up to eight hours a day – they would also patrol roads and carry out airstrikes on any vehicles seen – often being on the receiving end of heavy ground fire. The Lynxes also acted as escorts for the Dakotas when they were deploying paratroopers, which inevitably attracted ground fire. The following quote from Peter Stiff’s The Silent War warrants repeating: “…. To combat this (Lynx escorts for the Dakotas), they used the hair-raising tactic of diving down to fifty metres and strafing the guns with rockets and napalm to divert attention from the troopers. Pilots were rotated fortnightly, when the relief’s arrived at Chiredzi fresh and eager to do battle. Hannes, who had spent almost three months on a diet of adrenaline, dodging FRELIMO ground fire with previous pilots on a day to day basis, developed a jaundiced view of their enthusiasm. This in no way detracted from the admiration he felt for them.” Is that not a nice, worthy compliment for the Lynx pilots of No 4 Squadron? The story of Lieutenant Douw Steyn’s first deployment by No 3 Squadron Dakota into Moçambique is quite humorous, in that I got to know Douw well many years later, and had the opportunity to reminisce about the apprehension that was a part of life in those days. Douw recalled, and I quote verbatim: “I remember it with vivid clarity. It was just after last light when we readied to jump by static line south of Mapai. We had ammunition and supplies for a three-week stint. We hooked up our static lines. My Boss, Lieutenant Kokkie du Toit, was first in the door, I was second and the other eight operators jostled behind me. The Dakota unexpectedly attracted 14,5-mm ground fire. I was scared stiff and watched fearfully as the glowing dotted lines of tracer seemed to reach up for the trundling old Dak. How they missed, I did not know. To my utter amazement Kokkie made no attempt to withdraw from the door. He merely stood there patiently waiting, as if it was a routine practice. As if it was just a firework display. The Rhodesian jumpmaster was also unconcerned. “ ‘Surely he had the authority to call off this bullshit. What was the bloody fool up to? Sod this,’ I thought, my heart pumping. ‘They must be mad. Absolutely out of their minds. How can they drop us in shit like this?’ The green light flashed and “I knew they were really insane”. “Go!” “I tumbled out of the door behind Kokkie. We landed uncomfortably in a sandalwood plantation. One operator was badly injured by a dry stick penetrating his arm and was casevaced the next day. FRELIMO knew we were around, but not exactly where. We remedied their lack of knowledge when the Rhodesian chopper came in for the casevac the next morning.” Authors note: The story did not end there. To quote from Peter Stiff, Douw did in fact do himself justice. The Recces began walking their planned route, intending to ambush the road and railway line, but things did not work out, because FRELIMO were hard on their tracks. They spent the day on the run and were lucky to survive an ambush. They had no vehicle mines because of weight limitations, but did have some South African Rimi anti-personnel mines. Douw Steyn, as the team’s engineer, improvised a vehicle mine by combining P4 plastic explosive with one of their mechanisms. They knew that when FRELIMO vehicles struck mines, their tactic was to rapidly evacuate and disperse into the veld on both sides of the road. Douw buried his improvised vehicle mine in the road and camouflaged it, then imaginatively positioned ten anti-personnel mines on both sides of the road. Sure enough a vehicle appeared and detonated the landmine. True to form, the surviving FRELIMO soldiers leapt from the truck and dashed straight into Douw’s devil’s garden of anti-personnel mines. Twenty FRELIMO soldiers paid the ultimate price for their carelessness. However, shortly thereafter, the Recces also mounted attacks in the Madulo Pan area, and during a contact on 11th February 1978, Lieutenant J H Kokkie du Toit (officially from 1RR) was killed in action. Because of bad guti at that time, a casevac couldn’t reach them to evacuate the body. Douw had to carry his Boss around, continuously evading FRELIMO hunter groups, for two days, for the guti to lift. Eventually a helicopter arrived, with a No 4 Squadron Lynx, to casevac both Kokkie’s body, and Douw, who had sustained a splinter injury to his foot. Douw was treated at the Triangle Hospital for his foot – plus a self inflicted injury to his buttocks and legs when a detonator he was working on exploded below his chair. In another Operation O incident, Danny Svoboda was one of two Alouette helicopter pilots who flew over the Mapai area to extract a group of ‘D’ Squadron (SADF Recces) that had had two contacts with a FRELIMO mobile reaction unit known as X-ray forces. The Rhodesian pilots had to switch on the spotlight in the lead aircraft during their night casevac but also attracted a lot of ground fire. Danny was leading, and would switch off his lights whenever they needed to over-fly the rail sidings en route back to Rhodesia. Using exceptional flying skill combined with good luck and daring, they successfully evaded the ground fire without damage. Their final hurdle was the power line of the Cabora Bassa hydro-electric scheme, which ran north-to-south just within the Moçambique border – which they skipped over. Immediately afterwards one Alouette ran out of fuel, forcing them to land. They were still uncertain if they were back in Rhodesia or still in Moçambique. Fortunately, as it turned out, they were just over the border. Danny Svoboda took off in the one with fuel remaining. Continuing the spotlight technique, he stayed just above treetop level and reached Mabalauta Fire Force base safely, enabling the wounded Recce operator to get urgent medical attention. The second helicopter returned the next morning after it was refuelled. It is pleasing to record that “The operators still marvel how the pilots got them back to safety”. MTOKO FAF 5: 1 to 7 FEBRUARY 1978 Sergeant Tweedy Reid-Daly was the K-Car Alouette III No 5719 gunner to Terence Murphy, deployed to Mtoko during the week 1st to 7th February. He recalls an interesting story whilst trooping with dummy drops during his stint in the bush. “The Fire Force, K-Car together with the G-Cars, set out from Mtoko to carry out dummy drops across a river near the Moçambique border. As we neared the river the ground rose up to a hillock, on the other side of which ran the river. Flying over the hillock we noticed that, although there were huts and chickens, there was no sign of any inhabitants but down to and along the side of the river were well worn path and fishing / washing spots. We flew on and carried out our dummy drop exercise and on the return decided to fly back over the small compound we had seen. “Directly overhead the compound, which still looked deserted, we suddenly encountered the familiar crackling of rifle fire and felt we had been hit. We flew on down the other side of the hill and checked temperatures, pressure and RPM’s, - all okay except we were running rapidly out of tail rotor control and within seconds it had failed altogether. With one of the G-Cars as top cover we flew on to an old runway, on which the grass was about waist height, if not higher, and would have covered an ant-bear hole, but were pleased to see some Brownjobs parked on the left side of the runway. However, an old Bedford truck was parked too close to the centre of the runway and after frantic radio calls managed to get some action from the Brownjobs. To our horror, as we were descending and ready to put down the army driver turned the truck directly across our flight path instead of turning off the runway. “It must have been a combination of good piloting and luck that Terence managed to coax the Alo over the truck, the cab of which disappeared by what seemed like inches below the nose of the helicopter. We managed to gain some more height and one of the G-Cars directed us – by now two very nervous and dry mouthed crew members – to another abandoned airfield on the other side of a range of hills, the Alo was fishtailing badly until we reduced speed. On approaching the now abandoned airstrip we had a quick briefing, it would be a good idea for me to hold onto the park brake and once down would be told to brake hard. “Now to get to the park brake in a K-Car you had to unbuckle your seat harness and lean forward. All good and well, but once in position I noticed that a short distance in front of my face was the instrument panel and still remember thinking what I was going to look like if things went wrong. Finally we managed to put down without incident other than two dirty great skid marks (– on the ground!). We scrambled out with our weapons with Terence mumbling something about never wanting to see another helicopter in his life again. We found we had taken a bit of ground fire, the tail rotor cables had been severed, the tail boom, engine and I think the fuel tank had been hit and our brand new trusty “put-put” had been mortally wounded. “We were flown back to Mtoko while the Brownjobs looked after our Alo while waiting for a repair crew to arrive. “A day or two later we climbed into a PRAW aircraft to be flown out to retrieve our now serviceable Alo. We lined up at the end of the runway, the pilot running through his cockpit-checks, selecting flaps down as part of it, when we noticed that the pilots ‘mitts’ were nowhere near the flap selector and the flaps were by now doing their own thing by running back and forth – up and down. Terence nudged me, we were both sitting behind the two front seats, and whispered “Is this normal?” pointing to the flaps, I assured him that it wasn’t and on consulting with our PRAW pilot on this matter was assured that it was okay and that it had been like this for a couple of weeks! (This is the same aircraft that Bruce Edward had also flown in). “With two fidgeting and slightly apprehensive Bluejobs on board the throttle was opened and we rapidly gained speed. To our astonishment and some distance down the runway we noticed that the ASI needle was still firmly resting on the little pin where the zero indication mark was. The pilot realising that he had a problem shut the throttle and after fierce braking came to a halt at the end of the runway. The flaps were still doing their own thing. “We clambered out of the PRAW aircraft and an irate Terence, using colourful phrases not exactly common to the good old Queens English, assured our most apologetic PRAW pilot that he would never fly in one of these things again and would fetch our aircraft on condition we were ferried by Air Force aircraft. He then promptly refused the PRAW pilots offer of a lift back to the top, and with bone dome and map case in hand stomped off towards the camp with yours truly trying to keep up. “Our Alo was finally retrieved.” AIR STRIKE LOG - refer # 777 No Date Aircrew Target Aircraft Results 777 06 to 09/02/78 Mike Borlace / Beaver Shaw Contact C/s 14 and 42. Trooping C/s 43A G-Car 5729 Deploy dogs, top cover and casevac landmine victim. Op sorties 6th, 7th and 9th Feb. 777 – Mike recalls: “This was a series of ops that started with an ambush of the Selous Scouts in which Basil Moss's son Keith was killed, and subsequently a white hitch-hiker was abducted and eventually taken to Moçambique - John Kenny (or Kenward perhaps?) - We just had the one helicopter but made contact with the group several times - this guy John subsequently wrote an account of the experience after the war - and we were apparently within yards of getting him several times.” FIRE FORCE CHARLIE – SHABANI: JANUARY 1978 Commanding the three or four Fire Forces placed an additional strain on available Air Force manpower resources. It came as no surprise to me that my turn would arrive sooner rather than later. Staff Officers were needed to perform Operational Commands as well. I spent a short spell as Officer Commanding Fire Force Charlie. This entailed commanding a highly mobile tactical air support function with the Support Commando, 1 RLI - the crack, all white, Rhodesian Light Infantry unit. Aircraft allocation was four Alouette helicopters. One K-Car was fitted with Hispano 20-mm cannon and also carried the Army airborne commander, who would deploy his stopper groups using the remaining three G-Cars. The Fire Forces invariably operated from the established FAFs – FAF 4 and 5 Mount Darwin and Mtoko for operations in the north and north-east, FAF 7 Buffalo Range for operations in the south-east, and FAF 8 Grand Reef near Umtali, for operations in the east. However, as the war progressed, the Fire Forces also deployed from numerous other locations like the JOC centres, Ruda in the Honda Valley, Fort Victoria (JOC Repulse), Mabalauta in the Lowveld, and from Shabani – as in the case of Fire Force Charlie. The tactical advantage of the Fireforce system was its flexibility – all that was needed was a reasonable airstrip. The Fire Force principle required a high level of co-operation between the Air Force and the Army and this was maintained at all times. The Army provided the combat troops while the Air Force supplied the helicopters, fixed wing aircraft, pilots and its deadly firepower. The Commando OC directed ground operations from the K-Car from an orbit high enough above the contact area. The troop-carrying Alouette helicopters ferried troops to and from a contact zone, carried out casualty evacuations and re-supplying ground troops with arms and ammunition. The object was to deploy the required troops on the ground in a given area in as short a time as possible. Once the G-Cars/Z-Cars had disgorged the first wave of troops, they returned to base to collect the second or even third wave. Depending on distances, the second wave would sometimes proceed towards the contact area in vehicles loaded with drums of fuel for the helicopters, to reduce the turn-around time. Acting in support of each Fire Force was a No 4 Squadron fixed wing aircraft – initially the Provost, then the Trojan, and latterly the Reims-Cessna F337 Lynx. Although ungainly with its pull-push power plants and twin tail booms, it made an excellent support weapons platform and could deliver its Sneb rockets, frantan (napalm) and twin Browning •303 front gun fire with deadly accuracy. The Lynx usually initiated the attack while the 20mm Hispano cannon of the K-Car hammered away in support. Ground troops were put in as stop groups, to prevent the terrorists from escaping. After the initial airstrikes had gone in, the main sweep line moved forward toward the centre of the contact area, either killing the terrorists or driving them on to the guns of the stop groups. Any time during an operation, stick leaders could call on the K-Car and the Lynx for air support. Fire Force Charlie – at Shabani To confront ZANLA infiltration from the Russian Front into Southern Matabeleland (See also the Air Strike Map, at the back of the book) In order to maintain my flying currency, I commandeered Lynx R 3240 on 22nd January 1978 to carry out a rather too short thirty-minute general flying sortie in the vicinity of Shabani, with its many granite rocky outcrops. The RLI was well known for achieving the highest enemy kill rates. Their high spirits would continue well into the night, more often than not resulting in high jinx. After one particular contact, their rowdy behaviour got the better of me. I got annoyed when the Commando Commander careered their staff car around the Air Force camp, ripping out our tent pegs, screeching with laughter as our tents collapsed, and generally just making a nuisance of himself. We conscientious airmen were trying to get some shut-eye, but there was no luck in store for us. As the most senior Bluejob on site, I lodged an objection in the strongest possible terms. Although one had learnt at an early stage that Officers should refrain from confronting drunken bums, the rowdiness left me with little option but to appeal to their better judgement - all to no avail. The RLI were hell-bent on letting off steam. The next morning I complained to the CO, but no apology was forthcoming from the Brownjobs. I was not prepared to let the matter ride. A couple of days later, the Fire Force was visited by high ranking General officers. I mentioned the unruly behaviour to the Air Force Chief of Staff, hoping that he would whisper in his counterpart's ear on the way to the main JOC at Fort Victoria. Whether he did so or not, I don't know. I also gave my Station Commander a feedback report. It appeared I was somewhat unpopular regarding my respect for military order and discipline. On the positive side, Fire Forces achieved spectacular successes. It was an economical method of deploying highly mobile fighting units rapidly to scenes of unrest - without having to rely on the complex infrastructures required in the establishment of semi-permanent forward airfields - FAFs. In his book One Commando, ex-PJI Sergeant Dick Gledhill did an excellent job of describing several Fire Force actions. He mentions FAF 4 Mount Darwin, FAF 5 Mtoko, FAF 7 Buffalo Range, FAF 8 Grand Reef, and several assaults on terrorist camps in Moçambique. The tactics involved the use of the ground support Lynxes, with heliborne stop groups and K-Cars, plus airstrikes involving the Canberra bombers. Although his novel is fiction, it is very much based on fact. He was on the ground when FAF 8 was attacked by over 200 ZANLA terrorists on 17th December 1977, and later transferred to the Air Force serving as a PJI under Squadron Leader Derrick de Kock. Chris Cocks, a stick leader in 3 Commando RLI, also does an excellent job of describing several Fire Force actions in his book, Fireforce. Despite the very long hours, strain and tensions, I enjoyed my stint as Officer Commanding Fire Force Charlie. Shabani was not too bad. The PWD (public works department) guys had laid on running water and electricity for us, and the runway and small hardstanding had been tarred. And so, after a while, it was back to Thornhill, to once again catch up with my uncontrollable OCAW in-tray. I maintained my flying currency by flying Air Sub-Lieutenant Brick Bryson to New Sarum on 2nd March 1978. On 14th March, I flew the No 4 Squadron technical Warrant Officer, Jim Light to Air Headquarters for a meeting. I needed to brush up on some air weaponry and get in some instrument flying prior to another looming FAF 1 “retread stint“. That same day I carried out an operational shoot, firing 400 rounds air-to-ground, 8 Bubs (break-up-bombs) and 8 x 37-mm Sneb rockets. My choice of instrument flying was just as well. A week later an abnormal cold front bringing in the guti weather meant that actual instrument flying was carried out with some JPs as my safety pilots. ASL's Ray Haakonsen and John Kidson witnessed my NDB, VOR and radar controlled GCAs. I was now ready for my next FAF 1 deployment. I had occasion to revisit Fire Force Charlie on 1st June 1978. It was not to be. My task was an Admin Staff Visit. My OC 'B' Squadron GSU Air Lieutenant 'Danger' Ncube, caterer Warrant Officer Danny van der Merwe, Security Officer Flight Sergeant Pete Horsborough and I took off from Thornhill in a Lynx to visit ADR - Air Detachment Repulse, FAF 7 Buffalo Range and FFC at Shabani. About forty-five minutes out we encountered a lot of low cloud, with 'guti' conditions moving in rapidly from the south-east. I decided to abort my journey to the Lowveld and I set course for Shabani. I found a gap in the clouds near Mashaba and spiralled to 'victor mike below' - VMC - visual meteorological conditions below cloud base. Then my problems started. The mountain range tops were sticking into the bottom of the cloud blanket. I managed to fly through a saddle but once on the other side I was faced with another range of hills in my path, running at right angles to my line of flight. The hilltops were in cloud. I turned round and headed back on my reciprocal track, but then discovered that my 'gap' through the saddle was no more. The cloud base had lowered, merging the mountain range with the cloud. I could not take a chance in view of the fact that missing the gap would mean crashing into the Mashaba Mountains. I then continued my low-level orbit and was barely some thirty feet above ground level. I couldn't find any other gaps and then did something very stupid. Instead of initiating a climbing spiral through the low cloud, I relied on my senses and previous Fire Force Charlie experience; I headed towards where I thought there was low ground in the range of hills between my position and Shabani airfield. We were literally skimming the treetops. The ground was rising. All of a sudden I flew into a puff of cloud and lost sight of the ground. I thrust both throttles wide open, pulled the nose up and initiated the steep short take-off technique, with a touch of flap, hoping that I would clear any looming obstructions directly in front of my flight path. But I had four souls on board. With the extra weight, the response wasn't all that good. 'Danger' and Danny were mean heavyweights. That just added to my problems. Having committed myself to a climb straight ahead, I pulled the Lynx as close to the stall as I dared and hoped for the best. I could kick myself for not opting for the spiral climb when I had the opportunity. I expected to fly into the hillside. Fortunately, somebody up there was looking after me. My Guardian Angel tested my vertigo in the 8/8th cloud and I flew the next thirty minutes on instruments, landing back at Thornhill. I was lucky to record mission “aborted”. My subordinates thought I was the greatest since bubble gum - they didn't seem to mind that our intended Staff Visit to ADR FAF 7 and FFC was a failure. It was, after all, a very narrow escape. On 5th June 1978 Flight Lieutenant Ken Law - an old ex-OCU student of mine flew safety pilot for me during a formal instrument flying sortie, with NDB and radar controlled GCA letdowns. That night I flew my second sortie of the day, which included a quickie ground controlled approach. Tudor Thomas would be away and my role was three fold - take over as Acting OC FAF 1, No 4 Squadron relief pilot, and report for Operation Elbow air support for SAS Special Forces duties. OPERATION ELBOW: 1 JANUARY to 12 JUNE 1978 Throughout January and February 1978 the Special Branch had been monitoring ZIPRA movements close to the Botswana/Rhodesia border. SB Mike Howie established that a ZIPRA transit camp about 15 km south of Kazungula and some six kilometres across the border inside Botswana was being used by terrorists along the Bulawayo/Plumtree railway line; robberies, landmine incidents, disciplinary killings and attacks on isolated farmers. The Special Air Services ‘B’ Troop was based up at the game rangers’ houses on the banks of the Zambezi, a few kilometres from Victoria Falls. The SAS were monitoring ZIPRA movements, sending in a four-man reconnaissance team to select hot-pursuit ambush sites. The SAS was successful in ambushing a Botswana Defence Force/ZIPRA convoy, but this led to Botswana closing their Kazungula border with Rhodesia. By March 1978 OC ‘B’ Troop SAS Captain Colin Willis had set up his tactical headquarters at Deka forward camp, a few kilometres from the Zambian border. They planned to attack the ZIPRA DK 1 and DK 2 terrorist camps, and to mine the road between Kabanga Mission and Simani Mine in Zambia. The Zambian Army Brigade headquarters was established at the mission. ZIPRA was known to be using Simani as a staging post for their DK camp incursions into the Lupane region of Matabeleland. On 23rd March 1978 I was deployed to FAF 1 in Lynx R 3417 with my technician Sergeant Rautering. That night I took Senior Aircraftman Andrews up with me for a spot of night flying, in order to maintain my currency on type. One of the engines on Lynx R 3140 was surging and I took Sergeant Rautering up for a quick engine air test. On March 25th I flew Captain Colin Willis and Special Branch D Birch, providing top cover for the Special Air Service ‘B’ Troop's recovery by helicopter to their Deka base. Several chopper lifts were required to pick up a lot of equipment, which the Special Branch was anxious to get their hands on. One SAS call-sign could not be located and it was decided that I should carry out a search the next day. Contact was established during the night and I got airborne again at first light the next morning with Army Medic Staff Sergeant Wiltshire to locate the lost call-sign. I landed at Binga to drop off the Medic. 0n the 27th, I did convoy cover, landing at Cewali. Two days later, I was called to an ambush at Mananda Dam, for Telstar duties and I then routed to Woodvale for fuel, continued on to Brigade Headquarters at Kumalo, returning to Wankie after a decent three hours forty minute mission. On the last day of the month I carried out a reconnaissance sortie of all the Matetsi farm homesteads. I flew a night flying sortie with NDB letdown on 2nd April and ended this short detachment spell the next morning by returning to base with Sergeants Pete Billet and Rautering. But I would return a month later. My Mahogany Bomber ‘in-tray’ needed attention – and besides, it was that time of the year to commence preparations for Ministry of Defence submissions on routine Major/Minor works. My next detachment to FAF 1 lasted from 5th to 12th May 1978. Captain Fred Watts and his 1 Commando RLI had meanwhile also been deployed in support of Colin Willis and his SAS. I duly positioned Wankie in Lynx 3405, in order to take over my favourite, R 3048. The next morning I carried out a reconnaissance of Vic Falls airport - invariably to offer moral support for the South African tourist flights to the Victoria Falls. On 7th May I was tasked to carry out a Telstar mission for the SAS, flying between Deka on the Zambezi River and along the Zambian road towards Simani Mine. The SAS had successfully blown up Alfred Nkita Mangena, the ZIPRA army commander (the number 2 i/c to Joshua Nkomo) - about 5 km south of Kabanga Mission. Colin Willis had scrambled a couple of helicopters with a small stick, hoping to recover the 'big fish' body, but they were beaten to it - the body had already been taken away by the time the helicopters got there. On May 11th, I escorted a pair of 'Spiders' - helicopters, who hot-extracted one of Fred Watts’ RLI chaps on a casevac from the Operation Elbow area. The following day my relief arrived from Thornhill. Lynx R 3034 was now overdue its routine second line servicing and I needed to return the aircraft to base. I accordingly flew Sergeant Nobby Clark and SAC Brooker back to No 4 Squadron. I resumed my desk job, just in time to submit my Estimates of Expenditure to the Secretary for Defence – obviously through the Station Commander – as well catch some well earned rest and recuperation. My third on-the-trot deployment to FAF 1 lasted from 6th to 19th June 1978. I flew the courier Lynx to the FAF to relieve the 4 Squadron pilot for his return to base. I took over his Lynx R 3034. My detachment got off to a good start. My first mission on the 7th was a lengthy top cover sortie over the Kariangwe area. Then immediately thereafter I was dispatched to Binga to uplift a Field Reserve volunteer Mr Boyd, and a CMED official Mr Stuart, plus urgent documents which were needed back at Wankie. I then had a couple of days of inactivity. On 11th June 1978 my airtask was escorting, and providing top cover for the 'B' Troop SAS trans-border deployment by Spiders (code-word for helicopters). Trooping took two hours. It would appear that either the Zambians were aware of the activity, or that a punch-up had occurred. There was a call for a hot-extraction the next morning and I duly escorted the two helicopters back into Zambia. Operation Elbow had unfortunately claimed another SF victim and I sadly learned that Second Lieutenant Falzoi had been killed in action. On 13th June I was requested to carry out a search and rescue mission for a lost police patrol. I agreed to take Section Officer Weinel along with me, which was just as well because we were able to locate the patrol at Lusulu. The reconnaissance had taken slightly over an hour. Later in the day I also carried out a meaningful top cover mission for 'B' troop SAS. They asked me to land at Deka and I duly uplifted Majors Pat Mincher and Peter Matkovitch for FAF 1. That night I carried out NF continuation training and also squeezed in a non-directional beacon letdown in slightly over half an hour. The 14th was a day of rest. On 15th June 1978 there was a railway line explosion at Matetsi so I recce'd along the railway but found nothing. The perpetrators were long gone. Then later during the day it was back to provide top cover trooping for the SAS. The next day I was off to Wankie National Park airfield to uplift Squadron Leader Tudor Thomas for his return to the FAF to resume command. I had enjoyed standing in for him during his absence - it certainly made the days pass quickly, attending to all the matters that go into commanding a forward airfield. I had no sooner dropped Tudor off when I was off on a 'secret' mission with Special Branch (dispatching SAM-7s to Salisbury). My third sortie on the 16th was to drop Lieutenant Barthorpe and Ministry of Works official Hangartner at Wankie Main airfield, and I then continued to provide top cover for the Spiders who were re-supplying the SAS in Zambia. My fourth sortie of the day was top cover following a sighting of ZANLA terrorists at Dandanda. Some decent flying was flown on the 17th. The ground forces assaulted targets in the Kariangwe area and I remained airborne for over three hours providing top cover. In the afternoon I was tasked to resupply the FFD - Field Force Detachment at Wankie National. Then early the next day I was tasked to carry out a dawn and dusk top cover for the helicopters. My spell at Wankie was drawing to a close. I had enjoyed Acting as FAF Commander in Tudor's absence, conducted meaningful flying, and was ready to now enjoy my umpteenth honeymoon. I was probably approaching my limit to the good old Air Force saying “Absence makes the heart grow fonder”. And so it came to pass that I returned to Thornhill, Gwelo, with Lynx R 3034, and my technicians Sergeant Logan and SAC McKillop. OPERATION TURMOIL: 26 FEBRUARY – 6 to 10 MARCH 1978 Operation Turmoil was the airstrikes and attack on the Kavalamanja ZIPRA staging post (Mushika area, Zambia) by the Air Force Hunters and Canberras, together with various Army elements. Information on the staging post first came to light in August 1976 when Special Branch heard that ZIPRA occupied a camp with Zambian soldiers and Chinese instructors. The camp was situated sixteen kilometres west of Feira, in Zambia (at the point where the Zambian, Moçambique and Rhodesia borders meet, on the Zambezi River). It was also known by various other names such as Geneva, Kanyemba as well as Feira Base. Canberras were tasked to target photo-reconnaissance but the interpreters found nothing suspicious. Then at the end of June, early July 1977, an SAS recce team was deployed; they also found no positive evidence of Rhodesian dissidents. However, a radio intercept in February 1978 indicated that 150 ZAPU terrorists were experiencing food shortages, and that their intended infiltration into Rhodesia had accordingly been delayed A Territorial Force (TF) platoon established an OP and soon determined that there were definite signs of CT’s (communist terrorists). When the CT’s attempted to cross the Zambezi, the TFs sprang their ambush, which also alerted the main camp, which in turn duly retaliated with mortars and heavy machine guns. This action prompted a call for air support and a pair of Hunters was quickly on the scene to neutralise the enemy fire. Then on 1st March 1978 No 7 Squadron helicopters dropped off a two-man recce group in the mountainous country to the west of Kavalamanja, to locate the anti-aircraft position armed with 14,5 and 12,7 millimetre guns and spy on the local movements. It was established that a Zambian Army camp was situated about ten kilometres from the ZIPRA complex and an assault was immediately launched – with units drawn from the SAS, RLI and RAR. The attack took place on Sunday, 6th March 1978, at 10h00, with a Hunter strike followed by Canberras dropping Alpha bombs. Shortly behind the Canberras, Dakotas dropped paratroopers to the north-east of the target. In addition, an RLI Fire Force launched their assault from the west. Forty-two ZIPRA terrorists and five Zambian troops were killed, their large ammunition dump was destroyed and a number of vehicles demolished. Our casualties were one RLI trooper killed, six RLI and two Scouts wounded. The ground troops were all recovered back to base the next day, and a helicopter was dispatched on 10th March to uplift the ground reconnaissance team. (Permission to use the original map by JRT Wood in The War Diaries of André Dennison, is gratefully acknowledged) AIR STRIKE LOG – TURMOIL 6 MARCH 1978 - refer # 790 No Date Crew Target Aircraft Results 790 06/03/78 Turmoil Vic Wightman (four sorties) Tony Oakley JR Blythe-Wood (six sorties) Glen Pretorius Dakota Kavalamanja terr complex, near Feira / Kanyemba, Mushika area Zambia Hunter Hunter Hunter Canberra Dakota K-Car G-Cars Hunters destroyed 8 Zambian vehicles, killing 5 Zambian soldiers. 42 ZIPRA also killed. 2 Strela G to A missiles and 51 landmines recovered. Refer JRT Wood, pp196-198 OPERATION PANNIER – 27 FEBRUARY 1978 Operation Pannier entailed the SAS recce’s of ZIPRA terrorist camps in the Western Province of Zambia – such as Muchingwa, Forward Base Camp 1 & 2, Rama Farm, Katambora Camp Sinde / CH Plots, Lesumo and Pandamatenga. SAM SEVENS The significant recovery of the SAM-7’s warrants elaboration. On 16th June 1978 I flew Special Branch Superintendent Nicollys and Major Pat Mincher from Wankie to Victoria Falls airport. The purpose of our mission was to load two perfectly serviceable SAM-7 missiles into a twin-engined Cessna C 421 sent from Salisbury to collect these pristine condition heat seeking surface-to-air missiles which had been captured from ZIPRA terrorists. The ubiquitous missile is called Grail by NATO forces and Strela by the Russians. It weighs nine kilograms and is fired from a launcher held over the shoulder – the operator using a simple aperture sight. It is heat seeking and guided by sensors in its nose, firstly towards the light reflected from an aircraft and then to the infra red emissions from the hot metal of its engine exhausts. We marvelled at the gyroscope within its glass dome, which controlled the tail fins. The SAM-7 is not very unlike the American Hawkeye missile used so effectively in Vietnam. It was designed as a lightweight infantryman's air defence weapon for ease of carrying and firing in the field. The trigger mechanism had a two-stage movement. The first stage would activate the battery power source, and the sight would glow red until target acquisition was achieved. Then as soon as there was a successful lock-on, and the target came within range, the sophisticated sight would glow green. It was then up to the infantryman to pull the trigger beyond the second stage in order to initiate rocket launch. There was a ‘cold charge’ to initiate the launch before ignition proper, so that there wasn’t just a smouldering pair of ‘vellies’ left on the ground. The rocket then accelerated to well above the speed of sound on its way to the target. The SAM-7 can reach a maximum height of five thousand feet, while the range is about three thousand five hundred metres. We soon found that among other limitations, it needed to be aimed and fired inside a cone of about six degrees of the line of sight of the aircraft, if it was to have any chance of locking on to the target. However, many pilots developed a healthy respect for the weapon – especially after a number of aircraft was hit. The recovery of these deadly weapons certainly justified all the escorting of the SAA airliners that I had carried out in and around Victoria Falls airport. Tourists were still flocking to the Falls, but the Special Branch was careful to 'hide' the find from the civilian aviation authorities lest it adversely affected the lucrative tourist trade with its foreign capital injection into the Rhodesian economy. Unfortunately, the Viscount Hunyani disaster was destined to befall Air Rhodesia in September 1978. After safely loading the missiles onto the C 421, I returned my passengers to FAF 1. The SB impressed upon the pilot the need to treat his cargo - still in perfect compactors - with the utmost circumspection and to maintain secrecy as far as the mission was concerned. It was perhaps ironic that about nine months later (March 1979), Nkomo's ZIPRA shot down two Zambian Air Force aircraft by mistake. I might add: “That certainly is sweet justice. It was music to my ears”. OPERATION ABDUCTION: JUNE/JULY 1978 Operation Abduction was a Selous Scouts scheme to make contact with terrorist groups in the Beit Bridge area in June 1978, and also in the Fort Victoria area in July 1978. The June exercise set up a white Scout, Sergeant Wally Insch, as an apparent Department of Wildlife ranger. Wally acted as a ‘white capture’ by terrorists, intent on an abduction to Moçambique. The plan called for the Selous Scout pseudo group to march Wally towards the border, and relying on the bush telegraph getting to the ears of the real terrorists that a white had been captured. The ‘march’ started about ten kilometres west of the Bulawayo to Beit Bridge road, just south of Mazunga ranch, and then in an eastward route towards the Moçambique border. According to Special Branch, a large gook gang numbering about twenty was known to be operating in the Bubye area, and it was this gang that the pseudos were hoping to entice to take their “white capture” off their hands. When four real terrorists appeared, a Selous Scout suddenly fired his RPG-7 rocket launcher, struck one of the terrorists at point blank range – the rest scattered in all directions – upsetting the apple cart. After re-grouping, the pseudos crossed the Beit Bridge to Salisbury road and soon established contact with another terrorist detachment. The pseudos needed written permission from the local Sectoral commander to transit this sector. Whilst the two opposing sides were sussing each other out, a contact took place some five kilometres to their north-east, and the resultant gunfire caused such alarm and confusion that Wally Insch scooped up his weapon and shot two terrorists dead. This event compromised the objectives of the plan and thus put paid to any further local attempts to glean Special Branch intelligence for the Fire Force’s attention. Meanwhile, Flight Lieutenant Basil Moss was doing some sterling work for the Interim Transitional Government, operating in the Wedza area. Basil was tasked to control the Mangula-based former terrorists, who had turned in favour of the Muzorewa and Sithole faction. The Mangula gooks were deployed in the Wedza Tribal Trust Land, and the area was duly frozen – as per Selous Scouts normal modus operandi. This was thus another one of those Top Secret operations involving the Special Branch and Selous Scouts. On one Sunday, a PRAW pilot reported to Basil that he had seen about thirty ZANLA terrorists sprawled, apparently dead, by the roadside. The PRAW pilot landed at Wedza to uplift Basil, and he counted 41 corpses. It transpired that the Auxiliaries had made contact with real ZANLA gooks in the frozen area, were captured and then summarily executed. This led to a Fire Force deployment into the frozen area and 29 real gooks came short – being on the receiving end of the superior fire power that the Air Force provided from their K-Cars and G-Car helicopters, and Lynx close air support aircraft. Operation Abduction-2 was launched in the Fort Victoria area in July 1978. Sergeant Wally Insch was again set up as a white abductee from the Renco gold mine area. His mission was to make contact with a ZANLA commander, named Shelton, known to be operating in an area east of Fort Victoria that straddled the main road to Umtali. Shelton was a slippery and cunning fellow, but fancied himself as a competent medic. The Selous Scouts’ plan called for Wally to be in need of medical treatment, as an abductee being marched to Moçambique. But the plan went wrong when Wally’s pseudo group was led into a village where the locals started slowly feeding the ‘white man’ poisoned food. The locals demanded that the “Mulungu” be killed there and then – even before contact could be made with real gook Shelton. Wally’s pseudo terrorists were able to bluff their way to a small hill from where radio contact was made with the Repulse JOC at Fort Victoria for Fire Force support. The JOC was not interested in acceding to the Selous Scouts’ suggestion for a ‘mock’ Fire Force deployment, but did agree to have Wally and his call-sign extricated from their hilltop. When the terrorists’ mujibas witnessed Wally being airlifted by helicopter off the hill, the operation was compromised with the realisation that this had been the work of the Skuz’apo all along. OPERATION SPLINTER: I MAY 1978 Operation Splinter was opened up in May 1978 to control the border along Lake Kariba. The South African Recces also sent their marine special forces to operate alongside our own Special Air Service - and contributed significantly to the Moçambique offensives on and along the Cabora Bassa project. OPERATION DETONATE: 1978 Chief Mola was abducted from the Sengwa Basin and taken across Lake Kariba to Zambia. Operation Detonate was launched when the SF assembled at the Bumi Hills Safari Lodge to conduct the BSAP follow-up. Air Force and PRAW flew to the Bumi Hills airstrip, together with SAAF helicopter crews. Bailiff David Lemon wrote in Never Quite a Soldier that the RLI were also involved, and that the gang of 23 terrorists that had captured Ignatius Sithole (and whose body has never been found) were believed to have rowed across the Lake. Rowing across the Lake was very unusual, as powered craft was considered the only safe means of crossing such an expanse of water. A ROMAN (NELSON) TRAGEDY: 28 JULY 1978 Kevin Nelson's death and its aftermath are reminiscent of a classical Roman Tragedy. It will be recalled that I flew two sorties with Sergeant Kevin Nelson shortly after my hasty Lynx re-familiarisation a mere seven or eight months earlier. Kevin was my technician during our Operation Tangent deployment to FAF 1 in early November 1977. He also acted as my air observer during the Kazungula action when we accounted for one Zambian soldier killed. Kevin's younger brother, Rob, had been killed in action the year before on 18th May 1977. He was Roger Watt's technician when their Alouette III was shot down. Roger was lucky to survive the helicopter crash although he sustained burns during the flaming descent. Rob was the air-gunner manning the twin Brownings of the G-Car, and as he was in the rear of the chopper the fire was more intense. He leapt out about four hundred feet above the ground to escape the flames and was killed. His death was a tragic blow to the family, especially for Rob’s mother who had lost her 'baby'. Kevin Nelson was also killed in action. Like his younger brother, he was the air-gunner. Another similarity was aircraft type. The only difference was that Kevin was in a Z-Car - an Alouette piloted by South African Flight Lieutenant (Captain) Francois du Toit, whom I knew well. Both pilot and technician were killed in Moçambique. This double death was just too much for the devastated mother. She took her own life. Her grief in losing both of her only two children was just too great to bear. Mrs Nelson committed suicide shortly after the death of Kevin. It reminded me of a Roman tragedy worthy of comparison to classical Caesar, Othello or even Romeo and Juliet. As a tribute to the Nelsons, I saw fit to repeat Kevin’s last moments as witnessed by the other Alouette pilot who documented the story to Bill Sykes (for Pride of Eagles inclusion – by Beryl Salt). The verbatim report reads as follows: “Flight Lieutenant Francois du Toit and I were on hot extraction standby at Mount Darwin in support of Major Neil Kriel’s Selous Scouts troops. My technician was Corporal Chris Saint and Francois had Sergeant Kevin Nelson. Both Francois and I had been awarded the MFC earlier that day. I am not sure what Francois got his for, but mine came as a big surprise as it was for the sort of operation everyone on 7 Squadron was doing regularly. Pride was mixed with embarrassment. “Late in the day (28th July 1978), we were tasked for an uplift of someone else’s troops north-east of Chioco in Moçambique. Neil Kriel was not pleased to see the two helicopters disappear. It was a long way and with only four soldiers, so we took lots of fuel and planned a pick-up of two soldiers each near last light. Our fuel load would preclude lifting the normal four in one helicopter. It was not supposed to be a ‘hot extraction’. Little did I realise at that time what value the affect that the extra fuel would have some hours later. “We planned our route carefully using all the latest intelligence on known enemy areas to avoid. This required lots of turning points. Flight Lieutenant Chris Abrams was airborne in the Lynx and we established comms with the call-sign without any problems. Francois was leading and I was in a wide echelon starboard. Running in about two minutes out, our routine became a nightmare; there was a ferocious eruption of ground fire, mostly to our left. Within seconds I saw Francois’ G-Car (in fact South African Z-Car – author’s note) descend rapidly into the trees. No fireball and no call on the radio. Chris Saint was blasting away and I was calling urgently to Chris Abrams in the Lynx. It transpired that we had over-flown an unmarked camp of over 300 terrorists. Whilst our helicopter had come under intense ground-fire, we must have been nearer the edge of the camp than Francois. “With our own troops literally a few miles away, the obvious plan of action was to uplift two of them at a time and drop them as close as possible to the downed helicopter in an attempt to secure the area. Of course, at that time we had no idea how many we were up against but the almost constant firing was a clear indication that the opposition was huge. The light was not going to last but we had lots of fuel – still far too much for four troops. I called for two soldiers to prepare for uplift. Having heard all the firing and probably seen the tracers, they were understandably apprehensive as we prepared for the drop-off. I doubt that their fear was greater than mine was; for all of us, the anticipation was terrifying. Desperately hoping that the enemy would be just as frightened, I planned my approach from the position we had been when Francois and Kevin went down. It seemed logical to assume that the terrorists would not know how much opposition they had and were likely to be escaping to the east, away from the direction of most of the helicopter noise. By this time, Chris Abrams was giving us maximum support and I distinctly remember looking up and seeing his Lynx surrounded by ‘flak’. I guess they were popping off every RPG-7 and SAM they had. I seem to recall that Chris had his technician with him – doubtless he would be regretting his predicament and wishing he was back at base sipping a cold lager and listening to the action on the HF. “I don’t remember much about the next bit except that we managed to over-fly Francois’ helicopter at about 15 feet. It looked very flat – obviously a high rate of descent impact. The chance of survival seemed unlikely but we had to get the troops to confirm. The ground fire seemed to be continuous but I don’t recall taking many hits; maybe they were firing blind, or aiming at the Lynx. “We went back for the next two soldiers to get maximum support at the scene. Within a few minutes we were ready to make the second approach but, by then, the call-sign on the ground was screeching – pinned down by too much opposition, they felt they were being overwhelmed and could not advance to the crash site despite having been dropped about 50 yards away. Now we had a real problem on our hands – fading light, two troops needing to be extracted; two on board and way too much fuel to uplift within normal Alouette III limitations; plus we did not want to leave the downed crew. The troops on the ground were sounding more and more desperate. Chris Saint and I made a plan - we would lurk behind a ridge to the west and dump everything possible overboard. This would reduce our weight and allow maximum time for the situation to change. Maybe the troops would be able to get through. The thought of leaving our colleagues was horrendous and things were not looking too good. “I told the call-sign to stand by with a white phosphorous grenade. On our run in, Chris would make a series of attacks in the Lynx. I would call for the white phos, over-fly their position and land at the next available clearing. This called for two prayers - one for a landing area before the main enemy concentration and one for a healthy engine and gearbox for the overweight take-off. As we flew up and down the ridge in relative security there was time to ponder. Pondering was not good – my legs were on the verge of uncontrollable shakes; my mouth was bone dry and speaking had become less natural. I felt pretty sure we would not make it. It’s amazing how they seem so cool in the movies. “After about ten minutes, with fading light and the situation on the ground not improving, we had to accept the inevitable. My memories of the uplift are a blur – running in with Chris attacking in the Lynx; desperate shouting on the radio; Chris Saint firing our Brownings; the white phos; a frantic search for a clearing; landing amongst the trees and in very long grass. Then the eternal wait for the desperate troops to find us. They scrambled on board and we hauled ourselves out from amongst the trees; guns firing, gearbox whining; away to the west and temporary safety. I hardly dared look at the collective gauge. It’s a wonderful machine the Alouette. “The trip home in the dark with not enough fuel for our original destination; re-planning for an alternate safe haven and having to leave the proven safe inbound track. After a long and tense sortie, we landed at Mary Mount Mission where I found the senior army officer was Rudd, a prefect from school when I was a junior. I remember having to clean his shoes and carry his books. It was good to see him. Having completed our ‘Sitrep’ to base, Rudd provided some welcome brandy. I needed plenty. “The next day Chris and I were airborne before dawn. Our G-Car was fine – some holes but no serious damage. We were amazed to be tasked to Mount Darwin on ‘hot extraction’ duties for Major Kriel rather than on the rescue mission. Perhaps HQ thought our nerves would be shot. Maybe they were right. “Flight Lieutenant du Toit and Sergeant Kevin Nelson were both found dead from gunshot wounds. For the past 22 years I have found it more comfortable to believe that these were inflicted before impact.” I was at FAF 7 when I heard the news that Kevin had caught the chop. It was a sad day. I was doing a spell of ground duty, and had not flown for over a month. The next day, 29th July 1978, I commandeered Lynx R 3044 to carry out three circuits and landings at Buffalo Range. The sortie lasted a mere fifteen minutes, but it was sufficient for me to maintain my flying currency. I had previously flown on 19th June following my bush stint as Acting Officer Commanding FAF 1 (Wankie). After FAF 7, it was back to Thornhill to do what I was being paid to do – fly OCAW's Mahogany bomber. OPERATION METRIC: 30 July 1978 Operation Metric target details are sketchy – but because Varky Varkevisser in a Vampire together with Vic Wightman and John Blythe-Wood flying Hunters out of New Sarum, the air-strike target was very likely northern Moçambique (or Zambia). The Air Strike Log shows that air strikes were carried out on 30th July 1978, the same day that Tembue ll had been struck – see Operation Mascot below. OPERATION MASCOT: 10 JULY to 1 AUGUST 1978 Canberra aircraft on photographic reconnaissance had maintained a careful watch on the Tembue complex to the north of the Cabora Bassa Dam, ever since the raid by the Air Force, Special Air Service and Rhodesian Light Infantry, following their marked successes at Chimoio. In due course the Air Force photographic interpreters produced photographs showing a series of camps forming a new complex nearby the old one, which was named Tembue-2 (Maroro). The complex appeared to accommodate about five hundred and fifty terrorists. A Dakota of No 3 Squadron, flown by Squadron Leader Dave Thorne and co-piloted by Flight Lieutenant George Sole dropped Selous Scout Captain Chris “Schulie“ Schulenburg on the evening of 10th July 1978, from low level, and closer to the complex, than originally planned. The plan was to drop two 2-man sticks HALO (High altitude, low opening) and at a DZ (drop zone) west and north of the camp. Schulie convinced Officer Commanding No 3 Squadron Dave Thorne otherwise - he wanted to be dropped near the target. With George's exceptional navigational skills, the Dakota dropped the Scouts exactly where Schulie asked to be dropped and then waited with bated breath for Schulie's radio confirmation that they had landed safely. After a minute or so, the crews heard the whispered message “I think they've seen us but we're okay”. Group Captain Norman Walsh of Comops was not pleased that Schulie's request had been acceded to and had serious doubts about the outcome of this particular pre-operation assessment. Then on 19th July, the second Scout call-sign was compromised when they were shot at, and radioed for hot extraction. The operation was considered blown, but after two days Schulie reported that things had returned to normal. Although there were no properly organised camps…. mostly grass shelters with hides under trees and with campfires at night and smoke from early morning cooking fires. After some debate, Comops ordered an airstrike to be put in on the Sunday, 30th July, and that this would be followed by a ground assault immediately afterwards. I take up Dave Thorne's story as follows: - “No 3 Squadron's involvement was to drop 128 SAS and RLI paras around the base three minutes after the initial jet bombardment. This involved getting eight Dakotas, with 16 paras each, airborne early enough to be exactly five miles from the respective pre-selected DZ’s (drop zones) at the moment of the jet strike. In order to do this, a number of Volunteer Reserve (VR) pilots had to be called up. These comprised all sorts: a department store manager, farmers, a photographic shop owner (who breeds Gaboon Vipers for a hobby), civilian pilots with no military experience (apart from these call-ups) and ex-Royal Air Force pilots. Most of our VRs had very little experience of flying in formation with two aircraft, let alone eight. “The briefing had to be, therefore, much more detailed than normal. Included and stressed in the briefing was the fact that, from a timing point of view, we needed time in hand but, if we were too much ahead, we would have to do a 360-degree orbit in order to lose some time. If one stays abreast or beside the lead aircraft, any turn results in a requirement to change one's speed: being on the inside of the turn, requires a reduction of speed and being on the outside of a turn, requires an increase of speed. To cope with this, each aircraft simply has to move into a line-astern position, keeping its number within the formation, one behind the other. As every experienced Air Force pilot knows, the leader can do almost anything and following is a very simple and safe process, without the need for any great speed changes. I mentioned at the briefing that the orbit would probably be to the left. “H-hour (the time for the jet-strike) was early in the day because, with an operation of this size, the whole day is required to ensure that: the objective is achieved; the wounded are casevaced; helicopter fuel is parachuted (by 3 Squadron) to a suitable, pre-designated DZ; helicopters are refuelled; parachutes are collected; the mop-up is thorough; soldiers re-positioned and, eventually, helicoptered to a suitable airfield where No 3 Squadron would be waiting to fly them back to base; etc. The list is endless. So, to meet H-hour plus three minutes, the eight Dakotas, each loaded with its quota of paras, lumbered into the air in the pre-dawn darkness at 30 second intervals and settled into a loose V formation, the leader in front with 3, 5, and 7 out to my left and 2, 4, 6 and 8 out to my right. Naturally, I had chosen my trusted colleague, George Sole, as my co-pilot once again. “As dawn approached and ground features became discernible, George was able to pin-point our position (somewhat left of track) and relate it to the time that it would take us to reach H-hour plus three. It was immediately apparent that we were running, as planned, ahead of time and would need to lose about three minutes. An orbit was necessary. “Also as planned, radio silence was an essential factor to the element of surprise, so not a word could be uttered to warn my followers that the briefed orbit was about to take place. No worries: my briefing had been thorough and detailed. Because we were left of track and because a gentle turn to the left would take us less than two minutes to do the 360 degrees, an orbit to the right was preferable. An orbit right would take a bit longer than two minutes to get to the new heading that was now required. Again, no worries: as every pilot familiar with formation flying knows, to follow an orbit, one simply has to slide into a line astern position. “Imagine my horror when, after going about 30 degrees of turn, numbers six and eight (both VRs) appeared out to my right, abreast of me, trying desperately to slow down. They were getting dangerously close to the stall and had already selected flap to avoid this. I stopped turning and was forced to break radio silence: “What are you doing?” “We though you were going to orbit to the left.” Admittedly, at the briefing I had said the orbit would probably be to the left but this was no excuse for not getting into line astern. Instinctively, all the other pilots had slotted in behind me but numbers six and eight were now virtually ahead of the whole formation, having stayed on the inside of the turn so far. “I growled: 'Move into line astern' and, after a few more minutes, we were able to continue our turn, regain track, make up a bit of lost time and, eventually, thanks to George, drop our paras on the planned DZs at the designated time: H-hour + 3. The attack went in at 08h00 on Sunday, 30th July. Schulie, meanwhile, had spotted about fifty terrorists from the camp below him who were escaping away to the west, and he couldn't make comms with either the Air Force or the ground troops to counter the gooks taking the gap. “Operation Mascot turned out to be a bit of lemon in that only about 30 trainees were found in the camp and it was suspected by Comops that Schulie had indeed been spotted and then duped into believing that the camp was operating as normal.” Also, the compromise and hot extraction of the other Selous Scout call-sign did not help either. Meanwhile, the camp was being evacuated by the hardcore that left the 30 behind as bait. Lieutenant-Colonel Ron Reid-Daly subsequently claimed that the drop zones used were miles from the terrorist complex, and the terrorists easily made good their escape before the security forces had walked the long distance necessary to get there. The issue as to whether or not, the gooks had been there, when the attack was mounted, was hotly debated afterwards. The Air Force was puce with rage when they heard the Army was accusing them of ruining the attack, by dropping the paratroopers at the wrong place. Eventually, the Army and the Air Force found common ground and found sour grapes with the Selous Scouts. The amusing sequel to this episode is that a very funny poem was circulated among the VR that depicted the erstwhile leader, of the eight Dakotas, to be the culprit of the orbit debacle (right versus left), causing the tail-end-Charlie to change his number from eight to one. Dave did not find the poem funny at all. It is also noteworthy that in June 1978 Captain Chris Schulenburg’ became the first holder of the Grand Cross of Valour, Rhodesia's highest bravery award. During August 1978, Hansie Bezuidenhout was again involved in one of his many PATU call-outs. On or about 14th August, there was a contact with terrorists at Nunedon Mine in the Urungwe, which was well known to Hansie. His PATU stick was detailed to follow up on tracks, which they duly did. Having chosen an ideal spot, they set themselves up in ambush positions that only had a restricted killing ground – a large bush obstructed their view, just prior to the enemy being caught by complete surprise. Whilst lying in wait, the ambush’s presence was compromised when the machine gunner’s tripod slipped, and making enough noise to alert the gang as they approached the bush obstruction. Hansie had no option but to fire off the first shot – dropping one terrorist in his tracks. As soon as the first gunshot rang out, the terrorists bombshelled, scattering and merging with the surrounding bush with amazing speed. As a result of the compromise, and forced premature springing of the ambush, this action accounted only for the one terrorist shot by Hansie. As a matter of interest, Hansie confided to the writer of the high regard in which the ground forces held the Air Force. He recalled one particularly long ‘leap-frogging follow-up’, with helicopter support – and paid tribute to pilot Nick Meikle who attended to PATU’s every need. AIR STRIKE LOG – 28 AUGUST 1978 - refer # 719 No Date Aircrew Target Aircraft Weapons Result 719 28/08/77 Ted Lunt / Frank Robinson Geoff Oborne / Brian Booth Ray Bolton Lynx Terrorist camp located by PRAW 70km east of Bindura. (Or 120km west of Grand Reef?) K-Car Alouette 5713 G-Car Lynx 20mm cannon .303 Browning Frantan Geoff Osborne shot down. Alouette damaged by ground fire – Cat 4 Geoff Oborne recalls the following: Chopper crash “The Police Reserve Air Wing had one of their big camps where their many light aircraft were involved in looking for terrorist camps in the area east of Bindura. A mini Fire Force of one K-Car -Ted Lunt, two G-Cars - Ray Bolton and I and a Lynx were positioned at Bindura in support of the PRAW exercise. The army contingent was a few RAR sticks. “On a clear day we were all milling around the Police Station waiting for a call to search the areas where the PRAW pilots thought there might be a terr camp. At around noon Ray Bolton was tasked to do a resupply mission, leaving just the one other G-Car. As fate would have it a call came in that a camp had been spotted and it looked like there were terrs present. Ted briefed us - the plan of attack being SOP - standard operating procedure - with the K-Car pulling up, etc. etc. The camp was about 70km east of Bindura on the side of a small hill next to a river. Our two choppers got airborne and routed via the airfield to wait for the Lynx to join us. The balance of the RAR troops boarded their trucks and made off down the road to a point south of the gook camp. “The K-Car pulled up and I went into an orbit round the area. After about a minute Ted said that the K-Car had them visual and was opening fire. I could hear the 20mm cannon going wild in the background. On my second orbit Brian Booth my tech, said he had seen a gook running up the side of the hill in the open. We staggered over to the area (we were very heavy) and opened fire with our Brownings. The terr, realising he was caught in the open, just stood there and fired back at us. After what seemed an eternity and a lot of .303 rounds later he eventually dropped and lay face down in the grass. “By now Ted wanted my troops to be put on the ground so he directed me to an LZ in amongst the trees. I landed and deployed the RAR stick. I then went to the road to pick up another stick. I returned to the contact area where I could see the Lynx putting in a Frantan strike. As we came into the orbit again we were shocked to see that the terr we thought we had killed had gone, a tactic we were to take note of for future contacts. “Ted told me to drop my stick where the Frantan strike had gone in. I was quite happy as I thought if there were any terrorists around they would either be dead from the strike or wouldn’t feel like fighting any more. I came into the hover and as I was about three feet from touchdown I saw two terrs stand up behind the bushes about 30 metres away in my two o’clock position (on the opposite side to the Brownings). They brought up their AKs and opened fire at the chopper. I pulled the collective lever up to the stop and we leapt into the air again. I pushed full right pedal to bring the guns to bear and also to place my armoured seat between the terrs and me. The clatter of gunfire was really loud and as we got to treetop level in a 30-degree bank the engine suddenly stopped. I shouted over the radio “I’m crashing” – there was no time for a formal ‘Mayday’ distress call. I managed to level the chopper as we hit the ground. The blades hit a tree off to the left and burnt grass and dust covered the chopper. Then it all went quiet. I looked behind to see if Brian and the troopies had survived the crash but they were nowhere to be seen. I un-strapped, jumped out and turned to grab my rifle. It was missing. I ran in the opposite direction from where I thought the gooks were and lay down behind a tree some 50 metres away. Above me the K-Car was orbiting my downed helicopter. I was wearing a green flying suit so I prayed that Ted and his gunner wouldn’t mistake me for a terr. It also dawned on me that an immediate rescue was out of the question as the other G-Car was away. “I looked around for friendly forces but all I saw was a dead body dressed in blue lying on the other side of the stream. After five minutes or so I noticed the RAR stick, with Brian in the middle, advancing towards the downed chopper. I whistled and they came over. “I noticed that Brian had my AK 47 rifle which I promptly took back. He explained that he had grabbed the first weapon he could find as he fled. We all moved further away and into the riverbed where we used the banks as protection. I told Brian to wash his face in the river water as he was bleeding from a cut. When he had finished I decided to take a drink. Keeping an eye on the dead body across the river 20 metres away (in case it also suddenly came alive) I lowered my face to the cool water. As I was about to take a sip a huge explosion erupted next to my face. I flung myself back in fright only to see Brian killing himself with laughter. He had thrown a boulder into the water next to my face just to give me a scare. I nearly put a bullet into his leg! “The RAR stick leader informed us we were to do a sweep of the gook camp. Cursing Ray Bolton for being away so long with the rescue chopper, we began to move through the camp looking for more terrs, not something for which we had been trained! As Blue Jobs we had to walk behind the sweep line, probably because we would have been a liability had there been a scene. We hadn’t quite reached the camp area when we heard the sound of Ray’s chopper. “Three hours later we were in a PRAW aircraft on our way to New Sarum. There was nobody to meet us there so I went home and had a good sleep. “The next day I phoned the squadron and was told there was a spare chopper available and that I was needed back at the sharp end. So off I went back to the bush. “Oh! Well, that’s war”. FAF 1 - OPERATION TANGENT: 13 to 20 SEPTEMBER 1978 On 13th September 1978 I again traded in my Mahogany Bomber for a Lynx. The powers that be required my “re-tread” services for another bush deployment in order to relieve the critical shortage of experienced pilots. My brief was to position Beit Bridge for a short two day Special Forces operation by the Selous Scouts in the Diti Tribal Trust Land. I was then to proceed to Wankie in support of the Special Air Service who were engaged on Smersh external operations. I was told “Don't worry; you can always catch up with your bumph when you return to the office - Thornhill will still be here when you return. Brian Byars will keep an eye on any urgent matters.” Having reported to No 4 Squadron the courier Lynx was already fuelled up and waiting for me. I flew due south and landed at Beit Bridge where I handed my Lynx over to a JP (junior pilot) for him to return to base for his R&R. My Lynx technician Corporal Fubbs assured me that Lynx R 3094 was in perfect shape - in fact 100% serviceable. I carried out a quick pre-flight inspection, verified my tech’s findings, and hastened over to the Browns for their latest Sitrep (situation report). Captain Dale Collett briefed me to be at cockpit readiness because a punch up was brewing at Mtentengwe. I was pleased to renew my friendship with Dale. He was not one to “bugger around”. As a Second Lieutenant, Dale Collett was the first Rhodesian soldier to win the SCR Silver Cross of Rhodesia, the second highest award for gallantry in the Rhodesian Security Forces. I did not have long to wait (not that I was actually sitting in the cockpit). Before I knew what hit me, Dale yelled “Get your butt into the air - I'll brief you once we're airborne.” Dale directed me to the sighting in the Mtentengwe and requested that I put in an airstrike. I was only too glad to oblige, and selected rockets and front gun. I let loose with 1 x 37-mm Sneb for target marking purposes, followed by firing 100 x •303 from my twin Brownings. The airstrike was over in the blink of an eyelid. The bad news was we hadn't scored, but as a consolation we continued with our armed reconnaissance for a total of two hours flying, landing back at Beit Bridge. The rest of the first day was uneventful. After a good night’s rest, I was requested to conduct a top cover reconnaissance in the Diti TTL. This mission proved more fruitful, resulting in the killing of one ZANLA CT (Communist Terrorist). The Gooks had bomb-shelled and had gone to ground. The sortie lasted a mere eighty minutes. However, aircraft (and aircrews, I might add) were in short supply and pressure was on the Scouts to release me for urgent top cover for the SAS external into Zambia and Botswana. Later that afternoon, I packed my kit, uplifted my tech, Corporal Fubbs and flew to FAF 1. We arrived at Wankie on 14th September 1978. I found myself jumping from the frying pan into the fire. The SAS had deployed their recce sticks in the Katombora area but were experiencing radio communications problems. My first night-stop at FAF 1 was disturbed. I was roused from my sweet dreams and asked to make contact with the SAS call-signs. I rose from the dead, noted cloud cover about but nevertheless got airborne well before sunrise. It was a rather short sortie of one hour ten minutes duration and I was able to make good use of twenty minutes flying in cloud - the enemy may well have heard me, but couldn't see me. I was able to carry out my Telstar duties satisfactorily and landed before the sun made its appearance. It was too late to hit the sack again, so I joined the caterers and helped myself to several cups of coffee plus a double breakfast of bacon and egg with plenty of toast. On 15th September, I positioned my Lynx at Sprayview airstrip at Victoria Falls for standby duties. It was an uneventful day and I returned to FAF 1 by mid-afternoon. I had no sooner got back to Wankie than I was once again scrambled for SAS Telstar duties in Botswana and Katombora. The three-hour sortie meant a night landing, but this time I was in time for a late supper. I was in no mood to hit the pub and looked forward to an early night, because I knew that the morrow would entail helicopter deployment for the continuing external operations. My first sortie on the 16th was top cover for the Spiders (helicopter) trooping 'C' Squadron SAS. We were monitoring the Zambian Army radio transmissions, and no doubt their intelligence blokes were doing likewise to all our transmissions. Radio silence and strict radio discipline was the order of the day. Trooping was completed within two and a half-hours. I had just landed to refuel when the first call came in of a contact. Major Pat Mincher jumped in my Lynx with me - in order to communicate with his troops on the ground. The contact resulted in two gooks killed. Pat Mincher and I really 'clicked' well together. Our teamwork was good. He and I had now flown together four times during Operation Elbow. He had got to know the capabilities of the Lynx pretty well. We suffered one casualty of our own, which the helicopters were able to casevac to Sprayview. I was then tasked to uplift the casualty from Sprayview and fly the wounded man to Wankie where better medical facilities were available. The Colliery Hospital doctors were gaining valuable battle injury experience, and were often faced with amputations for landmine injuries. The 17th September was a quiet day. By late afternoon I decided on a reconnaissance along the Botswana border and took VR Flight Lieutenant Harley Boxall along for the ride. Harley was from the Bulawayo squadron, performing FAF Camp Commandant duties. These volunteer guys certainly did a great job on the front line, relieving GD Pilots for the jobs they did best - flying. Anyway, to break the boredom, I dropped four Bubs bombs and fired 50 rounds •303 in the vicinity of Beacon 10 - just to let the gooks know we were around should they wish to spoil for a fight. I am sure Harley enjoyed the ride. Harley was a quiet, modest, ex-WW II pilot with many a hairy tale to tell. On the 18th I was scrambled for a sighting from one of our O.P.s. These would be ground call-signs that would establish themselves on the top of 'gomos' (hilltops) overlooking suspected or known infiltration routes. Ten minutes after take-off I was recalled. It was a lemon. That was good about the SAS - they didn't waste air power unnecessarily. The sighting was some innocent locals that were mistaken for gooks. I didn't mind, it was the only flying I did that day. If it had been any unit other than the SAS, I would have muttered into my beer because some of the trigger-happy Browns, like the RLI, were accountable for more lemons that I would care to remember. A lemon leaves a sour after-taste for the action orientated pilots of the Air Force. We hit a small jackpot on 19th September. We accounted for two CT’s during a contact in the Wankie National Park. I was still airborne during my two-hour flight in the Lynx when I was asked to relay to the Special Branch chaps that the gook Sectoral Commander had been captured. The SB had their ways and means of making uncooperative terrorists squeal. My detachment was nearing its end and to account for such a big fish was like the cherry on the top of a very productive spell at the sharp end. Later in the day I provided top cover for the Spiders who were trooping the SAS. Lynx R 3094 had performed well on every day since my bush deployment. As fate would have it, the fifty five-minute top cover mission for the SAS and Alouette helicopters would in fact prove to be my last operational flying duty (as a retread pilot) for the remainder of the Rhodesian bush war. Operation Snoopy commenced whilst I was doing my bit at FAF 1. OPERATION SNOOPY: 19 to 24 SEPTEMBER 1978 Operation Snoopy was another major external operation mounted by the Air Force, Special Air Service and Rhodesian Light Infantry against 25 ZANLA camps within the Chimoio Circle (approximately 70km from the Rhodesian border). The present camps were to the north of the old Chimoio camp, which had been attacked by the Rhodesians the previous November. A newly qualified young Lynx pilot was carrying out a reconnaissance some 35 km to the south of where intelligence had estimated the presence of some 2,000 ZANLA. Troops were sent in to investigate and they came under fire from a different place. Reinforcements choppered in from the old abandoned camps also met with determined resistance - and pilots were reporting spotting tracks, trenches and small camps - and drawing heavy anti-aircraft fire. The new target was ten times bigger than originally thought, being some thirty kilometres by forty kilometres and consisting of dozens of small camps. The ground forces were having contact after contact, resulting in the pilots having extreme difficulty pinpointing their targets. The haze that hung over the targets worsened once the camps began burning. There was a cacophony of aircraft milling around - Canberras were running in for their bombing runs, Hunters were attacking in another direction, Lynxes were keeping an extra good lookout, and the helicopters were dodging in and out. During the heat of the battle, a Golf bomb killed SAS Trooper Steve Donnelly (Steve was one of the Three Musketeers named by Johan Bezuidenhout. He died in Small Bez Johan’s arms. The third Musketeer, Frans Nel, died when he was shot in the head during a paradrop. Small Bez had told the author that the Three Musketeers had made a name for themselves in the Elite SAS). Hunters destroyed three Russian armoured personnel carriers that arrived in the camp. The battle raged on for three days, where-after the Security Forces withdrew back to Rhodesia. On Monday September 25, The Herald headline read “Border Raids: 25 Camps hit. Mission success: FRELIMO forces among dead”. The headline photograph showed three dead FRELIMO soldiers outside their Russian-supplied armoured personnel carrier in a camp, which the terrorists called “Voetsek”. The Combined Operations communiqué stated that the tasks of the security forces were the destruction of the bases, the collection of intelligence, the destruction of logistics and the elimination of terrorists. All these missions were successfully completed. OPERATION GATLING: 19 OCTOBER 1978 Operation Gatling was preceded with a diversionary attack on ZANLA encampments along the Pungwe River in Moçambique before mounting the attack on Westlands Farm near Lusaka, Zambia at 08h30 on 19th October 1978. Westlands Farm, or Freedom Camp as it was called by its three thousand ZIPRA occupants, was situated just three miles north of the Zambian capital Lusaka. Being creatures of habit, the ZIPRA terrorists would be parading at 08h30 precisely, hence the timing of the attack by the strike force. The main strike force consisted of four Canberra B2 bombers of No 5 Squadron, called Green Section, and eight Hunter FGA 9s of No 1 Squadron, divided into four of Blue Section, two of Red Section and two of White Section. In addition, there were four Alouette III helicopter K-Cars, each fitted with twenty millimetre cannon, and the Command Dakota, a DC-3C of No 3 Squadron, call-sign Dolphin 3. The Command Dak was fitted with numerous items of electronic equipment such as HF, VHF, UHF, and teleprinters capable of decrypting messages to and from Milton Buildings, the Rhodesian Air Force and Defence Headquarters in Salisbury. On board were the Air Force Director of Operations, Group Captain Norman Walsh, Commander Comops General Peter Walls and the Commander of the Special Air Service, Major Brian Robinson. Briefings for the raid took place in the Parachute Training School hangar at New Sarum Air Force Base. The SAS Regiment and RLI Commandos also took part in this trans-border operation, and assembled two nights beforehand to be given their targets and battle orders. A huge scale model had been made, showing locations in minute detail. Everything was shown, including bunkers, trenches, and barrack blocks, lecture halls, messes, parade grounds and gun placements. There were three main targets in Zambia. ▫ Phase One of the operation would be the Air Force strike on the ZIPRA base at Westlands farm, just outside Lusaka. ▫ Phase Two was an attack by the entire SAS on the ZIPRA base at Mkushi 125-km north-east of Lusaka, simultaneous with the Westlands airstrike. ▫ Phase Three was the attack by the RLI on the CGT-2 (Communist Guerrilla Training Camp) ZIPRA base situated near the Great North Road, 15-km north of Lusaka. Operation Gatling – Chris Dixon and Green Leader fame Each pilot had been allocated a specific duty or target. The helicopter K-Cars of No 7 Squadron took off first from Forward Airfield Kariba, heading into Zambia to their refuelling station at a small airstrip half way to Lusaka - occupied by troops of the Rhodesian Army. They were the third wave of attack, after the Canberras and Hunters had carried out their first run attacks. As with most air operations, precise flying and exact timings were required by all the aircraft. The Canberras took off from New Sarum, to meet up with the Hunters. The Canberras were carrying a unique type of bomb unknown elsewhere in the world, code-named Alpha bombs. Each Canberra carried three hundred of this bright red, locally designed and manufactured lethal weapon. The Hunters took off from Fylde near Hartley, the base of the Air Force Regiment, and headed for Makuti on the Zambezi escarpment. They flew at twenty thousand feet before descending on Mana Pools (giving the impression of a routine border patrol along the Zambezi) to join up with the four Canberras. The Hunters were armed with another locally developed Golf bomb, 68mm Matra rockets, 100-gallon Frantan (napalm) bombs and their normal weapon load of 4 x 30mm Aden cannons. With the Canberras and Hunters having joined up, the formation flew at fifteen hundred feet above ground level to a point three hundred and twenty kilometres north-west into Zambia, then turned almost due west to Lusaka - on a course designed to avoid the Zambian Air Force base at Mumbwa. At a predetermined point, the four Hunters of Blue Section broke off, accelerated and climbed to fourteen thousand feet - and attacked the assembled parade, from the north, in steep dives, at twenty-second intervals. The Hunters were scheduled to perform four tasks. The four in Blue Section were the first into the attack, to stun the men on parade and mark the target for the low-level Canberras. The two in Red Section were tasked to orbit the main Zambian Air Force base at Mumbwa, near Lusaka, and to shoot down any military aircraft that took off to intercept the raiders. The remaining two, in White Section, were tasked to strike the encampment with frantan, after the K-Cars had begun the third wave of attack with their cannon. Finally, the four in Blue Section were to return and rake any remaining survivors with their Aden guns. The ZIPRA forces were taken completely by surprise as the combination of the percussion Golf bombs and thousand pounders hit them on the parade ground. Forty-five seconds later, before those ZIPRA forces left standing had time to recover their senses, the four Canberras arrived, and flying in line abreast, with the navigators/bomb-aimers’ lining up on the Hunter strikes. Then the familiar “Bomb doors open, Master on, left, steady, steady, right, steady, steady, bombs gone, bombs falling.” Then those magic words, which are music to any pilot's ears: “On Target.” The Hunters continued to discharge their deadly Frantans and 30-mm cannons. Then the four K-Car helicopter gunships, already in the area, joined the bun fight - their 20-mm cannon firing, with stoppages being expertly cleared by the highly trained and battle-experienced technicians / gunners. Then came Operation Gatling's famous and widely publicised Green Leader's radio transmission to Lusaka Control Tower, effectively exercising complete control over Zambian air space - and in the process making a complete mockery of Zambia's ability to react to Rhodesian pursuits. Chris Dixon – “Lusaka Tower, this is Green Leader” Lusaka Tower – “Green Leader – Lusaka Tower?” Chris Dixon – “Lusaka Tower, this is Green Leader. This is a message for the Station Commander at Mumbwa, from the Rhodesian Air Force. We are attacking the terrorist base at Westlands Farm at this time. This attack is against Rhodesian dissidents and not against Zambia - Rhodesia has no quarrel, repeat no quarrel with Zambia or her Security Forces. We therefore ask you not to interfere or oppose our attack. However, we are orbiting your airfield at this time, and are under orders to shoot down any Zambian Air Force aircraft, which does not comply with this request, and attempts to take-off. Did you copy all that?” Lusaka Tower - “Copied” Chris Dixon - “Roger. Thanks. Cheers.” John Edmond immortalised the airstrike in Zambia with his Ballad that reads as follows: Our wings are a fortress to our land. Today, a special mission’s planned. Dear land, today I’ll serve thee well. My motherland has gone through hell. No one in the world to heed her; tomorrow the world will know Green Leader. Fight anywhere and everywhere. Speed and Courage – and a prayer Seek and Strike – Strike from above Do it for the ones you love And as our sections now deploy – a minute to run. Seek and destroy Swift to Support – men and machines Aspire to achieve our dreams. This is what God would have willed Kill, or see the children killed My little country cries for peace No one would hear her case. At last – no one in the world to heed her, To-morrow the world will know Green Leader. No one in the world to heed her, tomorrow the world will know Green Leader. A little later the Zambian Air Controller requested permission from the Rhodesians for an international airline approaching from the north, to land. Permission was politely refused, with the instruction to make an orbit of the airfield, thereby delaying his landing. Retorted the Kenya Airways airline transport pilot, “Who is in control - You or the Rhodesians?” “Well I think the Rhodesians do at this time.” answered the Air Traffic Controller. After the airstrike, Norman Walsh came on the air with “Okay, you can carry on now” to the Controller, signing off the transmissions. The attack by the Rhodesian Air Force was over. The raid was by no means the most significant attack made by the RhodAF, but it was one of the most publicised and it represented some of the earlier tactics employed, and the self-developed specialised weaponry. The RLI attack could be mounted only after the Dakotas and Alouettes had finished delivering the SAS troops to Mkushi. They were flown to FAF 2 – Kariba, the night before, under cover of darkness, and went into battle by Dakota paradrop around midday. Rhodesian intelligence conservatively estimated that one thousand five hundred terrorists were killed. But as proven time and time again, with the turmoil and resultant confusion, plus the wounded that crawled away to die elsewhere, there is no absolutely reliable method of assessing the casualties caused to the ZIPRA forces. In addition to Operation Gatling, the Rhodesian Air Force took part in numerous combined operations during 1978. These included an attack in May on a barracks in the centre of the Moçambique town of Tete; the destruction of a ZIPRA base on the north side of Lake Kariba during July; an assault during September on New Chimoio (Chimoio Circle), in which the pilots of Canberras, Hunters and Lynxes operated almost blind through an intense heat haze; and an attack during December in which a single Hunter completely destroyed an ammunition dump in the north of Tete Province. However, one fact is certain. The Viscount “Hunyani” and the peoples of Rhodesia were avenged. OPERATION BOUNCER: 11 OCTOBER 1978 Operation Bouncer was planned to abduct ZANLA Commanders Rex Nhongo and Josiah Tongogara and although it failed in its mission it did demonstrate the excellent respect and co-operation between the Rhodesian Air Force and the Special Air Service. In addition, it further reinforced the technical ingenuity of our innovative and highly competent technical staff. Operation Bouncer was mounted in the heart of Funnyland, otherwise known as the Russian Front, between Beira and Lourenço Marques (later Maputo). Rhodesian Intelligence had established that the ZANLA Commanders would travel from Chimoio, crossing the Sabi River at Vila-Franca do Save en route to the renamed Maputo. The briefing was for SAS to paradrop, capture prisoners and recover by Alouette helicopters. The operation started going sour when the paradaks dropped the 12 SAS paratroopers into a populated “Freds” area - amongst the FRELIMO. Very soon OC FAF 7 was called out to dispatch four G-Cars to extract their compromised colleagues. However, the helicopters couldn't get there and back without refuelling and this necessitated additional fuel drops by Dakota. Then one of the two Lynxes providing top cover radioed FAF Commander Squadron Leader Peter Briscoe that one of the G-Cars couldn't get its rotors going again. Without batting an eyelid, a stick of four SAS remained behind to guard the chopper, while Pete arranged for a new clutch from Salisbury, duly brought down to Chiredzi by Canberra. The clutch was uplifted by two helicopters and accompanied by a Lynx for top cover, set off for the stranded chopper in Funnyland. On arrival, the crews had already removed the burnt out clutch and the replacement was then installed in double quick time - of the order of three-quarters of an hour. En route back, the weather deteriorated just as fast as dusk turned into night, forcing the three helicopters to night-stop in Fred territory, thus running the risk of the loss of nearly a complete Fire Force - something the Air Force could ill afford. Fortunately, all went well and a safe recovery was duly executed - which would not have been possible without the good co-operation which existed amongst AHQ, FAF, New Sarum, Canberras, Dakotas, Lynxes, Alouettes and last but not least, the trusty and dependable Special Air Service. So much for Operation Bouncer. OPERATION JACKET: 2 NOVEMBER 1978 Operation Jacket was an air raid on a ZIPRA terrorist camp on 2nd November 1978, in which ten to twenty men were killed, and fifty wounded. Zambia quickly asserted that it was a refugee camp but it soon became clear that it was a storage depot. As expected, the raid brought protests from all and sundry and even resulted in a violent reaction against whites living in Zambia. It also encouraged British weapons and monetary aid to rehabilitate the Benguela railway in Zambia / Angola. However, there was very little world condemnation when ZIPRA terrorists from Zambia blew up our railway 34 kilometres south of the Victoria Falls – as it happened – on the same day that the air raids were launched. OPERATION VODKA: DECEMBER 1978 Operation Vodka was an attack on the ZIPRA camp at Mboroma in Zambia on 22nd December 1978. The camp was in a remote area one hundred and forty kilometres north of the Zambezi River. A Dakota paradropped the Selous Scout reconnaissance team into the area on 28th November. They were able to carry out their preparations from aerial photographs taken by Canberra. Intelligence revealed the presence of about one hundred and twenty prisoners of war, who were guarded by some 40 to 60 ZIPRA, additionally armed with 14,5 Russian anti-aircraft guns. The attack commenced with a Hunter airstrike, followed by the Dakota paratroops. The ZIPRA resistance melted as the airstrike went in – no doubt due to the loss of some eighteen terrorists killed. About thirty prisoners were freed. Transport aircraft uplifted the assault force from a nearby airfield and the prisoners, together with the raiding party were uplifted to safety at a border base camp overlooking the Zambezi. Quite a few Islander light transport aircraft from No 3 Squadron were used to fly out captured enemy documents and equipment. Dakotas were used for the paratroopers, and recovery of ZIPRA prisoners released from the Mboroma Detention camp. Amongst those rescued was a former member of the police – BSAP – and a grandson of a Rhodesian Senator Chief. Both testified as to inhuman torture at the hands of the terrorists. The Sunday Mail summed up the operation in their Christmas Eve release thus: - “Operation Christmas Cracker on Friday was unlike other Rhodesian raids which hit the enemy supply and training camps. This one, to rescue abducted Rhodesians held in appalling conditions, was a truly humanitarian action in the best spirit of Christmas. To the rescuers Rhodesians say: ‘Well done, those men.’” OPERATION PYGMY: NOVEMBER to 22 DECEMBER 1978 Operation Pygmy was an airstrike by Canberras on the ZIPRA training base at Mulungushi, some one hundred kilometres north-east of Lusaka, on 22nd December 1978. The camp was located on the western shores of the Mulungushi Dam, and was used to school the enemy in conventional warfare. The timing of the Canberra airstrike coincided with the Hunter strike on the Mboroma camp (Operation Vodka). An intercept of the Zambian Army radio-net revealed that thirty-three terrorists were killed in the airstrike, and many others wounded. At the time the camp had apparently contained a total of some two hundred and seventy conventionally trained ZIPRA terrorists. OPERATION SHOVEL: 15 DECEMBER 1978 Operation Shovel was mounted as a result of information gleaned from a high-ranking terrorist. The Special Branch established from the secretary of the ZANLA High Command for the Tete Province (whose immediate superior was the top operational commander Josiah Tongogara) that: - A certain hangar at Tete airfield contained a large amount of explosives and arms. Resupply for Tete was by rail, from Beira to Moatize, the station nearest to Tete. Acting on this hot intelligence, Comops tasked No 5 Squadron to carry out the necessary photo surveillance. No 1 Squadron was tasked to carry out airstrikes on the explosives store (cache), and the Special Air Services, in conjunction with No 3 Squadron for support, to blow up the rail bridge (and hopefully, the re-supply train as well). A pair of Hunters was duly scrambled. The leader’s rockets fell short but the number two made no mistake, and his rockets scored a direct hit. It transpired that the massive arms dump (3,000 land mines) hoarded in the hangar blasted the hangar itself, plus the surrounding buildings off the face of the earth. So intense was the force of the explosion that the ammunition dump caused utter devastation over a wide radius. AIR STRIKE LOG - refer # 904 -– 28 AUGUST 1978 (Vic Wightman - three sorties) A Dakota, meanwhile, took off from FAF 5 Mtoko to paradrop the SAS in the vicinity of the Mecito Bridge. The 1,000 kilograms of TNT charges was dropped by Dakota, but was unfortunately off target – and the poor old SAS troopies had to slog through the bush to locate the charges. Once on site with the charges, the SAS discovered that the bridge was a lot higher than the photo interpreters had revealed. Anyway “a Boer maak ‘n plan”, and so the charges were laid, and the ground forces awaited the arrival of a train to complete their demolition objective. The demolition team did not have long to wait – on 15th December 1978 a steam train appeared – destined to end its journey at the bottom of the riverbed. The SAS group followed up, firing their RPDs and RPG-7s into the rear of the train and carriages. There was a token exchange of fire from the FRELIMO who were on board, but they quickly gave up the fight and fled into the Moçambican night. At five o’clock in the morning on 20th December 1978, Small Bez (Johan Bezuidenhout) heard a rumble in the distance and called to an OP on a nearby hill to verify his suspicions of approaching vehicles. This was duly confirmed – a large convoy of about 20 assorted trucks appeared through the early morning rain half an hour later. The ambush was sprung when the SAS fired an RPG-7 rocket at a troop carrier, while the mission commander remotely detonated a landmine under a Land Rover. The explosions brought the assorted trucks following the convoy to an abrupt halt – they U-turned and sped off in the direction they had come. The convoy sought shelter in an orchard, but was spotted by an eagle eyed Lynx pilot. By 08h30 the low cloud cover had cleared sufficiently for the Lynx pilot to talk a pair of Hunters onto the target. Airstrikes accounted for the remaining vehicles, the cherry on the top being a ZANLA petrol bowser. Comops could, once again, chalk up another very successful airstrike, convoy and bridge demolition operation.